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ABSTRACT
For more than a year the world has tried to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic. This
special issue of the Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research
(JICRCR) provides an expert evaluation of how different countries have responded to
this global threat. As the pandemic has fundamentally affected most of our lives in
a multitude of ways, lessons learned and insights gained from innovative and inclusive research have also advanced theory and practice in public health crisis and risk
communication.
KEYWORDS: COVID-19, JICRCR, crisis, risk, public health, international, WHO

In late February 2020 the COVID-19 emergency was beginning
to emerge into public view and risk and crisis communication
researchers and practitioners were preparing to attend the annual
International Crisis and Risk Communication Conference in
Orlando, Florida, hosted by the University of Central Florida’s
Nicholson School of Communication and Media. Then editor Brooke Fisher Liu (2019–2020) asked the incoming editor Audra Diers-Lawson (2020–2022) what she thought of
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pitching a special issue on COVID-19 to the journal’s editor-inchief, Timothy Sellnow. They believed it was an important special
issue for the journal as did Sellnow and the Nicholson School of
Communication and Media, the journal’s sponsor. Just a week or
two later in March and only a few days before the World Health
Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 pandemic during
the ICRCC conference, I was recruited as the guest editor for the
journal’s first special issue with a focus on the COVID-19 crisis
and risk communication. At the conference’s closing ceremony,
the special call for the COVID-19 special issue was officially
announced by the journal.
As Liu and Viens (2020) advocated in their reflection on the
research gaps in the field of risk and crisis communication, our
research needs to “expand its horizons with a more global perspective that better recognizes the work, theories, and differences
around the world” such as “crises that span boundaries, including
public health outbreaks’’ (p. 10). This special issue, focusing on
the COVID-19 pandemic, a global public health crisis defining
our time, responds to this call and directly contributes to closing
research gaps by being nimble and responsive to emerging global
risk, crisis, and emergency issues around the world (Liu & Iannacone, 2020).
Joint Effort of a Global Community of Crisis and Risk
Communication Scholars
Between then and early December of 2020, we received an enormous amount of interest in publishing the special issue. As one
of the first academic journals in our field to have a special call on
COVID-19, we were uniquely positioned to receive scholarly works
studying the risk and crisis communication aspects of COVID-19,
especially how it is being communicated and responded to at the
earlier stage of the pandemic embedded with high uncertainty,
ambiguity, and complexity. This angle, aligning with the journal’s
aim, understanding and tackling the challenge of COVID-19 at
the close intersection of crisis and risk communication (Seeger,
2018) with an emphasis on human and mediated communication
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issues (Liu & Iannacone, 2020), differentiates our special issue
from other COVID-19 special issues announced in other journals.
Between mid-December of 2020 to late March of 2021, a total
of 52 crisis and risk communication scholars worldwide were
committed to and completed their reviews for a large volume of
submissions to the special issue (see Appendix for a full list of special issue reviewers and institutions). Articles submitted, reviewed,
and included by the special issue are from both academic and
nonacademic institutions in diverse locations around the globe.
The enthusiasm demonstrated in a diverse group of manuscript
authors and the commitment dedicated by a diverse taskforce of
reviewers (from the journal’s editorial board or post-hoc reviewers) exemplified the journal’s growing community of excellence in
risk and crisis communication—providing an outlet for specialists
in the field and supporting new scholars from around the world
(Liu, 2019; Liu & Iannacone, 2020).
Advancing Public Health Crisis and Communication Theory
and Practice
The COVID-19 pandemic, with embedded risk and crisis issues
of deep penetration and wide-range impact, embodies the unique
challenges from public health crises (Nowak & Greenwell, 2021)
and contributed to the “sticky crisis” challenges, a new crisis concept first articulated by the University of Georgia’s Crisis
Communication Think Tank and later became the foundation for
a new book, Advancing Crisis Communication Effectiveness (edited
by Yan Jin, Bryan Reber, and Glen Nowak, 2021). A “sticky crisis”
is caused by industry-wide, complex, and challenging crisis issues
that are often intertwined and likely to reoccur in the future, near
or afar (Coombs et al., 2021; Reber et al., 2021), impacting organizations, industries, and publics alike. According to Reber and
colleagues (2021):
Sticky crises demand not only a near-instant response, but they may
require crisis communicators to see possibilities, understand the
potential breadth and scope of an emerging crisis, each which can
bring it additional complexities and communication demands. (p. 7)
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The COVID-19 pandemic is an embodiment of how a sticky
public health crisis exerts its uncertainty, complexity, and severity,
the management of which takes joint efforts from both scholars
and practitioners around the globe.
Last but not least, as Claeys and Opgenhaffen (2016) pointed
out, there is a “scholar-practitioner divide” (p. 233): crisis communicators (also risk communicators, we argue) often do not apply
scholarship to inform their crisis response because “theories are
too abstract and . . . are not readily applicable by professionals in
times of crisis” (p. 238). This sheds light on the journal’s dual mission of extending theory and practice in order to continue closing the divide and bridging the gap by supporting risk and crisis
communication scholarship with multidisciplinary contribution
that provides advice for both researchers and practitioners as its
primary purposes (Liu, 2019).
This special issue, including nine articles contributed by scholars and practitioners around the world and from both academic
and non-academic institutions, contributed to the journal’s mission of advancing risk and crisis communication scholarship
and practice (Diers-Lawson & Meißner, 2021; Liu, 2019; Liu &
Iannacone, 2020; Liu & Viens, 2020; Seeger, 2018), as well as the
scholar-practitioner shared vision of tackling the complex and
recurring challenges of a sticky crisis (Reber et al., 2021) such as
the COVID-19 pandemic, generates new and timely knowledge
that advances the practice of the entire profession, which will help
prepare organizations and public health authorities worldwide for
future public health threats.
The Special Issue: Innovative and Inclusive Research
on COVID-19
The special issue reflects the wide range and reach of crisis and risk
communication research of the journal (Seeger, 2018), emphasizing quality and impact as demonstrated in developing “new
approaches, theories, and insights about crisis and risk communication” (Liu, 2019, p. 9) and advancing crisis and risk communication, especially in public health domain, in terms of both depth
and breadth. Below are a preview and reflection on the nine articles
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included in the special issue. Together, the COVID-19 pandemic
crisis and risk communication issues are examined via qualitative
(e.g., textual analysis, interviews, and participant observation) and
quantitative approaches (e.g., survey and big-data content analysis) across a wide range of cultures and locations globally (i.e.,
Austria, Ghana, Greece, Norway, Singapore, Sweden, and the
United States). The diversity of authors, topics, and the inclusion
of multiple cultures from Africa, Asia, Europe, and North America
echo the journal’s call for disseminating scholarship for researchers and professionals worldwide (Liu, 2019).
Special Issue Articles

The first three articles set the foundation for reviewing the key
frameworks in crisis and risk communication research with
in-depth, qualitative analyses of messages conveyed via the voices
of government officials and health authorities in different parts of
the world (i.e., Ghana, Norway, and the United States), emphasizing the critical role of conveying, evoking, and sustaining trust in
government-led public communications at the onset of a health
crisis. Grounded in theory, Adu Gyamfi and Amankwah qualitatively analyze 14 speeches delivered by the Ghanaian President on
the COVID-19 pandemic in the country to demonstrate how the
speeches conveyed information about the pandemic to the public. They identified seven crisis and emergency risk messaging
best practices: explain what is known, explain what is not known,
explain how or why the event happened, promote action steps,
express empathy, express accountability, and express commitment. Voges and Binford turn their textual analysis lens to how
state governments in the United States’ communicated about the
COVID-19 pandemic as evidenced in governors’ first press release
responses across the country. Taking a social trust approach to
risk communication and using the external threat variables in the
contingency theory of strategic conflict management, they identified five thematic trends revealed in the first round of official state
governments’ COVID-19 public communication. Offerdal and
colleagues re-envision available means of persuasion by revisiting the classical rhetorical concept of ethos. Based on interviews
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and participant observation in public health institutions in
Norway, they examine how appeals to ethos may build trust in
health authorities’ public communication during the COVID-19
pandemic. They report the value of understanding the rhetorical
situation of a pandemic and the importance of active communication with transparency in building public trust in authorities’ risk
communication.
The next three articles focus on the perspective of the public on
how different stakeholders responded to organizational communication efforts about the COVID-19 pandemic, jointly emphasizing
the imperative of transparent communication in facilitating public
coping with an ongoing public health crisis. Via a survey among
employees, Stranzl and colleagues examine employees’ perception
of organizational transparency during the long-lasting situation
of the COVID-19 pandemic in Austria. They find that employees’
perception of their organization’s approach to transparency directly
influenced their job engagement and disengagement (the latter also
mediated through organizational trust and job-specific anxiety),
highlighting the importance of transparency during times of high
uncertainty and the urgent need to care for employees’ emotional
well-being during a crisis. In the context of COVID-19 risk communication in Singapore, by examining comments on five Singapore media outlets’ Facebook pages via big-data content analysis,
Chen and colleagues capture what topics are being discussed by
the public and the social-psychological processes that characterize Singaporean communities’ reactions to the pandemic and the
implemented precautionary measures. With evidence, they argue
that understanding individuals’ psychological concerns is a critical
first step toward formulating risk communications that may lead
to better health outcomes. Taking a slightly different turn, Johansson and colleagues explore a rather-puzzling question: Why don’t
Swedes wear face masks during the pandemic? And according to
the authors, the answer lies with the consequence of the public’s
high (blind) trust in the government (i.e., higher government trust
reduces the likelihood of wearing face masks), based on a large
Swedish survey fielded during the pandemic. They call for more
research on the trust-compliance relationship that might enhance
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or harm crisis management effectiveness in facilitating citizens’
crisis coping efforts.
Two in-depth case analyses, via textual and rhetorical analyses,
further illustrate not only how organizations communicate about
the COVID-19 to the public or stakeholders but also the impact of
contexts, locations, and organizational structures and characteristics on the community sense-making process throughout the cycle
of crisis management (especially at the pre-crisis planning stages
and/or the beginning stages of a crisis). First, Hayes and colleagues
explore how rural and urban Texas hospitals in the United States
communicated about the COVID-19 pandemic, based on a rhetorical analysis of press releases from these two hospital systems.
They find that the use of setting details is effective for the hospitals to ground their health-related information in their specific
communities, which made information accessible and attainable
but potentially reinforced place-based tensions and inequalities.
Aspriadis further provides a case study, via discourse analysis of
public briefings and speeches, on how the government officials
and public health authorities in Greece managed two waves of
COVID-19 in 2020. The author assesses the Greek government’s
crisis management efforts by identifying message framing and rhetorical strategies implemented crisis communication procedures
and diagnosing their (in)effectiveness in documented outcomes
during the two waves of the same public health crisis.
The special issue closes with an article that calls for the need
of managing and communicating about invisible hazards. In the
context of Norway, Skotnes and colleagues discuss differences
between invisible and visible hazards and make a strong case for
authorities to be vigilant about the possible differences in risk perception among authorities, the public, and various stakeholders.
They point out that invisible hazards (e.g., COVID-19) are often
uncertain, complex, and ambiguous risk problems. The findings
and implication serve as a strong call for future research and practice that involve citizens, creating trust, and being honest, highlighting trust and transparency keywords in managing complexity,
uncertainty, and ambiguity in risk and crisis communication.
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Review and Reflection

Although COVID-19 is a global pandemic, crisis and risk research
regarding this topic nevertheless has its geographic and thematic
bias (Diers-Lawson & Meißner, 2021). Different countries have different characteristics, contributing to the observed uniqueness of
how COVID-19 has been communicated about and responded in
different geographic locations and cultures (Dryhurst et al., 2020;
Petridou & Zahariadis, 2021; Schneider et al., 2021; Subert, 2020).
This observation is echoed, loud and clear, in studies included in
our special issue. Reflecting upon current COVID-19 crisis and
risk communication research, we identify three themes.
The first theme is the essential role of trust in pandemic communication and health crisis management. Trust has been one of
the focal concepts studied in risk research (Liu & Mehta, 2020).
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, there has been a surge in trustfocused studies in scholarly outlets such as Journal of Risk Research
and Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management (Balog-Way
& McComas, 2020; Lee & Li, 2021). Studies included in our special issue examine trust in relation to government communication
strategies (e.g., trust in government officials and health authorities
in Ghana, Norway, and the United States). Trust in media channels, especially as channels of delivering health risk information
(Appleby‐Arnold et al., 2019), has become a critical subject of
COVID-19 risk research (Schneider et al., 2021). Recent inquiries about the controversial role of new media (e.g., social media),
whether it increases or decreases publics’ trust in crisis and risk
information (Appleby‐Arnold et al., 2019; Nutbeam, 2020), further highlight the urgent need for more in-depth understanding of
publics’ trust in different sources and media channels, which vary
by country and differ in specific contexts of COVID-19 pandemic
communication (Nutbeam, 2020).
The second theme is the urgent need of understanding and
tackling misinformation challenges. Effective communication in
a pandemic takes an interactive process of information exchanges
between individuals, groups, institutions, and even governments.
Information disorders, such as the unprecedented surge of misinformation about COVID-19, disrupt exchanges of accurate
information and threaten public health and safety. Although
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misinformation has been studied by risk communication scholars
(Krause et al., 2020) in a relatively substantial range of international perspective (Hansson et al., 2021; Krause et al., 2020; Yoo &
Choi, 2019), more research is needed to study different forms of
misinformation (with varying shades of facticity) and explore how
increased public trust in news media and government authorities
might motivate individuals to digest COVID-19 information and
act upon recommendations from health authorities (Hansson et
al., 2021). As heralded by one of our special issue articles, the rise
of COVID-19 misinformation embodies the danger of invisible
hazards, the understanding of which, including identifying and
analyzing the complex risk characteristics that confound the process of crisis and risk communication, is to be furthered.
The third theme is the increasing diversity of research methods and approaches to crisis and risk communication. Articles in
our special issue have exhibited a balance of qualitative approach
(e.g., textual analysis, interviews, and participant observation) and
quantitative approach (e.g., survey and big-data analysis), which,
together, help weave a rich tapestry depicting the interaction of different factors driving COVID-19 communication and interpreting
these complex phenomena with culturally grounded insights. By
so doing, our special issue directly addresses the need of understanding and addressing “wicked” or persistent problems affecting
people globally (Diers-Lawson & Meißner, 2021) by emphasizing
international perspectives and methodological diversity in closing
knowledge gaps about COVID-19 pandemic communication.
Looking Ahead
The field of crisis and risk communication research, in light of
the sticky crisis challenges and the ongoing efforts of bridging the
academic-industry gap and the cultural and geographic divides, is
at an exciting new era of going both deeper and broader in terms
of research depth and impact spread. However, as a global community of scholars that advance theories and research-based insights
that provide advice and values to practice, we need to support the
growth and address blind spots (Diers-Lawson & Meißner, 2021).
Directly echoing the call for more research better reflecting the global environment and diverse crisis and risk contexts
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(Diers-Lawson & Meißner, 2021), this special issue, using the
COVID-19 pandemic as a focal point (mandating cross-cultural
and multi-perspective approaches), exhibits innovative and inclusive scholarship that advances crisis and risk communication theory and practice, contributing to tackling highly sticky crisis issues
with their recurrent and severe nature (Coombs et al., 2021; Reber
et al., 2021).
To close, as Liu and Iannacone (2020) mentioned, “while the
world’s attention remains on the COVID-19 pandemic, we must
rise to the challenge of disseminating research that can support
responses to this crisis and the ones that we will face in the future”
(p. 140). It is an honor to be the special issue editor, working with
the entire editorial team and our community of scholars and practitioners to learn from the past, reflect on the present, and inspire
what is to come near and afar.
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The COVID-19 pandemic is causing incessant disruption to the social and economic
lives of societies. Public health and crisis communicators have recommended some
best practices in crisis and emergency risk messaging for effective health messages
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The global coronavirus disease (COVID-19) continues to have a
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confirmed cases and 2 million deaths have been reported globally,
and new cases and deaths are reported each day (WHO, 2021).
Thus, to contain the spread of COVID-19, countries have put in
place stringent public health and social measures such as limitations on domestic and international travels, stay-at-home orders,
and closing down of schools, shops, and religious centers (WHO,
2020). This global pandemic has the characteristics of both risk and
crisis. As a risk, the COVID-19 pandemic threatens things people
value such as social and religious gatherings including economic
activities (Fischhoff & Kadvany, 2011) and also brings uncertainties about “questions over the incubation period, infectivity before
symptoms, seasonal dimensions, the specificity of the disease for
certain population groups, re-infection rates, and perhaps most
importantly, the mortality rate” (Balog-Way & McComas, 2020,
p. 839). Also, as a crisis, it is unanticipated and widespread, threatens priority goals, and requires rapid response to attenuate harm
(T. L. Sellnow & Seeger, 2013).
Communication, particularly public health communication, plays an important role in protecting public health during
pandemics (B. Reynolds & Seeger, 2005), and such “communications must successfully instruct, inform, and motivate appropriate self-protective behaviors; update risk information; build
trust in officials; and dispel rumors” (Vaughan & Tinker, 2009,
p. 324). Due to the important role public health communication
plays during pandemics, governments of countries affected by the
COVID-19 pandemic have been providing information through
public addresses to their citizens about what to do and measures
undertaken to contain the spread of the virus. For instance, when
the WHO officially declared COVID-19 a global pandemic in
March, the president of Ghana, Nana Akufo Addo, immediately
addressed the nation about measures undertaken by the government even though then the country was yet to record a COVID-19
case. According to crisis communicators, this timely information
from the president served to prepare and ready the public for the
COVID-19 pandemic occurrence in the country (Coombs, 2009;
T. L. Sellnow, 2015). T. L. Sellnow (2015) articulates that providing
information to the public (i.e., stakeholders) during the pre-crisis phase can potentially diminish the harm caused by the crisis.
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Between March 2020 and January 2021, the president has delivered 23 public addresses on the pandemic, and the country has
recorded over 68,559 cases and 433 deaths (WHO, 2021).
Communication scholars have developed risk and crisis communication theories and models that “outline factors necessary for
successful communication at different phases of crisis or emergency
response” (Parmer et al., 2016, p. 1215). While risk and crisis communication were originally distinct subfields, they have evolved to
be more interactive, culminating into an integrative model called
the crisis and emergency risk communication (CERC) (Palenchar, 2009; B. Reynolds, 2002; B. Reynolds & Quinn, 2008; Veil
et al., 2008). The CERC model has been applied in public health
contexts such as the H1N1 influenza pandemic (B. Reynolds &
Quinn, 2008; Seeger et al., 2009), Hurricane Katrina (Vanderford et al., 2007), and Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico (Andrade
et al., 2020). Previous studies have recommended best practices
for developing and disseminating messages during crises or disasters (Parmer et al., 2016; D. D. Sellnow et al., 2019; T. Sellnow &
Sellnow, 2010). For example, D. D. Sellnow and colleagues (2017)
empirically tested the IDEA (internalization, distribution, explanation, action) model in the domain of food contamination recalls
and found that the IDEA model messages were more effective
than control messages in motivating participants to engage in selfprotective behaviors. However, the IDEA model does not include
the elements of accountability and commitment which are considered important components of crisis and risk messages (CDC, 2014;
B. J. Reynolds, 2011). Parmer and colleagues (2016) have extended
the CERC model, particularly the content dimension, to develop
seven best practices of crisis and emergency risk messages. This
modified version of the CERC model captures accountability and
commitment components, making it more comprehensive than
the IDEA model as a crisis and risk message design framework.
Thus, the present study utilized Parmer et al.’s version of the CERC
model as its framework. Parmer et al. used these best practices
to examine media coverage of foodborne epidemics and natural
disasters and found that six of the seven best practices appeared in
less than 25% of stories. Their findings further revealed that information communicated to the public about the foodborne illness
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outbreak was different from those of natural disaster events. Specifically, foodborne illness outbreak stories exhibited more best
practices of crisis and emergency risk messages than natural disaster stories. However, their study has several limitations of which
the current study seeks to remedy.
First, their study focused on media content which might be
different from the content of presidential public addresses because
media content is primarily influenced by journalistic values such
as prominence, proximity, currency, timeliness, conflict, human
interest, and bizarreness (Boyd, 1994). These journalistic values
influence how media cover crises and emergencies. Thus, this
study seeks to utilize these seven best practices to investigate
the president’s public addresses on the COVID-19 pandemic in
Ghana. More precisely, it is unclear whether these public addresses
follow the best practices that are recommended to make messages
most effective for protecting public health during an emergency
or crisis. Second, their study focused on story length and the total
number of best practices per story but did not examine qualitatively how these best practices were used in news stories. Thus,
the present study adds to the literature on the crisis and emergency risk messaging best practices by employing a qualitative
approach (i.e., thematic analysis) to examine how these seven best
practices are used in the public addresses to convey information
about the pandemic to the public. Lastly, their study focused on
foodborne illness outbreak and natural disaster contexts which are
different from the COVID-19 pandemic as their findings showed
differences between foodborne illness outbreak stories and natural disaster stories (i.e., foodborne illness stories had more best
practices than natural disaster stories). The purpose of this study is
to provide practical guidelines for public health and crisis communicators on how to develop and disseminate effective public health
messages through presidential public addresses to inform the public about what to do to protect themselves during pandemics. We
first review existing literature focusing on the crisis and risk communication models. We then describe the research questions and
present a thematic content analysis study.
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The Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) Model
After the events of 9/11 and the anthrax crises, the CDC recognized that a more integrative approach to risk, crisis, and
emergency response communication was needed “in an era of
bioterrorism as well as other emerging global threats to public
health” (B. Reynolds & Seeger, 2005, p. 49). Hence, the crisis and
emergency risk communication (CERC) model was developed.
This model, which is practice-oriented, has both process and
content dimensions (Parmer et al., 2016). Whereas the process
dimension evaluates the crisis or emergency and designs response
to events unfolding at five different phases of the crisis: pre-crisis,
initial event, maintenance, resolution, and evaluation (CDC, 2014;
Quinn, 2008; T. L. Sellnow & Seeger, 2013), the content dimension
conveys “information to the public at large and the affected parties” (Parmer et al., 2016, p. 1215). The current study focuses on
the content dimension.
Seeger (2006) argues, “Best practices are useful for packaging
learned principles in a way that facilitates their communication
both within and between organizations and, ultimately, their adoption” (p. 233). Thus, Seeger (2006) has recommended ten best practices for effective crisis communication: (1) process approaches
and policy development; (2) pre-event planning; (3) partnership
with the public; (4) listen to the public’s concerns and understand
the audience; (5) honesty, candor, and openness; (6) collaborate
and coordinate with credible sources; (7) meet the needs of the
media and remain accessible; (8) communicate with compassion,
concern, and empathy; (9) accept uncertainty and ambiguity; and
(10) messages of self-efficacy. Seeger (2006) argues, “Messages of
self-efficacy are most effective when they have specific characteristics” (p. 242). Some of these message characteristics include specific harm-reducing actions, what can be done to help others, and
a range of activities. These messages of self-efficacy should contain
clear and meaningful actions and be consistent as well (Seeger,
2006). However, the messages of self-efficacy best practice have
some limitations. They do not express empathy, care, and compassion for people affected by the crisis or the disaster. Also, they
do not express commitment and accountability. All these components are crucial for designing effective crisis and risk messages.
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The Internalization, Distribution, Explanation,
and Action (IDEA) Model
Crisis communicators strongly recommend the dissemination of
instructional messages to the public during crises or emergencies (Coombs, 2009; T. L. Sellnow, 2015). According to Coombs,
instructional information should seek to tell the target audience what they need to do to protect themselves from the crisis.
Specifically, scholars like Mileti, Fitzpatrick, and Sorensen articulate that such messages must meet two basic criteria (T. L. Sellnow,
2015). First, the message must be accessible to the public. Second,
the message must account for limitations in literacy and numeracy among the target population, so the content of the message is
easily understood by all. In this regard, T. L. Sellnow and Sellnow
(2013) have developed the IDEA model for designing effective
instructional risk and crisis messages. The IDEA model, which is
grounded in experiential learning, has four aspects: internalization, distribution, explanation, and action. The internalization,
explanation, and action aspects focus on message content, and
the distribution aspect focuses on channels through which messages are sent. Internalization messages express care, compassion,
and the impact of the crisis. Explanation messages address what is
happening and why, and what is being done in response. Finally,
action messages recommend specific action steps to take or not
take to protect oneself and/or loved ones. Previous studies have
empirically tested the IDEA model in the domain of food contamination (Escherichia coli) outbreak in ground beef and blended
meat (D. D. Sellnow et al., 2015; D. D. Sellnow et al., 2017; D. D.
Sellnow et al., 2019). The findings consistently show that the IDEA
model is an effective instructional risk and crisis message design
framework.
However, the IDEA model lacks breadth as it overlooks the
elements of accountability and commitment which are crucial for
designing crisis and risk messages. Extending the CERC model,
particularly its content dimension, Parmer et al. (2016) have developed seven best practices for designing crisis and emergency risks
messages. These practices are:
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Explain what is known at the time about the events’ impact on human health; explain what is not known about the threat to human
health; explain how or why the event happened; promote action steps
the reader or viewer can take to reduce the personal threat; express
empathy about the threat to human health; express accountability;
and express commitment. (Parmer et al., 2016, p. 1216)

Parmer et al.’s (2016) seven best practices are the most comprehensive; therefore, their modified version of the CERC model provided the framework for the present study. The following research
questions guided this study:
RQ1: What crisis and emergency risk messaging best practices are
demonstrated in the public addresses of the Ghanaian president on
the COVID-19 pandemic?
RQ2: How are the crisis and emergency risk messaging best practices used in the public addresses of the Ghanaian president to convey
information about the COVID-19 pandemic to the public?

Method
The study used a basic qualitative research approach to analyze
the content of public addresses or speeches of the Ghanaian president about the COVID-19 pandemic in Ghana. As the researchers were interested in understanding how the president’s speeches
constructed and conveyed meanings about the pandemic, this
research approach was most appropriate to “uncover and interpret
these meanings” (Merriam & Tisdell, 2016, p. 25). The president’s
public addresses were chosen as this study’s data for three reasons.
First, these public addresses served as direct sources of information
about updates on the pandemic and measures taken to control the
spread of the virus for both the media and the general public in the
country. The implication was that these speeches were influencing
the media agenda on COVID-19 related issues as well as shaping the general public’s perception of the pandemic in the country.
Second, these speeches were easily accessible as public documents
for analysis. Third, studies focusing on crisis and emergency risk
messaging are mostly conducted among populations in developed
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countries with little or no studies on developing countries like
Ghana. According to Henrich et al. (2010), most behavioral science studies have heavily relied on samples from Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic (WEIRD) populations;
and this heavy reliance “may cause researchers to miss important
dimensions of variations, and devote undue attention to behavioral tendencies that are unusual in a global context” (p. 80). Thus,
the unit of analysis for this study was the public address of the
Ghanaian president about the COVID-19 pandemic in Ghana.
Sampling and Data Analysis
The president has delivered a total number of 23 speeches about
the pandemic between March 2020 and January 2021; that is a
period of 11 months. However, this study selected 14 speeches
that were consecutively delivered between March 11 and July 26 as
its sample because the number of the COVID-19 cases increased
significantly in the country between those 5-month periods. These
14 speeches were 60 single-spaced pages of text—a total of 27,732
words. Before the data analysis, the first and second authors met
to discuss the data analysis method and procedures that would be
most effective for answering this study’s research questions. Thus,
Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six steps for conducting thematic analysis were utilized. This thematic analysis enabled the researchers
to identify, analyze, and report themes within the data (Braun
& Clarke, 2006). The authors independently analyzed the data.
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), the use of different investigators (referred to as the technique of triangulation) during data
analysis in qualitative research boosts “the probability [those]
findings” (p. 305) and enhances the credibility of interpretations.
To make sure that the study’s research questions were adequately
answered, the seven crisis and emergency risk messaging best
practices developed by Parmer et al. (2016) guided the analysis.
These seven practices included “explain what is known,” “explain
what is not known,” “explain how or why the event happened,”
“promote action steps,” “express empathy,” “express accountability,” and “express commitment.”
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First, all the 14 speeches were retrieved in Word documents,
and each researcher read and reread these speeches to familiarize themselves with the data. During this immersion stage, notes
were taken to produce a list of ideas. Second, this list of ideas was
used to generate initial codes from the data. The data was coded
around the crisis and emergency risk messaging best practices.
Coding was manually done by using highlighters to “indicate
potential patterns” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 89). A list of different codes was produced. Third, different codes were sorted into
potential themes. For example, codes sharing similar meanings
were grouped and were given a common name or term to differentiate one group of codes from another group of codes. At the
fourth stage, the researchers met to discuss the initial themes they
had each identified. The researchers reviewed these initially identified themes together to ensure that each theme reflected the crisis and emergency risk messaging best practices. They settled on
12 themes and finally merged them into three overarching themes:
health, sociocultural, and economic dimensions. Lastly, some rich,
thick excerpts from the data were included in the write-up of the
report to boost the credibility of this study’s findings (Miles &
Huberman, 1994).

Results
The results showed that all the seven best practices of crisis and
emergency risk messaging recommended by Parmer and others (2016) were present in all the 14 presidential addresses. See
Table 1 for which types of addresses each best practice appeared
in. The “explain what is known” and “promote action steps” best
practices were demonstrated in all the 14 speeches. Accountability
best practice appeared in 13 of the 14 speeches. The “express empathy” and “express commitment” best practices appeared in 11 of
the 14 speeches delivered by the Ghanaian president. Finally, the
“explain how or why the pandemic happened” and “explain what
is not known” best practices appeared in 2 of the 14 speeches. The
results also revealed that at least three best practices were present in every speech that the Ghanaian president delivered on the
COVID-19 pandemic.
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TABLE 1 Types of Addresses Each Best Practice Appeared In
Types of
Address

Best Practices

Update No. 1

Explain what is known; Promote action steps; Express
accountability

Update No. 2

Explain what is known; Promote action steps; Express
empathy; Express accountability; Express commitment

Update No. 3

Explain what is known; Promote action steps; Express
empathy; Express accountability; Express commitment

Update No. 4

Explain what is known; Promote action steps; Express
empathy; Express accountability; Express commitment

Update No. 5

Explain what is known; Promote action steps; Express
empathy; Express accountability

Update No. 6

Explain what is known; Promote action steps; Express
empathy; Express accountability; Express commitment

Update No. 7

Explain what is known; Explain what is not known;
Explain how or why; Promote action steps; Express
empathy; Express accountability; Express commitment

Update No. 8

Explain what is known; Explain how or why; Promote
action steps; Express accountability

Update No. 9

Explain what is known; Promote action steps; Express
empathy; Express commitment

Update No. 10

Explain what is known; Promote action steps; Express
empathy; Express accountability; Express commitment

Update No. 11

Explain what is known; Promote action steps; Express
empathy; Express accountability; Express commitment

Update No. 12

Explain what is known; Promote action steps; Express
empathy; Express accountability; Express commitment

Update No. 13

Explain what is known; Promote action steps; Express
accountability: Express commitment

Update No. 14

Explain what is known; Explain what is not known;
Promote action steps; Express empathy; Express
accountability; Express commitment
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The thematic analysis of the 14 speeches produced 12 concepts
aligned with the seven action steps in the CERC model. These concepts were merged into three main themes: health, sociocultural,
and economic dimensions.
Health Dimension
Three subthemes emerged to promote action steps on health that
the reader or viewer could take to reduce their threat: personal
hygiene, mask-wearing, and healthy lifestyle. In terms of what was
known at the time about the pandemic’s impact on human health,
two subthemes emerged: prevalence and severity of the virus. One
subtheme emerged to explain how or why the pandemic happened:
the importation of the virus.
Personal hygiene. This subtheme reflected actions that individuals, groups, and organizations could take to reduce personal and
corporate threats. These speeches recommended personal and
regular washing of hands with soap under running water, using
alcohol-based sanitizers after using public facilities, and keeping
reusable face masks clean, while promptly disposing of disposable
ones after use. Groups providing public services such as public
transport owners were also required to observe enhanced hygiene
protocols by providing the required amenities.
Mask-wearing. This consistently promoted actions that individuals could take to protect themselves from the virus by wearing
their face masks whenever they went out even as the cases of infections surged and the government grappled with space to quarantine infected persons; “all Ghanaians must remember that the
wearing of masks is now mandatory. Leaving our homes without a
face mask or face covering on is an offense . . . the frontline is your
front door.”
Healthy lifestyle. The addresses also promoted a health strand
that involved eating a balanced diet and having regular physical
activities. The public was advised to eat locally produced foods
such as millet, kontomire (cocoyam leaves), millet, cashew nuts,
crabs, plantain, okra, brown rice, and mushroom which contained
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Vitamin A, B6, C, D, and E, to boost their immune system. The
speeches also advised the public to engage in regular exercises
because “it is crucial that we improve our fitness levels and adopt
healthy eating practices that incorporate our local foodstuffs,
which boost our immune systems.”
Prevalence of the virus. This subtheme captured the extent to
which the virus had spread in the country. All 14 speeches conveyed information about the number of confirmed cases recorded
in the country: “At first glance, it is alarming to see that thirty-two
thousand, nine hundred and sixty-nine (32,969) people have so
far contracted the virus.” The speeches also indicated communities within the country with high prevalence and infection rates
enabling the public to determine whether their communities were
part of the infected areas or not, prompting any subsequent personal and group actions that were required to be taken.
Severity of the virus. This subtheme explained the seriousness of
the virus. The speeches reported the number of deaths as a result of
the virus to inform the public that the virus, if not taken seriously,
could kill them. However, the speeches gave a positive impression
that people were not dying as much as was initially feared when
the country’s death rates were compared to the global rate. “With
54 deaths currently reported by the Ghana Health Service thus
far in Ghana, the ratio of deaths to positive cases stands at 0.4%,
compared to the global average of 5.5%, and the African average
of 2.6%.” Though the death rate was reported to communicate
the seriousness of the virus, relatively higher recovery rates were
recorded and reported to inform the public that infected persons
could recover if they reported early to hospitals for testing, isolation, and treatment. This recovery rate information sought to
encourage persons who experienced symptoms similar to those of
the virus to get tested and treated if they tested positive.
Importation of the virus. This subtheme captured how or why
the pandemic happened in the country. The speeches indicated
that the virus was imported into the country by travelers returning from Europe, Asia, and neighboring countries like Burkina
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Faso, Ivory Coast, and Togo. “Seventy-nine percent (79%) of the
three hundred and seventy-eight (378) confirmed cases are, thus,
imported. As has been established, the overwhelming majority of
confirmed cases have come from travelers or from people who
have come into contact with travelers.” In addition to mandatory
testing and treatment for all travelers, they had to undergo a mandatory 14-day quarantine.
Sociocultural Dimension
Under this broad theme, five subthemes emerged from the presidential addresses. Three subthemes evolved to enhance action
steps the reader or viewer could take to mitigate any danger to
their persons. They were staying at home, social distancing,
and stigmatization. These three subthemes speak to the ethos
of Ghanaians as warm and hospitable people. One subtheme
emerged to express accountability and collective responsibility.
Another subtheme emerged to express empathy and understanding of one’s discomfort.
Staying at home. The president, in his speeches, ordered people
living in most infected areas to stay at home. “If you must go out,
it must only be to get essential items such as food, medicine, water,
undertaking banking transactions, or to use public toilet facilities.
But, as much as possible, stay at home.” To ensure compliance,
security personnel were deployed to enforce this order.
Social distancing. The speeches repeatedly encouraged the public
to adhere to the social distancing protocol to protect themselves
from the virus. Specifically, the speeches admonished the public
to stop shaking hands (a phenomenon common in the Ghanaian
culture) and avoid unnecessary close body contact. To ensure
strict adherence to this protocol, the speeches announced the suspension of all public gatherings such as conferences, workshops,
funerals, parties, nightclubs, drinking spots, beaches, festivals,
political rallies, religious activities, and sporting events.
Stigmatization. This subtheme was directly lifted from the
speeches because it accurately captured what was known about
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those who had recovered from the virus. People who had recovered from the virus were being stigmatized by their families and
community members, and the president in four of his speeches
sought to address those concerns.
I remain concerned about the stigma associated with this disease. Stories of persons who have recovered from this disease, and are being
shunned by their relatives and communities, are a source of considerable worry to me because they undermine our efforts to fight it. There
is nothing shameful about testing positive. We do not have to lose our
sense of community because of this pandemic.

This statement sought to reinforce Ghanaian’s sense of community, belonging, and oneness before the outbreak of the pandemic
and to discourage the public from stigmatizing persons who had
recovered from the virus. These speeches also recognized that the
stigmatization was due to the public’s fear that the recovered persons could infect others. As a way of dealing with that fear, these
speeches provided scientific information from the WHO and scientists to prove that recovered persons could not infect others.
“Persons, who have tested positive for the virus once they recover,
do not pose any danger whatsoever to anyone because the scientists tell us that they can no longer spread the virus.”
Collective responsibility. The speeches communicated the notion
of collective responsibility to express accountability. The president
frequently used first-person plural pronouns such as “we,” “us,”
“our,” and “ourselves” to indicate that the fight against the virus
required all efforts from everyone. “This fight, fellow Ghanaians,
cannot be that of Government alone. It is for all of us. We can defeat
this virus if we all commit ourselves to respect all the measures
that have been outlined.” The speeches also described citizens who
refused to adhere to the outlined social measures as unpatriotic.
The description sought to suggest that such individuals did not
love their country and were therefore not willing to sacrifice for
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the good of their country. This might to some extent cause public
disaffection toward individuals seen not wearing face masks.
Understanding of one’s discomfort. This theme expressed empathy about the threat of the pandemic to human health. The president acknowledged the disruptions this virus had brought to
people’s lives and therefore wished for an immediate return to
normalcy. “Fellow Ghanaians, I, like you, would love to see an end
to these restrictions. I know the difficulties each and every one of
you has been through over the last two months. You had to alter
completely your way of life. . . .” Empathizing with the public, the
president expressed that he stood by the people. In other words,
he understood and shared their struggles through this difficult
time. “We are in this together, and [the] Government will stand by
you . . . What we do not know how to do is to bring people back
to life.”
Economic Dimension
This overarching theme was developed through the provision of
soft loans and food to vulnerable and needy people and the pledge
for protection of lives emerging as an action step assuring citizens
of the government’s commitment.
Protection of lives. This subtheme reflected the president’s commitment to fighting the pandemic. The speeches portrayed the
determination of the president to protect the lives of teachers, students, and citizenry. “. . . the oath of office I swore on 7th January
2017 demands that I dedicate myself to the service and well-being
of you, the Ghanaian people. It is my job to protect you, and I
am determined to do just that.” To prove that he was determined
to protect lives and get the public’s trust, the president frequently
mentioned the distribution of protective equipment to frontline
health workers and students.
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Discussion
Crisis and risk communicators have recommended best practices
in crisis and emergency risk messaging that can make messages
most effective for protecting public health during an emergency or
crisis. The results of this study provide insights into some practical
ways that can help public health and crisis communicators develop
and disseminate health messages through presidential public
speeches to inform the public about what they can do to protect
themselves during a global pandemic. The findings show that all
the seven best practices of crisis and emergency risk messages recommended by Parmer et al. (2016) were expressed in all 14 presidential speeches. At least three best practices were demonstrated
in every speech that the Ghanaian president delivered. On the contrary, on average there were more than two best practices included
in each media story found in Parmer et al.’s (2016) study. While
their study found that the “empathy” best practice was expressed
in the fewest stories, the “explain how or why” and “explain what
is not known” best practices appeared in 2 of the 14 speeches—the
least frequent of the seven best practices in the present study. A
plausible explanation for the differences in frequency of the best
practices in presidential addresses and media coverage may be the
underlying values through which these contexts view or perceive
emergencies or crises. For instance, media contents are primarily influenced by journalistic values such as prominence, proximity, currency, timeliness, conflict, human interest, and bizarreness
(Boyd, 1994). On the other hand, political values (such as order,
liberty, and caring for those who need help) most likely influence
the contents of presidential public addresses or speeches (Swedlow,
2008).
Specifically, empathy was frequently used in 11 of the 14
speeches to indicate that the government understood the disruption this pandemic had brought to the lives of the public, and they
(the government) would stand by them. This indicates care for the
citizens. The broad literature on crisis and emergency risk communication argues that empathy and caring (i.e., words that acknowledge what people are feeling) help to build public trust, making it
easy for public health communicators to effectively persuade the
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public to take recommended actions to protect themselves during
a pandemic (B. Reynolds et al., 2002; B. J. Reynolds, 2011; Seeger,
2006). This study also found that the presidential speeches recommended some simple tasks (e.g., wearing a mask, washing hands
with soap under running water, staying at home, eating a balanced
diet, exercising regularly, etc.) that the public could take to protect
themselves from the virus. Previous research indicates that such
simple tasks would “help people gain back a sense of control and
help keep them motivated to stay tuned to what is happening”
during a crisis or emergency (CDC, 2014, p. 41).
Furthermore, this study found that the “explain what is
known” and “promote action steps” best practices appeared in all
14 speeches. Previous works revealed that instructional risk and
crisis messages designed based on the IDEA model emphasizing
elements of internalization, explanation, and action effectively
encouraged participants to engage in self-protective behaviors
during food crises (D. D. Sellnow et al., 2015; D. D. Sellnow et
al., 2017; & D. D. Sellnow et al., 2019). The implication is that the
presidential speeches might have been effective in encouraging the
public to take the recommended behaviors (e.g., mask-wearing,
social distancing, or handwashing) to protect themselves from the
virus. However, the infrequent appearance of the “explain how
or why” and “explain what is not known” best practices in the
presidential speeches suggests that the public might have limited
information or knowledge about factors that caused the pandemic
to happen. This might be counterproductive to messages encouraging self-protective behaviors. The study also found that social
stigma against COVID-19 recovered patients was addressed in
the presidential speeches. Studies on social stigma argue that stigmatization associated with highly contagious diseases can significantly increase internal sufferings of infected persons as well as
discourage infected or suspected infected persons from seeking
health care, making the containment of such diseases extremely
difficult (Budhwani & Sun, 2020; Parker & Aggleton, 2003; Ramaci
et al., 2020).
Notably, the presidential speeches provided scientific information to reassure the public that recovered persons could no longer
infect others. According to Misra and colleagues (2020), promoting
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effective messages against COVID-19 related stigma could help
to deal with any misinformation associated with this pandemic.
Though the presidential speeches strongly spoke against social
stigma associated with recovered persons, the speeches’ consistent mention of importation of the virus in the country seemed
to implicitly portray travelers, especially from Europe, as carriers
of the virus. This might have implicitly encouraged social stigma
against persons who had recently returned from abroad. Supporting this finding, Logie and Turan (2020) contend that “COVID19 travel restrictions may also facilitate stigma and xenophobia
by reproducing the social construction of illness as a foreign invasion, in turn reinforcing social hierarchies and power inequalities”
(p. 2004).
Additionally, the crisis communication literature suggests that
organizations or agencies should communicate their intentions
to their stakeholders (i.e., public or audience) by explicitly showing commitment to stand with their publics throughout the crisis
(CDC, 2014; B. J. Reynolds, 2011). This can be done by “stating
upfront, your organization’s objectives for the emergency response
and committing to reaching them” (CDC, 2014, p. 55). This study
found that the speeches consistently mentioned the government’s
five key objectives of responding to this pandemic: “limit and
stop the importation of the virus; contain its spread; provide adequate care for the sick; limit the impact of the virus on social and
economic life; and inspire the expansion of our domestic capability and deepen our self-reliance.” The speeches demonstrated
this commitment through the government’s provision of protective equipment to all healthcare workers, food for individuals
and homes in affected areas of restrictions, soft loans for micro-,
small-, and medium-sized local business, and absorption of water
and electricity bills for all citizens.
Theoretical Implications
Though the crisis and emergency risk communication is not a theory per se, it is an integrative model that has been “validated by
the experiences of health communicators and public affairs specialists who have completed the training, conducted the training,
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and executed the principles . . . ” (Veil et al., 2008, p. 29S). Veil and
colleagues call it a grounded theory. They argue that risk messages
influence public perceptions, expectations, and behavior during a
crisis. As a contribution, this study demonstrates that presidential public speeches could be used to shape public risk perceptions
about their vulnerability to the virus and how severe the virus
could become if not taken seriously during a pandemic. The literature on belief models suggests that individuals would take actions
to avoid unpleasant occurrences if they believed that it was likely
to happen to them and it would be severe (Rosenstock, 1974). Veil
et al. also propose that risk reduction during crises should be systematically examined; and psychological research suggests that
when people’s feelings of fear, anxiety, or dread are not effectively
managed during a crisis, they most likely feel hopeless or helpless (Benight & Bandura, 2004; CDC, 2014). The present findings
demonstrate that the public’s heightened fear or anxiety about the
severity of a virus during a pandemic could be reduced by giving
them hope through public health messages that infected persons
could recover when tested early and received early treatment after
testing positive.
Furthermore, the broad literature on crisis communication
explains accountability as “being accountable for the decisions you
make and the outcomes that arise from those decisions. The public and interested stakeholders will expect organizations to keep
their promises—stated and implicit” (B. J. Reynolds, 2011, p. 210).
Expanding on this definition of accountability, this study’s findings articulate that public health messages through presidential
addresses could encourage the public to be accountable to themselves by adhering to protective measures during a pandemic.
Public health messages could characterize individuals refusing to
adhere to protective measures as unpatriotic. Portraying or framing such unpatriotic individuals as unwilling to sacrifice for the
good and safety of their country could potentially motivate most
people to adhere to recommended protective measures. Additionally, this study demonstrates that first-person plural pronouns such
as “we,” “us,” “our,” and “ourselves” could be used in public health
messages to communicate the notion of collective responsibility to
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make the public feel more accountable to themselves and others
during a pandemic. This messaging approach could be most effective and persuasive in collectivist cultures or societies which tend
to “emphasize loyalty to the group . . . ” (Darwish & Huber, 2003,
p. 49). In collectivist societies, people are more concerned about
the needs and interests of others than themselves; and this concern
for others influences individuals’ decisions and actions in a society
(Darwish & Huber, 2003; Eaton & Louw, 2000; LeFebvre & Franke,
2013). During a global pandemic where individuals’ actions (such
as mask-wearing, social distancing, or handwashing with soap
under running water) significantly impact others, highlighting
the concern for protecting others in public health messages would
most likely influence the public to take recommended actions in
collectivist societies. Ghana is a collectivist society (LeFebvre &
Franke, 2013); thus, the speeches employed first-person plural
pronouns to encourage the public to feel more accountable to others (the collective interest) by wearing their nose masks, practicing
social distance, avoiding handshakes, washing their hands with
soap under running water, and so forth.
Practical Implications
This study’s findings provide some practical insights for effective
crisis and emergency risk messaging during a pandemic. First,
public health messages should promote simple action steps that
the public could take to protect themselves. According to social
cognitive research, perceived self-efficacy can either enhance or
hinder cognitive processes such that individuals with low selfefficacy would experience stress when faced with a difficult task
(Bandura, 1991 & 1994). Thus, during a pandemic where the
majority of people with different levels of perceived self-efficacy
are impacted, public health communicators should promote protective actions that are easy and simple for most people to take
on their own. Seeger (2006) suggests that self-efficacy messages
should contain clear and meaningful actions and be consistent
as well. Second, public health communicators should take proactive steps to promote effective messages that address social
stigma during a global pandemic. For example, stigma-reduction

Effective Communication during a Global Health Crisis

213

messages promoting social distancing should be designed in ways
that “foster empathy while simultaneously transforming physical
distancing into a normal and sustained practice until the pandemic is over” (Logie & Turan, 2020, p. 2004). Also, the findings
show that there are different layers of the stigma associated with
the COVID-19 pandemic (i.e., stigmatization of infected persons
and travelers). Recent research shows COVID-19 related stigma
associated with Asians (Budhwani & Sun, 2020). Thus, a multiapproach to effective messaging should be developed and disseminated to address different stigma issues during a pandemic. Lastly,
public health communicators should carefully consider the media
or channels through which crisis and emergency risk messages are
disseminated. The findings indicate that different channels have
different values that influence their message content. These varied
values largely determine which best practices are emphasized in
public health messages. D. D. Sellnow et al. (2017) suggest “traditional media channels remain an effective means for communicating instructional risk and crisis messages and should not be
discounted” (p. 13).
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Due to the deductive nature of this study (i.e., using Parmer et al.’s
(2016) recommended seven crisis and emergency risk messaging
best practices), we could not examine the language of the presidential speeches. Research based on CERC indicates that communicating messages full of technical jargon and euphemism during
crises implies “insecurity and lack of honesty” (CDC, 2014, p. 56).
Avoiding them helps build trust with the audience or the public
(CDC, 2014). Further, crisis communicators suggest that crisis
messages must account for limitations in literacy and numeracy
among the target population, so the content of the message is easily understood by all (D. D. Sellnow, 2015). Hence, a 6th-grade
reading and comprehension level has been recommended (CDC,
2014). Future research should examine the language used in presidential speeches during pandemics. Another limitation of this
study was that we only focused on the written speeches and did
not look at the delivery aspect (both verbal and non-verbal) of
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these speeches. Crisis communication research and practice recommend that spokespersons should “convey calmness and confidence through posture, tone of voice, facial expressions, and
gestures” to help their audience to “remain calm and confident
in their own actions’’ (CDC, 2014, p. 68). Future research should
examine the delivery (both verbal and non-verbal) of presidential
speeches during pandemics.

Conclusion
The study has provided insightful information on how global pandemics can be communicated from a developing country context.
Contrary to Parmer et al.’s (2016) findings but in sync with their
seven crisis and emergency risk messaging best practices, this
study concludes that appropriate expression of empathy; concise,
systematic, and simple risk communication messages; and a sense
of community gleaned through individual and collective accountability could mitigate the effects of social stigma. This could also
act as a balm to the public’s psyche on the COVID-19 pandemic,
culminating in better management of pandemics.
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The year 2020 will perhaps be best remembered as the first year in
which the novel coronavirus, COVID-19, began to spread widely
around the world. By the middle of 2020, the United States had
become the global epicenter for the novel coronavirus pandemic
with millions of confirmed cases and hundreds of thousands of
deaths as a result of the virus (Johns Hopkins, 2020). Given the
rapid growth of the coronavirus and the staggeringly high numbers of cases and deaths, it is important to briefly recount what
the pandemic looked like in its earliest days in the United States.
It is certainly possible that the virus had been silently spreading in the United States before the first verified case of COVID-19.
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However, the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in the United
States that the public was made aware of was reported in Seattle,
Washington, in mid-January 2020 (McNamara, 2020). The arrival
of the novel coronavirus in the United States was not initially met
with widespread panic. Though relatively soon after, state governors begin to formally declare states of emergency in response to
rising cases, beginning with Governor Jay Inslee of Washington on
February 29, 2020. Notably, February 29, 2020, the day Washington State declared a state of emergency was also initially believed
to be the first coronavirus death in the United States after a patient
died in Washington (Acevedo & Burke, 2020).
This death in Washington, while it was the first COVID-19
death to be reported to the public, was not actually the first death
from the new virus. In April of 2020, medical examiners in California posthumously identified that a person in Santa Clara County
California died due to complications from the novel coronavirus
on February 6, 2020, which is several weeks before the patient in
Washington (Chappell, 2020). After Washington became the first
state to declare a state of emergency, other states quickly followed
suit. By mid-March nearly all 50 states had declared a state of
emergency, and on March 13 President Donald Trump declared
a national state of emergency (FEMA, 2020). On March 13—the
day a national state of emergency was declared—the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center noted that there were a total
of 2,157 cases in the United States. The last governor to formally
declare a state of emergency for his state was Gov. Jim Justice (R)
of West Virginia who declared a state of emergency on March 16.
This issuance of a state of emergency was done in West Virginia
before the state had even seen its first confirmed case of COVID19, though the first person in the state did test positive the next day,
on March 17 (West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources, 2020). As these events demonstrate, the United States’
governors dealt with the initial effects of the coronavirus before
a national state of emergency was declared. As such, the interest
for this study is state governors as they were the initial actors and
leaders during the pandemic’s early stages.
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At its core, the United States is a constitutional federal republic, which means that there is both a national governing system
that oversees the collective 50 states and local governing bodies—
both state and municipal (U.S. Government, n.d.). The leader of
the national government is the United States President while the
leader of the state government(s) is the governor. Each United
States Governor acts as a leader to his or her state, so constituents
look to their governor for guidance and leadership. To illustrate,
governors tend to respond differently to threats (e.g., Hurricane
Harvey), but these previous threats were more centralized to certain locations. The COVID-19 pandemic holistically hit the United
States—and the world—but it was still up to the different levels
of government to lead. Thus, it becomes important to understand
the United States’ state governors’ early communications with the
public. The very beginning of the pandemic in the United States is
briefly outlined from the first reported case to the day the last state
governor declared a state of emergency.
While one can consider that governors acted quickly to declare
states of emergencies in efforts to prepare their states for the novel
coronavirus, it is also worth noting that this was a general time
of confusion for many people as to what the proper response to
COVID-19 was. For example, by the summer of 2020 it was widely
accepted among the scientific community that wearing a mask
was one of the most effective ways of slowing the spread of the
novel coronavirus (CDC, 2020). However, this message was not
always one made clear to the public. At one point in early March,
Surgeon General Jerome Adams said in an interview that wearing
masks can increase one’s chances of getting the novel coronavirus
(Schreckinger, 2020). This example was brought up not to show
a shortcoming of communication from government officials, but
rather to highlight how confusing the earliest days of the COVID19 pandemic were as the public and the scientific community alike
struggled to understand this threat.
It is important to unearth as many insights as possible about
initial communications from those in positions of power, such as
state governors, to better understand how novel threats should
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be communicated. State governors are responsible for decisions
about coronavirus policy, but also are responsible for how that
policy is communicated to the public. The communication coming from their offices not only drives discourse in their state, but
can also impact how the novel coronavirus is perceived nationwide. Provided that initial communication sets the tone for the
total communications about an issue, it is, therefore, important to
review what initial communications were made. Thus, a review of
each state’s governor’s initial press release was conducted to glean
insights into the risk management strategies taken during the early
stages of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Literature Review
This study examines the communication about the coronavirus
pandemic through a textual analysis of how each state’s governor
has approached the COVID-19 virus in a press release—situated
within risk communication framework and the contingency theory of strategic conflict management.
Risk Communication
Risk communication is a broad field of communication research—
one that is connected to various fields like public relations, communication management, and risk management. Risk management,
as defined by Stern and Fineberg (1996), includes “things, forces,
or circumstances that pose danger to people or to what they value”
(Stern & Fineberg, 1996, as cited in Rhee, 2008). Indeed, public
relations is at times considered an extension of strategic management of risks (Rhee, 2008). Organizations can use public relations
as a way to develop risk management strategies and communicate
with stakeholders during these risky times (Rhee, 2008). Effective
risk management requires communication practitioners to help
stakeholders understand how the organization made a rational
decision concerning the risk and how the decision upholds both
the stakeholders’ and organization’s ideas, interests, and values
(Brummette & Sisco, 2018).
Public relations practitioners, and any other type of risk management team, need to be aware of the differences and prepare
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strategies that are tailored to each situation. As part of this preparedness, scholars have worked to develop various approaches
to risk communication, such as the mental models approach (e.g.,
Morgan et al. 2002), the convergence communication approach
(e.g., Rogers & Kincaid, 1981), the three-challenge approach (e.g.,
Rowan, 1991), the hazard plus outrage approach (e.g., Sandman,
1987), and the social trust approach.
Each of these approaches center around a different risk communication core. For mental models, the core is found in cognitive psychology and is used to (1) help identify to whom the risk
communication should be directed to and (2) the processing of the
risk communication (Lundgren & McMakin, 2013). The mental
models approach is used to develop audience-centered perspectives on different risks. In contrast, the convergence communication approach views risk communication as a long and iterative
process that is constantly based around the organization communicating and the audience it is communicating with—values and
preferences (culturally or otherwise) constantly affect the process
(Lundgren & McMakin, 2013).
The approach of interest, however, is the social trust approach
to risk communication. This approach developed within an area of
social science research interested in a person’s—or an audience’s—
trust in an organization, such as a governmental institution.
Cvetkovich and Winter (2002) worked to develop this approach
through projects that he worked on for the United States, such
as with the United States Department of Agriculture. The core of
the social trust approach is based around values, evaluations, and
judgments (Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002). Fundamentally, having
trust is seen as a way to reduce complexities and complications;
the trust is fluid, however, and has the potential to be broken
(Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002). Cvetkovich and Winter propose
that trust is part of an evaluative process—one that helps a person
make judgments. This iteration of trust is fundamental but incomplete. Trust goes beyond having confidence in another person or
in an organization. Indeed, trust is made up of inferences—both
seen and unseen—about another’s motives, attitudes, and beliefs
(Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002). Trust built on what is seen (i.e.,
actions) provides the evaluator with inferences about the actor’s
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attitudes and beliefs just as much as trust that is built on what is
unseen—something that happened at a distance with no obvious
opportunity for the evaluator to directly observe (Cvetkovich &
Winter, 2002).
Beyond what is seen and what is unseen, trust is also built on
the congruence of values (Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002). The evaluator takes personal values and places them against the entity being
evaluated. Similar values for the evaluator and the evaluated entity
have shown to lead to higher social trust (Earle & Cvetkovich,
1997). Further, the type of situation at hand—environmental risk
versus a health risk—helps determine the type of values at play and
to what extent those values matter (Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002).
Through this approach to social trust, it is apparent that audiences use various processes to judge an organization. Social trust—
from the audience perspective of an organization—is founded
in the people’s ability to understand the organization’s goals and
values (Lundgren & McMakin, 2013). If an audience member
has negative attitudes toward an organization, any negative information they encounter regarding the organization will only work
to reinforce the distrust toward the organization (Lundgren &
McMakin, 2013). The reverse is also true: positive attitudes will
be reinforced when the audience encounters positive information
about an organization, which results in increased trust. Indeed,
social trust can be thought of as one of the most important aspects
of risk communication (Lundgren & McMakin, 2013).
The social trust approach ultimately sets the foundation for
the strategic conflict management of risks, specifically that of
COVID-19. As discussed, audiences use trust as a way to evaluate
and judge an organization’s communication—or the organization’s
presentation of a risk. The contingency theory of strategic conflict
management, in turn, presents a number of variables that organizations use to help them determine the best stance to take during
conflicts and times of uncertainty (Cancel et al., 1997). These perspectives are taken in tandem because the social trust approach to
risk communication demonstrates how imperative it is for organizations—such as governmental entities—to understand how their
social trust standings are determined by their audiences. Further,
the contingency theory of strategic conflict management views
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stance-making as fluid and depending on an organization’s evaluation of the situation. In this case, the situation—COVID-19—is
viewed through the contingency theory because it is imperative to
see how the local leaders of the United States presented the issue
to their respective constituents.
Contingency Theory
Contingency theory, often referred to as the “it depends” theory,
attempts to account for real-world complexities (Pang et al., 2016).
The core of contingency theory is the continuum, which attributes the flexibility organization’s use when determining a stance
on an issue; the continuum ranges from pure advocacy to pure
accommodation (Cancel et al., 1997). The stance an organization
is said to take depends on a variety of factors, 86 in total, and how
such factors influence organizational stance along the continuum
(Cancel et al., 1997). The contingency theory allows for a specific analysis of predetermined variables (i.e., those identified by
Cancel et al., 1997) and provides researchers with the opportunity
to analyze organizational stances in accordance with both the continuum and the variables.
It is important to note, however, that an organization’s stance
is not a legitimate enactment of all 86 variables at once; instead,
the contingency theory works to demonstrate how certain types of
variables may be more salient than others during specific situations
(Cancel et al., 1997). Based on this logic, researchers can investigate specific types of variable constructs, such as with Jin et al.
(2015). They propose five subgroups out of the total five theoretical constructs in order to determine how the grouping of variables
outweigh each other in terms of organizational decision-making.
Constructs are subgroups that contain more defined groupings of variables (Jin et al., 2015; Reber & Cameron, 2003). Within
these constructs are variables that are considered influential
based on the contingency theory (Cancel et al., 1997). Based on
the profound number of variables, it is typical for researchers to
choose which variables they consider important to their research.
Thus, for the novel coronavirus scenario, a focus on a subset of
external variables is used in order to understand how governors
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strategically communicated to their constituents about the risk of
the novel coronavirus.
External Variables

The external variables are split into five subgroups: (1) threats,
(2) industry environment, (3) general political/social environment/
external culture, (4) the external public, and (5) issue under question
(Jin et al., 2015). Each external variable subgroup includes a list of
specific variables—the specific variables of interest are within the
issue under question theoretical construct. Issue under question is
specifically of interest—as COVID-19 constituted the active issue.
Under issue under question are the variables issue size, issue stake,
and issue complexity.
Issue Under Question. The variables proposed within issue under
question include issue size, issue stake, and issue complexity. These
variables have been tested in various studies, such as with Dant
and Schul (1992), and later included in the contingency theory’s
list of variables as those considered influential regarding organizational stance decision-making (Cancel et al., 1997). An issue’s size
encompasses how an actor defines the scope of the issue itself; it is
further considered important as it helps develop norm responses
that will later serve as precedents for the issue itself (Dant & Schul,
1992). However, it is important to acknowledge the ramifications
of precedent-setting for an issue (Dant & Schul, 1992). An issue’s
stake refers to what threats, gains, or losses the issue holds over
those it could potentially affect (Dant & Schul, 1992). Further,
stake is used to better distinguish what is meant by issue size with
the former referring to the implications of the issue and the latter referring more to the scope of the issue. An issue’s complexity
is a variable that has the potential to influence conflict management actions (Dant & Schul, 1992). It is proposed that issues with
high complexity typically invoke solution tactics that include the
use of politics and bargaining while issues with low complexity
are typically solved by using problem-solving and persuasion tactics (Dant & Schul, 1992). Thus, it can be inferred that issues with
high complexity result in communication tactics that are generally
more abstract.

229

SO ORDERED

Given the relative unknowns regarding the COVID-19 virus
issue (both at the time of the press releases and after), it is prudent to understand how each state’s governor chose to describe the
issue to their respective constituents. Further, an analysis of governor messaging provides general insights into each state’s chosen
risk communication tactics. Thus, the following research question
is posed:
RQ: How does each state’s governor refer to the following external factors—issue size, issue stake, issue complexity—in their initial
COVID-19 press release?

Method
This study employs a qualitative textual analysis approach to
understand the implications of each state’s governor’s response to
the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, a textual analysis allows
for a thematic and systematic analysis of selected texts—the intent
being to garner a deeper understanding of the population by looking for commonalities and underlying trends (Fürsich, 2009).
Thus, this study employs this research technique and examined
each state’s governor’s first press release response to the COVID19 pandemic. Each press release was selected based on specific criteria: the release was the first mention of the pandemic and the
release came from the governor’s office. This study did not focus
on releases put forth by other state departments, such as the health
department. The reason for doing so is that the governor is a figurehead typically known to the public, interacts more consistently
with the public, has the authority to issue decrees, and is an elected
official. Thus, 50 press releases were analyzed—one for each state—
for thematic elements.
This textual analysis sought to analyze the first public press
releases that each state governor released dealing with the novel
coronavirus pandemic in 2020. To find this information, the
researchers went to each state government’s website and looked
for press release archives. Once found, the researchers searched
for press releases mentioning COVID-19 or the novel coronavirus pandemic. The researchers then looked for the earliest substantive press releases that included information about the state
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government and its perceptions of the novel coronavirus. The dates
of the first press releases about the COVID-19 pandemic from the
state governors ranged from January 27, 2020 (Connecticut, Lamont-D) to March 17, 2020 (Wyoming, Gordon-R).
Notably, many states’ first official press releases simply were
statements saying that reporters could expect more information
at a later predetermined time. These press releases were not considered substantive and were not included in the sample. Instead,
when the researchers found these as the first official coronavirus
statement they used the next earliest official press release. For
Arizona, the first press release from the state’s governor’s office
(Ducey-R) was a video conference, so the transcription for it was
analyzed. The press releases analyzed for this study is holistic—all
states’ governor’s press releases were included in the analysis.

Results
After reviewing each state’s governor’s initial COVID-19 press
release (n = 50), the analysis revealed four persistent themes evidencing the relative unknowns regarding the beginning of the
COVID-19 pandemic as seen in the United States. These themes
include COVID-19 contraction risk reassurance, a bolstering of
state actions, citizen readiness actions, and COVID-19 case travel
scapegoating. Each theme directly relates to the theoretical foundations of social trust and the contingency theory of strategic
conflict management. The press releases were specifically from
the governor’s office and averaged out to around one to two pages
each. A deeper analysis of the press releases reveals how little state
governments actually knew about COVID-19, which suggests that
their relative blasé attitude may have been attributed to the general
sense of uncertainty many felt while the virus spread across the
United States.
COVID-19 Contraction Risk Reassurance
(Issue Size and Complexity)
Throughout the press releases, it was common to find verbiage that
held tones of reassurance. The reassurance, however, came in two
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different forms—in either a reference to the low number of cases
or as an indirect downplay of the novel coronavirus itself.
Number of COVID-19 Cases (Issue Size)

State governors used the platform as a place to provide citizens
with the number of COVID-19 cases, which typically totaled out
to less than 10 (at the time of the press release): “. . . there are no
current diagnosed cases in the state, Montana . . . ” (Gov. Bullock,
MT-D); “There are no confirmed cases of COVID-19 in the State
of Nevada” (Gov. Sisolak, NV-D); “. . . while no one in Utah has
yet tested positive for COVID-19 . . .” (Gov. Herbert, UT-R). These
instances indirectly acknowledge the presence of COVID-19 cases
elsewhere, but they double as reassurances. Each state’s respective
citizens can take the lack of cases to mean that the state is successfully keeping the virus out of the state instead of taking the lack of
cases as meaning that the virus has not yet reached the state.
Further instances of reassurances came from describing the
well-being of a previously sick individual. Indeed, some governors
would reference how well a sick individual is doing—thus providing citizens with hope. Governor Cooper (NC-D) stated in a press
release, “. . . the person is doing well and is insolated at home.”
Additional states provided similar statements, including Governor
Cuomo (NY-D) who released a statement saying, “the patient has
respiratory symptoms, but is not in serious condition and has been
in a controlled situation since arriving to New York.” These statements came with assumptions that states had control over the contracted cases—again lending to the reassurance of their citizens.
This type of reassurance can potentially be construed as accidental
over-reassurance regarding the severity of the novel coronavirus.
Downplaying COVID-19 (Issue Complexity)

The time frame of these press releases—spanning from late January
to the middle of March in 2020—demonstrates the beginning
attempts at communicating about a virus that is virtually unknown.
Some of these communication attempts resulted in a downplay of
the novel virus itself—along with its severities. Governor Pritzker
(IL-D) released a statement that included the following:
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The immediate health risk to the state remains low. While the latest
available information suggests that person-to-person spread will continue to occur and additional cases are likely to be identified in the
United States, most cases of COVID-19 cause a mild illness. In very
rare cases people infected with the virus have died. Additionally, to
date, data shows that children are less likely to become ill. (Gov. Pritzker, IL-D)

Other governors used similar language in their initial press
releases including—but not limited to—Governor Beshear (KYR), “. . . even though Kentuckians are at low risk for this virus
. . .”; Governor Little (ID-R), “. . . the individual risk for coronavirus in Idaho is still low . . .”; Governor DeSantis (FL-R), “. . .
the threat COVID-19 poses to Florida remains low . . .”; Governor
Mills (MA-D), “. . . no cases of coronavirus in Maine as of today,
and the risk to our state remains low. . . .” These instances provide
their stakeholders with an indirect downplay of the virus’s potential severity.
Governors—from multiple states—provided their constituents
with verbiage that indirectly downplayed the virus’s severity. Similarly, the inclusion of the number of cases—or even the lack of a
COVID-19 case in a state—contributed to a reassured public. Even
though these press releases were released in the early stages of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the “low risk for the virus” statements indirectly reassured citizens far more than necessary.
COVID-19 Case Travel Scapegoating (Issue Stake)
States repeatedly mentioned that those who should most be concerned with contracting the novel coronavirus were those who
had recently traveled to places that were thought to be COVID-19
hotspots. Many governor’s offices such as Kelly’s (KS-D) specifically noted that individuals should only isolate if they have:
Recently traveled to China, Iran, Italy, Japan and South Korea and have
developed fever with lower respiratory symptoms including cough
and shortness of breath within 14 days of your travel, or have had contact with someone with a laboratory-confirmed case of COVID-19.
(Gov. Kelly, KS-D)
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Another instance of a state governor’s office discussing citizens
traveling as the way the novel coronavirus is spreading in their
state comes out of Indiana where they note that,
“This morning, Gov. Holcomb and the Indiana State Department of
Health confirmed the first case of coronavirus in a Marion County
resident with a recent history of travel to a Boston event tied to several
cases in other states.” (Gov. Holcomb, IN-R)

Though many governors’ offices noted the dangers of traveling to countries that were coronavirus hotspots, or in some cases
even states that were coronavirus hotspots, most downplayed
the possibility of person-to-person transmission within their
own states. Few states specifically mentioned the possibility that
the novel coronavirus could be widely spread from person-toperson among those who had not recently traveled. Connecticut is
one of the few states that noted that there was a significant danger
that COVID-19 could be spread between individuals who had not
been to China or another coronavirus hotspot. Instead the governor’s office in Connecticut hypothesized how the virus could
be spread between individuals noting that this virus is similar to
SARS and MERS:
When person-to-person spread has occurred with MERS and SARS, it
is thought to have happened via respiratory droplets produced when
an infected person coughs or sneezes, like how influenza and other
respiratory pathogens spread. Spread of SARS and MERS between
people has generally occurred between close contacts. (Gov. Lamont,
CT-D)

Bolstering of State Actions (Issue Complexity)
Governors used these press releases as an opportunity to show how
well the states were handling the COVID-19 virus. These instances
typically came through in the form of state preparedness or in referencing how other states were faring in comparison to their own.
Governor Kemp’s office (GA-R) released a statement that included
the following, “. . . fortunately, the Peach State boasts some of the
world’s most advanced healthcare experts . . . to make sure that
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we are ready for any scenario.” Governor Edwards (LA-D) stated,
“. . . Louisiana has been preparing since the COVID-19 outbreak
in mainland China.” Governor Ige (HI-D) mentioned a specific
healthcare liaison and professed his faith in this expert’s ability.
Notably, Governor Herbert (UT-R) put Utah’s number of cases
(at the time, zero) against that of the neighboring states. These
instances demonstrate how different states used their preparedness tactics and overall virus readiness as a way to demonstrate
competency. Governor Sisolak (NV-D) provided the following
statement:
I know that took a long time, but I want Nevadans to understand the
large-scale collaboration taking place across the state, and the commitment of each of the individuals who have been working on this
issue for months. They represent hundreds of more Nevadans in their
respective fields and regions they serve—all waking up every day with
the same mission: to prepare and protect the health and safety of the
public. (Gov. Sisolak, NV-D)

Like many others, this demonstrates how governors attempted to
provide citizens with evidence about how the situation is being
taken seriously and is given much thought. Essentially, these statements applauded their own efforts.
Many initial COVID-19 press releases included mentions
of a new state task force—including mentions of the highlyqualified members. Governor Abbot (TX-R), Governor Gordon
(WY-R), Governor Scott (VT-R), Governor Lee (TN-R), and Governor Bullock (MO-D) are among the governors that cited their
coronavirus task force efforts. However, some of these announcements only included the development of a task force (and potentially a list of experts) with little mention of the task force purpose
beyond the coronavirus, “. . . to help us be even better prepared,
this group of experts will work closely with me and my administration, along with local, state, and federal agencies as we continue
to monitor any potential developments” (Gov. Lee, TN-R).
Citizen Readiness Actions (Issue Stake)
Many of the sample texts included basic instructions for citizens as
to how they can protect themselves from COVID-19. A recurring
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message found in many of the press releases was that the best
method for protecting oneself was similar to how one would protect themselves from the flu: “the best way to prevent infection is to
take precautions to avoid exposure to this virus, which are similar
to the precautions you take to avoid the flu” (Gov. Abbott TX-R).
In addition to abstractly telling people to protect themselves in the
same way one would protect themselves from the flu it was common for states to have a bullet point list of concrete steps residents
could take to best protect themselves and their families, such as
this partial statement from the Virginia governor’s office:
Although COVID-19 is not spreading in Virginia and the risk here
is low, officials said Virginians can take precautions to prevent the
potential spread of this disease:
▶ Avoid close contact with people who are sick.
▶ Avoid touching your eyes, nose, and mouth with unwashed
hands.
▶ Wash your hands often with soap and warm water for at least
20 seconds.
▶ Use alcohol-based hand sanitizer that contains at least 60 percent
alcohol if soap and water are unavailable.
▶ Cover your cough or sneeze with a tissue, then throw the tissue
in the trash.
(Gov. Northam VA-D)

This list from the governor’s office of Virginia is one example of the
bulleted lists of COVID-19 precautions found in the press releases.
This concrete language can be very important so that people
have simple and easy to follow instructions; however, it should
be noted that often the language states used to give these instructions often invoked feelings of condescension—as if a parent were
speaking to a child. Most notably, before listing some of the ways
Nevadans can slow the spread of coronavirus the governor’s press
release stated, “I realize this is going to sound a bit like the advice
I used to give my daughters when they were little, but please bear
with me” (Gov. Sisolak NV-D).

Discussion
While the lack of information about a novel virus is to be
expected at the onset of a pandemic, the communication tactics
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and language used by governors in their initial COVID-19 press
releases did not appropriately set the tone for what would become
a global pandemic. Cvetkovich and Winters (2008) provides ample
logic and reasoning behind social trust: the evaluator—in this case
various clusters of American constituents—process and ultimately
judge the entity being evaluated—the U.S. governors. Provided
the results, it is apparent that the U.S. governors’ foundation for
addressing the COVID-19 pandemic was incomplete.
Given the rather sporadic types of press releases, it is unclear as
to whether or not a majority of the states had a set communication
risk plan in place. Indeed, less than 10 states referred to the overall
issue complexity of the issue and, when they did refer to the issue
complexity, the statements were more overreaching than definitive. Governors did not use the press release platform to emphasize the unknown elements of this novel coronavirus. Instead, the
press releases heavily reiterated the number of cases (or the lack
thereof) and the low probability of the coronavirus reaching their
specific state.
In references to the low risk, governors chose to provide either
comparisons or mentions of the virus in places outside of their
specific state. This specificity is reflective of the external variable
size—governors reflected on the issue’s size by using other locations’ interactions with the virus as a way to either reassure their
citizens or downplay the risk to the immediate state. Thus, the
issue size is present but the legitimacy of the issue size as relevant
to the actual state at hand was considered minimal in virtually all
press releases. The contingency theory encapsulates organizational
stance movement as organizations deliver communications (Cancel et al., 1997; Jin et al., 2015) and, looking at the initial COVID-19
press releases, it is clear that governors used the issue size as a way
to advocate for their own thoughts on the novel coronavirus. Governors referred to the virus and its impact as if in a vacuum that
included only the state in question. Thus, COVID-19’s issue size
was indirectly used to reassure rather than as a platform for providing citizens with communication about potential unknowns.
An issue’s stake helps establish how involved those affected
will become with the assumption that higher stakes lead to higher
levels of involvement (Dant & Schul, 1992). In terms of stake as
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related to the novel coronavirus, virtually no governors provided
information that referred to tangible losses, such as loss of life.
It is important to note that the number of cases and deaths had
not reached the thousands, as they had by midway 2020. The few
press releases that mentioned the known symptoms of COVID-19
also typically positioned the symptoms against flu symptoms. This
choice to capture the then-known symptoms of COVID-19 against
the flu symptoms points to stance choices are further reflective of
issue stake. Likening novelty to something known may be helpful,
but the downside of such an association is that the issue’s stake
is too likened to the flu. While the COVID-19 pandemic was an
increasingly ongoing and unprecedented event, the social trust
approach of risk communication blatantly describes the fallout
organizations face: audience members who have positive attitudes
toward the organization will use positive information to reinforce
their attitudes and trust in that organization (Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002). However, the reverse is also true, which means that state
constituents who felt that their governor’s initial response to the
pandemic was lacking were likely to have a lowered level of trust
as a result of the press release. Regardless, the press releases did not
provide definitive and tangible stakes about the novel coronavirus
issue. There was an intense lack of precaution statements about
COVID-19 and what the disease could do to a society.
While it is impossible to predict the future with precise certainty, the complete disregard for any mentions about the novel
coronavirus’s potential severity is astounding. Governors chose to
reiterate the apparent “low risk” of COVID-19 with little mention
of the ramifications of the disease itself. This apparent “low risk”
is a direct reference to the issue’s stake and, provided that these
press releases are from the states’ governor’s offices, offered constituents guidance on how to view the virus. The strategic language
used in the press releases attempted to mitigate uneasy feelings
and reassure stakeholders about COVID-19. This reassurance can
be reflexive of an attempt to gain or maintain social trust between
the state and the people, but the long-term consequences of these
stance choices were not obviously considered.
Based on the analysis, it is apparent that the press statements
made little mention of the novel virus’s complexity, which may
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be attributed to the complete lack of information about what is
at stake due to the virus. Governors prioritized reassurance of
stakeholders over communication about an unknown virus as
seen through the pattern of reassurance language present in virtually every press release. When pitted against the lack of information on the complexity of the virus, it is clear how governor
offices chose to placate their citizens instead of admitting to the
general public the unknowns about the virus. Communication
about an issue’s stakes, as described and researched by Dant and
Schul (1992), are connected to the level of involvement by way of
the message receivers. Thus, it can be inferred that the dismissal
of the novel virus complexity informs communication about the
potential stakes and—since the stakes were virtually never mentioned—influenced how citizens determined their own levels of
involvement for the coronavirus issue. While contingency theory
holds that a number of factors influence an organization’s stance,
it is important to note the weight of the issue itself is something
that the governors did not emphasize in their press releases. It is
suggestive then that other factors influenced the decision-making
for each state’s stance on the COVID-19 issue.
The COVID-19 case reassurance theme was prevalent in most
to all press releases—demonstrating how governors used these initial communication efforts to reassure and placate their constituents. While it is important to not incite mass panic upon the onset
of a novel virus, the level of reassurance found in the press releases
inferred that the virus was not something that citizens should be
concerned about. The language used had the opposite effect of a
mass panic. It provided citizens with comfort, a sense of hope, and
potentially gave citizens the go-ahead to dismiss any real concerns
about the severity of the virus. Governors typically included the
number of cases in their states—and at the time most were at zero
or one—and then proceeded to use language that inferred that
the virus would not reach the state or was contained by way of
state preparedness measures. Despite these measures, virtually no
statements then referenced the complexities surrounding a novel
virus. This attempt to reassure constituents lends to conversations
of social trust. The references to personal, state connections (i.e.,
“Nevadans” or “Arizonians”) demonstrates how the governors and
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state entities are attempting to provide constituents with common
ground and values to rally around. The appeal to immediate state
safety is a similar appeal to congruent values—assuming that the
constituents are invested in their state actions. Though the values
important for a situation are in part determined by the situation
(Cvetkovich & Winter, 2002), it is clear that the states attempted
to offer their constituents with values and reassurances that would
work in favor of social trust.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority of governors used the
initial COVID-19 press releases as a place to bolster state efforts
and actions. The theme, bolstering state actions, demonstrated
how some states used these communication efforts as an avenue
to showcase all their great work (e.g., taskforce creations and convening with politicians or doctors). It is important for the public
to know what their respective states are doing to work against the
impact of the novel coronavirus, but the manner in which the governors presented these efforts came off as prideful and boastful.
Indeed, some states even used other state efforts as a comparison
against their own. These references implied that some states were
acting better than others when COVID-19 was concerned. Unfortunately, this contributes to feelings of complacency or a false
sense of security as many governors made statements that include
variations of the phrase “low risk for Kentuckians” (with a substitute for the appropriate state). While some of the press releases
included information about the efforts each state made toward the
fight against the coronavirus, it is clear that some of these bolstering statements were made to make citizens proud of how well their
government was handling the situation.
COVID-19 case travel scapegoating was a trend for those states
who reported a COVID-19 case in their state. It was apparent
that governors wished to provide an explanation as to how these
affected individuals contracted the virus and such efforts included
using travel as the necessary scapegoat. This both worked to distance the infected individual(s) from the measures the state took
to minimize virus contraction and acted as a platform for the states
to tell their constituents how well their preparedness and testing
abilities worked. Again, this trend demonstrates how governors
assuaged general public concerns about COVID-19. Indeed, it is
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human nature to be curious about such matters, but the way the
statements were written made it seem like the main way to contract the virus was through travel—specifically travel to certain
areas of the world.
When it came to addressing how citizens should act, some
states either included a list of actions they likened to flu prevention
measures or forewent including preventative measures entirely.
The analysis further demonstrated how some statements included
language that came off as condescending or as if speaking to a child
(e.g., Gov. Sisolak, NV-D). Many governors reiterated the importance of handwashing by reminding their constituents of when
they (the constituents) first learned to wash hands. Some mentioned the importance of good hygiene, but they failed to mention
what this might entail. This level of condescension is appalling and
provides insight into how these elected officials see their constituents. On top of the general personal health comments, the officials
urged their constituents to treat the threat of this virus as either the
flu or another natural disaster (e.g., Gov. Wolfe, PA-D). Within the
example press releases, governors urged citizens to prepare with
weeks’ worth of supplies—stockpiling over-the-counter drugs,
food, and water. Taking the press releases in totality, however, it
becomes clear how some of the information and instructions seem
contradictory—with no mention of the issue’s stakes or complexity
but asking citizens to prepare on a natural disaster level.
Further, it can be inferred that the reassurance found in the
press releases contributed to the unintentional downplaying of the
COVID-19 virus itself. Indeed, the highest executive elected officials—de facto leaders—refused or failed to admit the unknowns
about COVID-19.
Governors are literally the highest elected official a state can
have and their statements make local, state, and federal news
cycles. Their statements have the potential to reach millions of
Americans, yet their single-minded attention toward public reassurance and state pride resulted in a drastic overlook for citizen
welfare. Each governor declares an oath that requires them to
uphold the office of the state and its citizens and such duty was
lacking during the early coronavirus times. Despite the fact that
some governors even reiterated their commitment to safeguarding
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citizens, omitting statements that referred to the issue’s complexity
and potential stake hurt their constituents. Further, it is argued
that state governors worked to maintain social trust with their
citizens, but given their ultimate stance choices—as seen through
depictions of COVID-19’s size, stake, and complexity—opened
them up to scrutiny. A hyper focus on immediate reassurance—
an attempt to speak to constituents through their predetermined
social trust contract—omitted the possibility that more, new information about the COVID-19 pandemic might change governors’
initial stances.
Limitations and Future Directions
This study only looks to state government press releases specifically from each governor’s office. The analysis focuses solely on
analyzing the press releases, but given the nature of the results,
it is important for future research to use ethical frameworks to
gain insights into the moral rightness of these press releases.
Additionally, future research can—and should—look to early press
releases from state health departments in order to understand how
health professionals (1) understood the COVID-19 pandemic and
(2) communicated that understanding to stakeholders. Health
professionals are increasingly being looked to as thought-leaders,
so an analysis of what and how these communications manifest is
of utmost importance.

Conclusion
The COVID-19 issue was a dynamic and ongoing situation—
especially during the onset of the global pandemic—even though
few governors referred to it as such. Given their prestigious powers
and elected status, it is assumed that governors act with the best
interest of their constituents at heart. However, the insights illustrate how the governors’ attitudes toward the complexity of this
novel virus set the tone for their constituents—how self-serving
some of the communications was—with states applauding their
lack of cases and their efforts to keep the virus out of their states.
Despite their efforts, COVID-19 ended up reaching all 50 states
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and infected millions of people (Johns Hopkins, 2020). Months
into the outbreak, it is apparent how confused, uncertain, and
unwilling to trust some groups of people are—perhaps because
of the tone their governor set at the beginning of the pandemic.
Risk management plans are lacking. It is impossible to predict
natural disasters, but it is possible to prepare for them through
both actions and communication plans. Initial communication
efforts need to better include information relevant to constituents
with acknowledgments of shortcomings tied with their communications about state actions. While it is unknowable whether or
not better initial communication by way of each state’s governor’s
office would affect the outcome of the COVID-19 pandemic in the
United States, it is apparent that there is work to be done in terms
of risk communication and state priorities.
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ABSTRACT
As illustrated by the COVID-19 pandemic, risk and crisis communication are crucial
responsibilities of modern governments. Existing research on risk and crisis communication points to the importance of trust, both as a resource in and an end goal of
communicative activities. In this paper, we argue that revisiting the classical rhetorical
concept of ethos in combination with the modern concept of the rhetorical situation
can contribute to fitting responses in risk and crisis communication. The paper examines how appeals to ethos may build trust in health authorities’ public communication
during the COVID-19 pandemic. Through interviews and participant observation in
public health institutions that handle the COVID-19 pandemic in Norway, the paper
finds that understanding the rhetorical situation of the pandemic allows for a better
understanding of the available means of persuasion. For instance, through the active
communication of transparency and independence when faced by uncertainty and
rapidly changing information.
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The COVID-19 pandemic has shone a light on one of the central aspects of government communication work, namely the
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have emphasized the role of trust in ensuring that messages are
heard (e.g., Boyd et al. 2019; Liu et al., 2016), some going so far as
calling trust “a primary driver of whether communities positively
respond to government communication” (Liu & Mehta, 2020,
p. 1). Attempts to establish best practices for risk and crisis communication have also pointed to trust as a central concept (Covello,
2010; Seeger, 2006), especially when a risk situation develops into
a crisis (De Vocht et al., 2016).
Despite the consensus on the importance of trust, the concept
is often not clearly defined nor conceptualized (Chryssochoidis et
al., 2009; Liu & Mehta, 2020). In terms of the practice of establishing, reconstructing, or maintaining trust, literature on risk and crisis communication often points to such aspects as demonstrating
honesty, empathy, and competency (Meredith et al., 2007) or openness and shared interest (Eiser et al., 2009). This list of strategies
bears a clear resemblance to, and is in part inspired by, the classical
rhetorical concept of ethos, defined as the speaker’s demonstration
of competency, virtue, and goodwill (Aristotle, trans. 2006; Peters
et al., 1997). Generally, trust can be seen as a relational concept,
often informed by rational assessment and experiences; a popular
definition by Hardin sees trust as “A trusting B to do X” (2001).
Trustworthiness can be understood as more of a moral quality,
something you are perceived as, in order to support trust being
placed in you (Hardin, 1996). We argue that studying trustworthiness through the rhetorical construct of ethos provides a clear
foundation for the conceptualization of trust, generally, and holds
advantages for the application of the concept within crisis and risk
communication, specifically.
First, ethos is a constantly renegotiated quality; it is an evaluation of the communicator that is performed by the audience and
based on rhetorical artifacts, communicated at particular times
as responses to particular problems (McCroskey, 1966). Second,
rhetorical theory allows for a more nuanced understanding of
efficient risk and crisis communication; in crisis situations, communication is rarely conducted by one single actor with supreme
authority. Instead, the official response to the pandemic is the
responsibility of overlapping official actors, from public health
institutions (PHIs), such as the U.S. Centers for Disease Control
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and Prevention (CDC), to state and local political entities, governments, and decision makers. Here, the modern theory of the
rhetorical situation (Bitzer, 1968) may provide a structured process for identifying the constraints and opportunities available to
organizations.
In order to investigate how PHIs may draw on ethos-based
communication during the rhetorical situation of a pandemic, we
have chosen to focus on two such organizations, operating in the
national context of Norway. Thus, our research questions are:
RQ1: How did the Norwegian PHIs attempt to strengthen, maintain, or rebuild ethos through their communication during the first
10 months of the COVID-19 pandemic?
RQ2: How were the strategies for strengthening ethos influenced by
the rhetorical situation of the pandemic?
RQ3: What are the general implications of the Norwegian PHIs’ use of
ethos-based communication in the rhetorical situation of the COVID19 pandemic for risk and crisis communication?

In order to answer these questions, we have conducted a qualitative study based on interviews and participant observation
during Spring and Autumn 2020 in the communication departments of two Norwegian PHIs.
Norway is generally recognized as a country characterized by
high trust in institutions and largely built its pandemic response on
voluntary adherence to guidelines. So far, the country has avoided
some of the more dramatic effects of the pandemic in terms of the
numbers affected, without having to resort to more invasive measures, such as curfews (Ursin et al., 2020). Internal weekly reports
on trust made available to us consistently indicated that 80 to 90%
of the population describe having high trust in the health authorities’ handling of the crisis (4 or 5 on a 5-point scale). We argue
that studying the rhetorical construction of trustworthiness in a
country where it seems to have been effective, both in the past
and during the pandemic, should be of interest to researchers and
practitioners of risk and crisis communication.
The paper is structured as follows: We will establish the context
of our study by presenting the structure of the Norwegian health
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authorities before reviewing the relevant literature and presenting
our theoretical framework. Subsequently, we outline the methodological framework and move on to the analysis of our case organizations’ communication work during the first 10 months of the
pandemic.
The Norwegian Health Authorities’ Role
in Communicating the Pandemic Response
Most countries have one or several PHIs, although their role,
autonomy, and function differ. Norway has two main PHIs with
central roles during pandemics, the Norwegian Institute of Public
Health (NIPH) and the Directorate of Health (DOH). While the
NIPH is responsible for tracking and reacting to outbreaks of infectious or food-borne diseases, both organizations hold a central
role in the plans for pandemic response (Norwegian Department
of Health, 2014). The NIPH has a stronger emphasis on research
than the DOH (NIPH, 2016), whereas the latter “shall improve the
health of the citizens and the community as a whole . . . by virtue
of its role as an executive agency, as a regulatory authority and as
an implementing authority in areas of health policy” (Norwegian
Directorate of Health, 2019, Public mandate section). In combination, and collaborating closely with the Norwegian government
to whom both ultimately report, the two PHIs hold the necessary
expertise and authority to establish and effectuate the national
pandemic response.

Literature Review
In discussion of crisis communication, pandemics are typical
examples of crises, whereas communicating about health risks,
such as potential infectious diseases, is often mentioned as a form
of risk communication. In situating the COVID-19 pandemic—
and, hence, our data material—it is relevant to consider the interrelations of risk and crisis. Generally, we agree with Seeger (2006)
who asserts that while the two terms describe slightly different
functions, they are often unified in practice. During the COVID19 pandemic, some functions of PHI communication could best be
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described as risk communication. Simultaneously, the PHIs were
clearly involved in crisis communication, attempting to manage
and provide information about the ongoing crisis and potential
developments while maintaining their own credibility and position as organizations. It might be possible to break down individual rhetorical acts or statements in order to define them as either
crisis or risk communication, but issues of trust clearly cut across
the two domains. Hence, we sidestep the question of the interrelations between risk and crisis communication during the pandemic
at present and, instead, aim to identify and detail the role of ethos
across the PHIs’ communication strategies.
In order to examine the role of ethos-based communication
during the pandemic, we will first introduce the concept of the
rhetorical situation. We argue that this contextual analytical framework is highly suitable to capture the challenges and possibilities
for communication from public institutions during a pandemic.
Public Communication Work, Pandemics,
and the Rhetorical Situation
The concept of the rhetorical situation was first introduced by
Bitzer (1968), who considered it to consist of three elements, an
exigence or pressing problem that can be influenced through communication, an audience that the rhetor aims at persuading, and
constraints in the form of rhetorical, physical, or cultural conditions of possibility for achieving the desired outcome (Bitzer,
1968). Subsequently, the concept has been nuanced theoretically
and adapted to current media environments, as scholars have
argued that (technological) affordances and other (media) possibilities should be included in analyses of the rhetorical situation
in order to avoid a deterministic understanding of rhetoric (Ihlen,
2011; Kjeldsen, 2015).
The framework of the rhetorical situation is important for
our understanding of the communication of the PHIs during the
pandemic. Establishing this starting point allows us to incorporate some of the contextual challenges and opportunities faced by
organizations during a pandemic, as already presented in crisis
and risk communication literature.
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One existing study specifically examines how the Hong Kong
government dealt with challenges of trust during the 2003 SARS
outbreak (Lee, 2009). Here, factors that differentiate public crisis
management from similar work in private companies are identified. One such challenge can arise from the complexity of public
bureaucracy which might result in inconsistencies in statements
made by different parts of the government. This can enhance communication and coordination problems between the government
and the public and create an impression of sub-optimal crisis
management that shapes present and future expectations of the
government as well as the public’s willingness to adhere to advice
(Lee, 2009).
Similarly, Liu and Horsley (2007) argue that public sector
communication work is shaped by several environmental and
contextual challenges, including the political aspects of all decisions, the specific expectation of serving the public and increased
scrutiny from the media and the public. At the same time, inconsistencies and disagreements between agencies and actors can also
be a result of differences in interpretations of what technical or
scientific information might be appropriate to divulge to the public (Chess & Clarke, 2007).
Existing research has also pointed to contextual factors in trust
between various types of organizations. While private industry
received the greatest increase in trust scores through demonstrating openness, the effects on trust in government institutions was
most significant when they demonstrated competency. This can be
taken to indicate that organizational trust is increased by breaking stereotypes such as public institutions being impersonal or
bureaucratic or private companies valuing their own profit over
the public good (Peters et al., 1997).
Although these studies do not use the terminology of the
rhetorical situation, they identify contextual and situated factors
in what rhetorical strategies constitute a fitting response in each
instance. We argue that the rhetorical situation as a theoretical lens
can contribute to a better understanding of these factors. In order
to add to these insights, we turn to the question of how ethos may
help address the constraints of the current situation of the PHIs.
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The Rhetorical Tradition—Organizational Rhetoric and Ethos
Since its inception, the aim of rhetoric has been to systematically
study the various means available for persuasion through communication (Aristotle, trans. 2006, 1.2.1). While the ancient tradition had a focus on individuals as rhetors, the modern field of
organizational rhetoric is dedicated to the study of communication
on behalf of larger entities such as private companies and public
authorities (Ihlen & Heath, 2018). This field rests on the premise
that organizations must communicate as collective actors in order
to achieve their goals. Hence, scholars of organizational rhetoric
study how organizations go about their communicative business,
drawing on a wide array of work from both classical and modern
rhetoric (Ihlen & Heath, 2018).
Here, ethos, the appeal to the communicator’s trustworthiness,
is a central mode of persuasion (Baumlin & Scisco, 2018), as this
is particularly challenging for a collective actor who must establish
itself through communication. Ethos is generally understood as
consisting of three dimensions: competency, virtue, and goodwill.
Speakers who demonstrate these capacities, it is implied, will be
more readily believed than others (Aristotle, trans. 2006, 2.2.5).
In this article, we explore how organizations may use rhetorical appeals to ethos to influence audiences’ trust in them and
their messages. For the practical analysis, we will operationalize
the three core parts of ethos as outlined by Aristotle combined
with modern notions of organizational ethos. In exploring the
dimension of practical wisdom as this relates to the demonstration of competency, such practical wisdom can be demonstrated
or strengthened through the use of formal or scientific language
(Ihlen, 2009); it can also be formalized as expertise, operationalized in messages that present scientific methods or approach (Xu
et al., 2020). The dimension of virtue has previously been operationalized in rhetorical theory as the use of partnerships with
trustworthy organizations and endorsements (Ihlen, 2009), while
persuasion theory has operationalized the related concept of honesty as being open about potential negative sides of the organization’s own position (Xu et al., 2020).
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Finally, goodwill has been tied to the demonstration of understanding, empathy, and responsiveness to communication from
others (McCroskey & Teven, 1999). In analyzing interview transcripts and field notes, we have treated segments that concern any
of these elements as connected to the rhetorical construction of
the organization’s ethos and analyzed them accordingly.

Method
The data material for the paper consists of (1) field notes gathered through participant observations in the communication
departments of the NIPH and DOH during the Spring and Fall
of 2020 (specifically, 6 days NIPH and 4 days DOH during March
and April followed by 5 additional days of observation at NIPH in
August); and (2) eight in-depth, qualitative semi-structured interviews, four in each organization, during the Fall of 2020.
Participant observation was chosen both as a way of capturing
the complexities of organizations as communicators (Ybema et al.,
2009, pp. 1–3) and as a way of ensuring a real-time perspective
on how the communication work was conducted and negotiated
during the height of the pandemic. As “a method for producing
data about realities, a way to systematically transcribe processes as
they are pursued and narrated by research subjects and observed
and experienced by the researcher” (Nielsen, 2012, p. 190), participant observation can be helpful in describing complex social
realities. It can be difficult to capture the uncertain and changing
nature of crises and disasters in structured and systematic fieldwork (Horsley, 2012), but our study was facilitated by the fact that
we had already established contact with one PHI and done extensive background research on the plans for pandemic communication prior to the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. As part of
negotiating access, a confidentiality agreement concerning classified and personal information was signed. During observations,
field notes were gathered by hand for each individual day, along
with reflective notes about possible interpretations, challenges,
concerns, and areas for further investigation.
In order to analyze and interpret the results of ethnographic
studies, it is necessary to triangulate the data gathered through
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observation. This was done methodologically by supplementing
with qualitative interviews and through a triangulation of sites for
observation with time spent at two different sites, with two different organizations at two different times (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow,
2009).
The interviews included in the study were semi-structured,
lasting around one hour each. Prior to the interviews, an interview guide was created, addressing central questions concerning
communication during the pandemic as well as more general
strategies for crisis and risk communication in the organizations.
The semi-structured approach allowed for the interviewer to adapt
the questions asked, based both on replies given to previous questions and the roles and responsibilities of the individual interview
subject within the communication departments. This approach to
interviews was informed by Kvale and Brinkmann’s (2009) sevenstep approach to qualitative interviews. In selecting interview
subjects, we focused on covering different aspects of the organizations’ communication work, picking both general managers and
employees working in the various internal teams responsible for
press work, social media and owned media. With the exception of
one online conversation, all interviews were conducted in person.
Field notes and transcripts of the interviews were analyzed in
order to thematically identify segments concerning issues of trust
and trustworthiness. Subsequently, selected illustrative quotes
from the interviews were translated by the first author for inclusion in the paper. The final included quotes were presented to the
interview subjects and approved. While we aim to provide rich
descriptions and interpretations grounded in the perceived reality
of employees in the chosen organizations, we do not claim generalizability from our cases to all PHIs facing a pandemic. Informed
by the concept of the rhetorical situation with its emphasis on contextual affordances and hindrances to efficient rhetorical action,
we argue that such generalization would, at best, be thin and, at
worst, misleading. We do, however, intend for our analysis to be
helpful both to academics and to practitioners, as we seek to draw
lessons from what is surely not the best-case scenario but maybe
one “as-good-as-it-gets” case for communicating the COVID-19
pandemic response.
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Results and Discussion
The Pandemic as a Rhetorical Situation
As mentioned initially, we argue that the rhetorical situation
(Bitzer, 1968) is an important theoretical lens for understanding
the complexities, challenges, and affordances surrounding public sector communication work during the pandemic. In order
to understand how the situation shaped the choices made by the
PHIs included in the study, it is first necessary to understand what
rhetorical problem they attempted to solve through their communication. The main objective is simple enough; PHIs attempted to
convey scientifically sound information about the nature of the
pandemic, the official state response as well as recommendations
for additional actions for individuals to protect themselves and
contribute to halting the spread of the pandemic. As one interview
subject, H1 at the DOH described it:
The goal of our communication has been to gain adherence from the
population, to have trust. We have worked along three axes: Building
knowledge, achieving trust, and ensuring that people have the right
behavior. That last one is hard, because it is about changing behavior.
(H1, DOH, Personal communication, 10.2020)

The broadly defined exigence of the pandemic means that the
rhetorical audience for organizations such as NIPH and the DOH
becomes the entire population of their country, primarily the general public, as these are “the mediators of change” who can resolve
the situation by acting in compliance with the PHIs’ advice. Simultaneously, the PHIs also communicate with several other target
groups, such as the medical community and the government itself.
Communicating to such a wide target group can be challenging, and subgroups within the general public have been identified
as particularly important, either because they are not reached by
general communication through the media or because statistics
and surveys have shown that they are not adhering to the guidelines as diligently as the rest of the population. The latter was, for
instance, evident during observations of the production and promotion of an instruction video for the correct use of face masks
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where both the choice of actor and targeting of the video aimed at
reaching people between the age of 20–30, particularly males.
In our analysis of the rhetorical situation, we must understand
the contextual constraints as well as the tools and resources that are
available to the PHIs to resolve the exigence. As a starting point,
the Norwegian PHIs are well-known and have a certain amount
of pre-built trustworthiness and recognition among the public.
For instance, polling conducted prior to the pandemic showed
that 60% of the population had a positive impression of the DOH
(IPSOS, 2020). Further, both organizations have pre-existing plans
for risk and crisis communication as well as valuable experiences
from previous public health crises in the country (Brekke et al.,
2017). Being official parts of the national crisis response also offers
tools that are not necessarily available to communication departments in private industry or the corporate world, such as the ability of communicating directly to all cellular devices in the country,
or direct lines of communication with health professionals all over
the country.
Regarding the ethos of the PHIs as a situational affordance as
well as a rhetorical strategy, we argue that their role and function
in the overall system of health care and governance strengthens
their initial credibility; they are not organizations who have to
build their reputation from scratch but are already established as
the scientific authority when it comes to public health. In an interview conducted prior to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic,
R1 at the NIPH described how establishing trust is central to communication work for the organization:
Building trust in the public is a frequent topic for us. We are aware that
the population presently shows a high degree of trust in us, and we
work to obtain and maintain this trust. We are especially aware that
we need this trust in a crisis situation, in order for our advice to be listened to and followed. (R1, NIPH, Personal communication, 01.2020)

The pre-established trust should be seen as an important affordance that influences how the organizations handle the rhetorical
problems of the pandemic.
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In the following sections we will identify and discuss some of
the rhetorical strategies for strengthening ethos employed by the
PHIs in Norway, relating these strategies to the complexity of the
rhetorical situation.
Ethos through Competency/Practical Wisdom
First, we consider the strategy of building ethos through the
display of practical knowledge, understood as trustworthiness
derived from the impression that the speaker is competent, qualified, and knows what they are talking about (Baumlin & Scisco,
2018; Ihlen, 2009). One of the challenges of risk and crisis situations in general, and pandemics in particular, is that they are characterized by uncertainty, both among the public and among the
experts (Seeger & Sellnow, 2019). One interesting example is from
the informant H1 at DOH who emphasized the need to increase
knowledge among the population as part of the communication
work during the pandemic:
We attempt to build an understanding of the situation we are all in
[. . .] increasing the level of knowledge and the competency among
every individual. I think that is quite central because if you know,
understand and see the context, it becomes a lot easier to trust in the
decisions and the general handling that is being done. So, we have
spent a lot of time explaining, simplifying and so on, and it’s been
quite complex because our advice has been changing quite frequently
and the advice has been quite complicated through the pandemic.
(H1, DOH, Personal communication, 10.2020)

Here, the organization seeks to build its own competency in
and through active attempts to build the knowledge and understanding of the audience. The situation makes it necessary to take
the time to repeat and explain in detail the various aspects of their
decisions in order to make it possible for the audience to understand and accept the measures as necessary. Simultaneously, the
organization strengthens its competency and expertise insofar as
the audience deems it to be knowledgeable and adept at communicating its knowledge.
Along similar lines, several informants spoke of strategies to
adapt to and improve communication through the use of feedback
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from the public, particularly when the feedback indicated that the
communication might be confusing or unclear. One informant,
H4 at the DOH, described the feedback process as follows:
Continuous adaptation and adjustment, I think so [that it was important for their successful communication work], we call it the golden
triangle in our team. We publish on [health website], people ask questions through the phone or through our chat-bot as well as feedback
through [health website] and then we revise it. (H4, DOH, Personal
communication, 10.2020)

While giving clear and easily understood advice might seem
like an obvious tactic of risk and crisis communication, the uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic presents a potential challenge
that our informants had to react to. Noting how the need to communicate quickly is in conflict with the desire to communicate
correctly, another informant, H2 at the DOH, said:
If we had been standing there, unsure about what to say, being late
with our comments or said “no, we have to get back to you on that,”
“we don’t know,” or “I can’t say,” if we had chosen that way of communicating I think we would have started out with a deficit [in trust]
[.] And that’s why. [the assistant director of the DOH] as well as [the
director of the DOH] has been very clear and very skilled at communicating through the entire period, but they have, even when we do
not know, said that “I can’t say for sure, but.” So, we have taken that
approach with a lot of things, and I think that has worked well. (H2,
DOH, Personal communication, 10.2020)

What the informant describes here, can in many ways be seen
as a balancing act between different best practice principles of crisis communication (Covello, 2010; Seeger, 2006; Seeger & Sellnow,
2019), defending the trustworthiness of the organization while
simultaneously recognizing the inherent uncertainty of the situation and answering a need for information even when information
is scarce or contested.
The fact that several different organizations, who did not always
agree with each other, were involved in official communication
about the pandemic can be seen as a characteristic of the rhetorical
situation that challenges the organizations’ ability to demonstrate
practical wisdom. This was not only the case in the COVID-19
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pandemic, but also during the Norwegian handling of the N1H1
pandemic (Brekke et al., 2017). When two different organizations,
both billed as experts responsible for devising strategy, disagree
with each other, it could potentially hurt the ethos, not only of
the individual organizations but of the official pandemic response
as a whole. This concern seemed strong during the first round of
observations at the NIPH in March, as the issue of how to handle
conflicting statements between the organizations and the DOH,
who at the time held separate press conferences each day, was
intensely discussed at meetings and in casual encounters between
the lead author and members of the communication staff. In the
follow-up interviews we asked informants about these episodes
of conflicting opinions and their potential effect on ethos, receiving varied answers. One informant from the DOH, for instance,
emphasized that the collaboration between the PHIs had worked
out well. When asked about potential negative impact on trust, the
informant, H2, replied that:
You would think so, but I do not think it has led to our position being
weakened in daily communication. Maybe it could have been in certain periods [of the pandemic] if there had been a lot of cases centered
around [NIPH] saying this thing and [DOH] saying that thing. There
have been some cases like that, where it has been a bit contested, but
I don’t think there have been too many. There haven’t been that many
big media cases about conflict. (H2, DOH Personal communication,
10.2020)

Most respondents seem to agree that conflicting advice
between the different institutions has not been that big of a problem for trustworthiness in communication about the pandemic, at
least not in its early stages. In fact, several informants highlighted
that communication and collaboration between the different organizations seemed to have worked well throughout the crisis, with
daily meetings and coordination efforts.
That is not to say that the number of organizations involved
did not lead to challenges in the rhetorical work during the pandemic. During observation at the two PHIs, it was repeatedly clear
that an important constraint was the fact that neither organization
was the ultimate authority regarding what advice would eventually
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be given and what regulations would be introduced. Instead, this
was the prerogative of the government/the minister of health. This
was especially evident during the period of observations at the
DOH in April 2020. The lead author followed the communication
department in the days prior to an important press conference,
which was to announce the first instances of easing of regulations,
including the opening of kindergartens and the lifting of a controversial ban on visits to secondary property such as cabins. The
week before this press conference, recommendations had been
given by the DOH and the NIPH in a report. However, early feedback indicated that recommendations in this report were likely to
be overruled by the government. This led the PHIs to spend significant time and energy strategizing and preparing for a rhetorical
challenge where their expert opinion was likely to be overruled.
This all changed a few hours before the press conference when the
PHIs were notified through email that the final decision would
end up being largely in line with the recommendations from the
DOH, with the exceptions of a few dates being pushed back.
Bringing this back to our theoretical framework, we would
argue that we can see clear examples of the rhetorical situation
challenging the use of ethos strategies tied to practical knowledge.
However, as the next section will show, the organizations were able
to draw on other dimensions of ethos in ways that mollified the
negative consequences of challenges to the dimension of practical
knowledge.
Ethos through Demonstrations of Virtue
Ethos through the demonstration of virtue was visible in the
answers from several of our informants in various ways, particularly through the perceived independence of the NIPH. One
example highlights how disagreement between authorities, which
might challenge ethos through competency (Baumlin & Scisco,
2018), can actually strengthen the overall trustworthiness, as it
displays openness and honesty:
One of the things that has contributed to people trusting us has been
that we have been open about what we recommend, even when the
government has decided on something else. [ . . . ] At least that is
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something I believe should strengthen the trust in the recommendations. (R2, NIPH, Personal communication, 10.2020)

Other informants similarly pointed to the importance of professional honesty to establish trustworthiness:
Being open, to be transparent so that it does not seem like you are
holding anything back in your professional assessment. Show that we
are not gagged, we are definitely part of the team, but we make our
own decisions and are free to express them. I think that gives credibility. (R7, NIPH, Personal communication, 10.2020)

Through a rhetorical lens, we can understand what is described
here as a fitting response to a rhetorical situation where the presence of several organizations might challenge the ability to build
trust through the demonstration of practical wisdom. Instead of
being weakened by the presence of conflicting opinions, the organizations are able to present their willingness to stand by their
opinions, even if they are challenged or ignored by other experts,
as a demonstration of virtue, in this case professional integrity,
honesty, and the courage of conviction.
During observations at the NIPH in the Fall of 2020, it was
also possible to observe the active preservation of virtue in the
form of guarding the perceived independence of the organization
from the political leadership of the Ministry of Health and Care
Services (MOH). When the governing party and the opposition
were having a public dispute concerning the recommendation to
restrict the operation of bars and nightclubs, the MOH inquired
if the NIPH would be able to provide scientific backing for the
policy. The NIPH feared that this could be seen as them being a
party in a political disagreement and decided it would not provide
such backing. In the end, the MOH used numbers provided by the
NIPH as part of their weekly reports about sites and locations for
transmission of the virus, but without the NIPH being perceived
as an active part responding to the desires of the government.
Ethos through Goodwill
One central constraint in the rhetorical situation faced by the
organizations in this study is that they are public and partially
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bureaucratic organizations. Expectations tied to such organizations’ language, tone, and emotional distance could be seen as
barriers to their demonstration of goodwill (Liu & Horsley, 2007;
McCroskey & Teven, 1999). Personal, emotional, and informal
communication, classical strategies for emphasizing goodwill,
are not traits traditionally associated with public sector organizations—and while demonstrating such traits might strengthen
the display of goodwill, it could lower trustworthiness in other
respects.
In this light, it is interesting that both organizations showed
signs of active use of rhetorical strategies that display empathy and
even identification with the audience, and several respondents
mentioned that they believed these strategies had helped them in
securing their audiences’ trust. For instance, R3 at the NIPH provided the following evaluation of the active use of social media:
And we got feedback last week where it was clear throughout that they
had trust in us, but also our way of speaking to them [the audience],
the ones commenting appeared to enjoy the way we talked to them.
That it is not the typical government or public service way of speaking.
Many would think that formality would increase trust, but I think you
benefit from having a more personal tone. (R3, NIPH, Personal communication, 09.2020)

Understood as a rhetorical strategy for strengthening ethos,
the use of personal, informal language as well as engaging in dialogue through social media demonstrates to the audience that the
speaker, in this case the NIPH, considers audience members as
individuals and cares enough about them to address them individually (McCroskey & Teven, 1999).
Interestingly, this approach to dialogue through social media
does not seem to have been prioritized at the DOH where the
communication department made an early decision to emphasize
what they described as “one-to-many” communication. However,
some strategies for demonstrating goodwill were visible in how
this “one-to-many” communication was designed. One informant,
for instance, mentioned how they took care in ensuring a sense
of safety in the reader and taking steps to include more personal
language such as the use of “you” and “those close to you” in their
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messages. This description, of something as simple as the use of
the word “you” being effective in building trustworthiness for the
organization, could be related to the idea of breaking with the stereotype of the cold and impersonal public organization (Peters et
al., 1997). At the same time, this informant emphasizes the more
general point that receiving the information needed to feel safe
can strengthen the impression that the organization has the citizens’ best interests in mind.
While the PHIs were willing to actively build goodwill aspects
of ethos in their communication, they were also aware of the expectations placed on their communication as public institutions. This
was, perhaps, best exemplified in observations at the DOH during
a meeting discussing a concrete campaign for a contact-tracing
app. During the meeting, participants discussed a planned promotional video using well-known comedians and humor to promote
the message that if enough people used the app it would be easier
to reopen society. It became clear from the discussion that the general tone and humor seemed to break with the participants’ idea of
tone and content from the organizations, and the campaign, ultimately, did not make it past the planning stage. This observation,
then, points to the issue of balancing the various appeals to ethos
and not prioritizing one aspect at the expense of others.

Conclusion
Returning to our initial research questions, we can conclude
that rhetorical strategies relying on the demonstration of ethos
(Aristotle, trans. 2006; Baumlin & Scisco, 2018) were clearly visible
in the communication strategy of the Norwegian PHIs included
in the study. Various aspects of demonstrating practical knowledge, virtue, and goodwill (Baumlin & Scisco, 2018; McCroskey
& Teven, 1999) were brought up by informants and appeared as
central concerns during participant observation. However, the
demonstration of ethos dimensions did not take the form of simply checking boxes or following existing principles, but had to be
adapted and changed according to a changing and challenging
rhetorical situation (Bitzer, 1968).
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Relying on our qualitative approach, particularly participant
observations, allowed us to capture how this rhetorical situation
was shaped by aspects pertaining to the character of the pandemic
as well as by conditions related to the PHIs’ position within the Norwegian system of pandemic response as public institutions (Peters
et al., 1997). Simultaneously, the affordance of preexisting public
trust in Norwegian institutions meant that the organizations’ main
task was to maintain their trustworthiness, rather than having to
build it from scratch. In practice, this might have influenced how
the PHIs were able to pivot away from dimensions of trust that
were challenged by the rhetorical situation by, for instance, relying on virtue dimensions when practical knowledge was rendered
unavailable. Honesty and the courage to stick by your views in the
face of disagreement was highlighted by informants as strengthening their ethos.
At the same time, there are important limitations to our study.
First, contextualization is an inherent condition of our approach.
While we can describe the pandemic response of the Norwegian
PHIs as fitting to their specific situation, using the same strategies
in another context might have led to a different result. In a country
such as Sweden, where PHIs have more authority and autonomy in
designing and executing the pandemic response (Jakobsen, 2020),
navigation of the inherent uncertainty of a global pandemic has
taken a different form. Further, even within the same country, we
would probably have reached different conclusions had this study
been focused on government communication work, originating
from the MOH or from the office of the prime minister. Finally,
there is reason to believe that results would have been different
in studies conducted in countries with lower levels of pre-existing
societal trust.
These limitations point to the importance of a situated, rhetorically grounded approach to further research on risk and crisis
communication, one that incorporates an understanding of the
rhetorical situation. Further research that details the rhetorical situations of responding to the COVID-19 pandemic in various contexts can contribute to the field of risk and crisis communication
by charting some of the more common challenges to building trust

266

OFFERDAL, JUST, and IHLEN

in crisis situations and, possibly, point to general ways of overcoming them.
Such further research would contribute to expanding existing best-practice advice (Seeger, 2006; Seeger & Sellnow, 2019),
which in its current form mainly relies on meta-examination of
crises, toward practical advice based on a deeper understanding
of the uniqueness of both specific risks and crises and of the organizations involved in responding to them. For the PHIs in our
study, this could mean incorporating and emphasizing independence as a central virtue in their communication work prior to
the next pandemic outbreak. Further, a general effort by PHIs,
the ministry, and the government in constructing a joint ethos of
the overarching health management field might be considered.
Strengthening the public’s understanding of the process of deciding on a response, including how scientific knowledge relies on
hypotheses, attempts at falsification and scientific advancement,
could serve as an inoculation against potential negative effects of
disagreement between scientific authorities, while simultaneously
strengthening the potential of virtue-based ethos strategies.
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ABSTRACT
This study provides an understanding of how employees’ perception of organizational
transparency during the long-lasting situation of the COVID-19 pandemic engendered
their job engagement as well as job disengagement. Data were collected by means of
an online survey among 410 employees in Austria during March 2021. Results show
that employees’ perception of their organization’s approach to transparency directly
influenced their job engagement and disengagement. Importantly, the relationship
between transparency and job engagement was also mediated through organizational trust, and job-specific state anxiety mediated the relationship between transparency and job disengagement. The results imply the importance of transparency
during times of great uncertainty and emphasize the necessity to closely consider
employees’ emotional states and worries during a crisis.
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At the beginning of 2020, the COVID-19 virus started to spread
suddenly and uncontrollably all over the world, resulting in a
pandemic and a major social and economic global disaster with
widespread implications for the public and private sectors alike.
In many organizations, the COVID-19 pandemic spawned a
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crisis, as it was an unexpected event with high uncertainty and
ambiguity (Coombs, 2015) where control within the organization
was not constantly maintained. In such a situation, organizations
have to inform their employees about crisis-related changes, meet
their needs to reduce job-specific anxiety (Spielberger et al., 1983),
and maintain trust in management (Hon & Grunig, 1999).
To contain the spread of the virus, the Austrian government—like many other governments in Europe and all over the
world—has ordered several shutdowns since March 2020, which
led to radical changes regarding organizations’ freedom to operate. The long-lasting crisis situation has involved many restrictions
that caused hardship and uncertainty for organizations and their
employees. Thus, a major organizational concern and an economic
necessity are to ensure employees’ continued job engagement (Chanana & Sangeeta, 2020; Mani & Mishra, 2020), which is defined
as the degree to which individuals stay attentive and absorbed in
the performance of their jobs (Saks, 2006). If employees disengage
with their jobs, an organization’s performance can suffer severely
(Wollard, 2011). To achieve job engagement and minimize the
risk of job disengagement, effective internal crisis communication is vital (Strandberg & Vigsø, 2016), which is defined as “the
communicative interaction among managers and employees, in a
private or public organization, before, during and after an organizational or societal crisis” (Johansen et al., 2012, p. 271). During
the COVID-19 pandemic, practitioners and employees alike have
called for a transparent, helpful, and bidirectional organizational
communication approach (Argenti, 2020; Orangefiery, 2020).
Extant research has not only highlighted the role of governmental transparency during the COVID-19 (Moon, 2020) and
SARS pandemics (Menon & Goh, 2005) but also demonstrated
the importance of organizational transparency to build trust and
alleviate stress (Spalluto et al., 2020). Under normal conditions,
employee communication benefits from a transparent approach
in which managers communicate substantial information, give
options for participation, and hold themselves accountable (Rawlins, 2009). Transparency is considered a key element in strategic
communication (Albu & Wehmeier, 2014), and research has shown
positive effects of transparency perceptions on organizational
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identification (Men et al., 2020), employee engagement (Jiang &
Men, 2017; Men & Hung-Baesecke, 2015), trust (Rawlins, 2009;
Yue et al., 2019), internal reputation and improvement of the
quality of employee-organization relationships (Men, 2014; Men
& Stacks, 2014), positive communication behavior (Kim, 2018), as
well as health information disclosure intentions (Lee & Li, 2020).
The role of transparent communication in organizational crises
can be explained by drawing on the social exchange theory (Blau,
1964), which describes how the deployment of organizational
resources results in employees’ reciprocation in terms of prosocial attitudes and behavior. Transparent organizational communication can be seen as a socioemotional resource (Foa & Foa, 1980)
that employees may repay with trust in their management and job
engagement (Saks, 2006). However, if employees do not experience transparency from their organization, they may feel discouraged to return any resources. Even worse, a lack of transparency
may enhance employees’ uncertainty and anxiety experienced
during times of crisis and cause them to disengage from their job
by disconnecting from their work roles (Kahn, 1990). Currently,
not much is known about the actual value of transparency perceptions in warding off negative reactions and strengthening positive
ones during organizational crisis situations like those caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore, the aim of this study is to
examine the role of transparency perceptions in strengthening job
engagement and buffering job disengagement during a time where
high uncertainty is expressed and employees depend on support
not just from the government but also from their employers. This
research aims to reveal the influence of employees’ perceptions of
transparent internal crisis communication during the COVID-19
pandemic on their job engagement and disengagement and unveil
factors that mediate this relationship.
The present study strengthens our understanding of crisis
communication during a major pandemic in several ways. First,
we provide empirical evidence for the value of a specific crisis
communication approach that has been considered a problemsolving mechanism for different societal challenges (Ringel, 2017).
Second, the study contributes to crisis communication literature
(e.g., Frandsen & Johansen, 2011; Heide & Simonsson, 2020) by
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integrating the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) to explain the
potential of transparent communication during a crisis to stimulate the reciprocation of job engagement and prevent job disengagement. Third, the study sheds light on the effects of crisis
communication on an under-researched, yet success-critical construct: job disengagement. It further reveals the role of job-specific
anxiety, which is an emotional response in times of health uncertainty (J. Hu et al., 2020) for job disengagement. The study aims
to stimulate the debate on the value of a transparent approach in
crisis communication to protect organizations from negative outcomes. Finally, its results will encourage communication scholars
to rethink the conceptualization of transparent communication.
After outlining the main constructs, theory, and deriving
hypotheses, we will present the results of a survey conducted
during the COVID-19 pandemic among 410 people employed in
organizations in Austria. The paper concludes with a discussion,
theoretical and practical implications, limitations, and ideas for
further research.

Literature Review
Transparent Organizational Communication during Crises
The public attribution of transparency is considered to be a celebrated, respected ideal and aspiration of modern society (e.g.,
Christensen & Cheney, 2015). During the COVID-19 pandemic,
practitioners have stressed the importance of a transparent communication approach. Argenti (2020), for example, advises those
responsible for corporate communication to transparently explain
what they know about the crisis, from where they obtain knowledge about the events surrounding the crisis, and what they do
not know. A survey among adults employed in the U.S. supports
this claim by emphasizing the demands for a transparent organizational communication approach from employees (Orangefiery,
2020).
From a conceptual point of view, organizational transparency
is inspired by considerations from management and strategic
communication research (Men & Stacks, 2014; Rawlins, 2009).
According to Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2016), transparency
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perceptions are the degree of perceived information disclosure,
clarity, and accuracy. Therefore, researchers have defined transparency as “the perceived quality of intentionally shared information
from a sender” (p. 1788). In communications, the multidimensional conceptualization by Rawlins (2009) is frequently used,
based on which Men and Stacks (2014) defined internal transparent communication as “an organization’s communication to make
available all legally releasable information to employees whether
positive or negative in nature—in a manner that is accurate, timely,
balanced, and unequivocal, for the purpose of enhancing the reasoning ability of employees, and holding organizations accountable for their actions, policies, and practices” (p. 306). Specifically,
Rawlins (2009) found empirical support for the combination of
three dimensions, or organizational efforts, to create perceptions
of transparency (Balkin, 1999): (1) the distribution of substantial
information; (2) the provision of possibilities for participation
to identify stakeholders needs; and (3) objective reporting about
organizational activities and actions to hold the organization
accountable (Rawlins, 2009).1
The first dimension, substantial information, comes close
to the understanding of the transparency concept as defined by
Schnackenberg und Tomlinson (2016). Rawlins referred to this
as the sharing of information that is relevant, clear, complete,
accurate, reliable, and verifiable in a timely manner. During the
COVID-19 pandemic, in particular, sharing general crisis-related
information about the virus and respective regulations in addition
to providing employee-oriented instructions on what to do and
not do have been considered core elements of crisis communication (Heide & Simonsson, 2020). Rawlins’s second dimension, participation, is considered essential to find out stakeholders’ needs
and wants. The importance of providing platforms for discussion
has also been emphasized in the crisis communication literature
(Heide & Simonsson, 2020). The third dimension, accountability,
means to focus on areas that require improvement and to expose
1. Rawlins proposed a fourth dimension of transparency, which he termed secrecy.
A closer look at this dimension reveals that it means the opposite of dissemination of
substantial information; therefore, it is not separately integrated in the model.
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the organization’s weaknesses (Rawlins, 2009). This demonstrates
responsibility and the ability to take criticism, thereby enhancing
the organization’s ethical nature (Men & Stacks, 2014). Rawlins
(2009) concluded that striving for transparency entails integrity,
respect, and openness, which also engenders stakeholder trust
(Balkin, 1999).
Empirical research on the value and effects of a transparent
approach during a crisis situation on employees has become more
prevalent in recent years. It has been shown that transparent communication stimulates employees’ sensemaking and sensegiving
processes during a crisis, which highlights the importance of ensuring participation, evaluating strategic communication behavior,
and developing further communication strategies (Kim, 2018).
For the external organization context, the relationship between
transparency and trust was experimentally investigated by Auger
(2014), who confirmed the positive effect of transparency on the
public’s trust and support. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, Lee and Li (2021) showed that transparent information is
relevant to increasing public trust. As employees are important
receivers of crisis information (Strandberg & Vigsø, 2016), more
research about the effects of internal transparent communication
is needed.
Job Engagement and Job Disengagement
Job engagement matters, especially during a worldwide pandemic
with massive effects on the economy and organizations (Chanana
& Sangeeta, 2020; Mani & Mishra, 2020). There are various conceptualizations and research streams on the antecedents and effects of
engagement in the working context (Shen & Jiang, 2019). Drawing
on Kahn (1990), Saks proposed a concept differentiating between
job engagement and organizational engagement. In this study, we
focus on job engagement, which Saks (2006) defined as “cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral components that are associated with
individual role performance” (p. 602). It is rather “the degree to
which an individual is attentive and absorbed in the performance
of their roles” (Saks, 2006, p. 602) than a mere attitude held by an
employee. We prefer this comprehensive understanding over more
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narrow views that perceive engagement solely as an affective state
(e.g., Men, 2015) or a psychological state (e.g., Schaufeli, 2013), as
it is more closely related to employees’ actual behavioral support
for their employer. According to Kahn (1990), three psychological conditions exhibit a relevant impact on job engagement and,
correspondingly, job disengagement: meaningfulness, safety, and
availability.
Previous research has shown the positive effects of employee
engagement, like a higher rate of job satisfaction (Biswas &
Bhatnagar, 2013; Saks, 2006), commitment to the organization
(Saks, 2006), reduced turnover intentions, and an increased willingness to support the employer through positive communication
behavior (Kang & Sung, 2017; Shen & Jiang, 2019). Yin (2018)
underlined the positive influence of engagement on citizenship
behavior (see also Saks, 2006), task performance, and the negative
relationship between counterproductive work and engagement.
Additionally, engagement matters for organizational success (Saks
& Gruman, 2014; Wollard, 2011) and competitiveness (Men &
Bowen, 2017; Saks & Gruman, 2014), as well as employee well-b
eing (Men & Bowen, 2017; Wollard, 2011) and employee satisfaction (Men & Bowen, 2017).
On the contrary, job disengagement, which is much less discussed in the academic literature (Rastogi et al., 2018), can be
understood as a state where employees cognitively, physically, and
emotionally uncouple themselves from their normal work role
as a way of self-protection (Kahn, 1990). According to Kahn, the
absence of the three psychological conditions—meaningfulness,
safety, and availability—trigger the decision to actively disengage.
Disengagement is, therefore, an internal process, a form of disconnection from the job where individuals protect themselves from
perceived threats (Kahn, 1990; Wollard, 2011). It is not a permanent state but rather a condition that depends on the work environment and “manifests in behaviors that put physical, mental,
and emotional distance between the worker and their work, their
peers, and their organization” (Wollard, 2011, p. 529). Others perceive disengagement as a component of burnout (Rastogi et al.,
2018). Importantly, job disengagement is more than the absence of
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job engagement, as different cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
outcomes are expected to further influence employees’ personal
and professional lives (see Wang et al., 2019, for the school context). Employees who are disengaged in their jobs do not merely
lack energized involvement in their work role. They also engage
in maladaptive processes where they emotionally, mentally, and
physically withdraw from their required responsibilities.
Importantly, job disengagement is assumed to be a huge problem for organizations (Chanana & Sangeeta, 2020) and employees
(Wollard, 2011), as demonstrated by a systematic literature analysis on the effects of job disengagement. It is presumed to include
low energy, low social behavior, disinterestedness, dissatisfaction,
poor work performance, counterproductive work behavior, uncertainty, and turnover intentions (Rastogi et al., 2018). Empirically,
it has been shown that job disengagement (Kahn, 1990) mediates
the relationship between psychological contract violation and
turnover intentions (Azeem et al., 2020). For the public sector,
Aslam et al. (2018) found that organizational injustice, negative
political influence, and work overload lead to disengagement.

Development of Hypotheses
The Influence of Transparency on Job Engagement and
Disengagement
The social exchange theory provides a valuable theoretical rationale to explain workplace behavior (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005)
and is, therefore, suitable to analyze the role of transparent crisis
communication and job (dis)engagement. One of the key assumptions is that relationships in the working context are based on reciprocity (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), where “something has to
be given and something returned” (Blau, 1964, p. 876). This reciprocal exchange is particularly crucial in times of crisis when organizations and employees depend on one another even more than
in normal times. During the COVID-19 pandemic, organizations
have demanded a lot from their employees. Most employees had
to adapt to changed working conditions either at their workplace
or when working from home. In sectors with slumps in orders,
employees often had to accept pay cuts, while those in system-
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relevant sectors had to work even harder. This meant that organizations needed to provide adequate resources in return for their
employees’ resources in the form of job engagement. As argued in
the social exchange theory, organizations can provide economic
(money, goods and services) and socioemotional (information,
love, status) resources in exchange for employees’ supportive emotions, cognitions, and behavior (Blau, 1964; Foa & Foa, 1980). As
economic resources were scarce during the pandemic, the need to
provide socioemotional resources, especially information, became
even greater. Transparent communication can serve as a socioemotional resource by providing relevant, timely, and accurate
information to employees. The role of communication to engage
employees has already been recognized in the academic discourse
(e.g., Rich et al., 2010), and previous research provides empirical
support for the positive relationship between organizational transparency and job engagement.
Interviews with public relations practitioners suggest that
internal communication is vital to build a culture of transparency,
which helps to engage employees at work (Mishra et al., 2014). Jiang
and Men (2017) as well as Jiang and Shen (2020) confirmed the
direct relationship between a good organization–employee relationship and engagement. Additionally, both studies showed that
authentic leadership mediated by transparent organizational communication fosters engagement. Employees are also more likely
to identify with their organization when they perceive the dimensions of transparency (Men et al., 2020; Men & Hung-Baesecke,
2015). Lemon (2019) complemented prior discussions by stressing
the role of active listening by management to engage employees.
Insights into the influence of transparency on job engagement have
been gained in the context of stable political, economic, and social
contexts but not in times of crises that are marked by uncertainty
and perceived threats to high priority goals (Seeger et al., 2003).
A lack of resources from the organization should undermine perceived meaningfulness, safety, and availability and, thereby, stimulate job disengagement. Drawing on the social exchange theory
and the findings from “stable economic times,” we hypothesize for
times of crisis:
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H1: The higher the employees’ perceived transparency of organizational communication, the higher their job engagement during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
H2: The lower the employees’ perceived transparency of organizational communication, the higher their job disengagement during the
COVID-19 pandemic.

The Influence of Job-Specific State Anxiety on Job
Disengagement
As a result of the strict regulations enforced by the Austrian government during the pandemic, many employees had to adapt
to working from home, whereas others working in systemrelevant professions had to remain “on the front line” under aggravated conditions. Whether at home or “on the front line,” many
were affected by the effects of reduced working hours, resulting
in reduced wages or even potential job loss. In addition to these
work-related stressors, the media fueled anxiety in people by
permanently reiterating the negative and possibly deadly effects
of a COVID-19 infection and the detrimental effects of the pandemic on the national and world economy. This is likely to lead to
job-specific state anxiety in employees (Spielberger et al., 1983).
Spielberger et al. (1983) defined anxiety as an emotional state
characterized by feelings of apprehension, worry and tension, rising blood pressure, and anticipation of future threats or dangers.
According to Brooks and Schweizer (2011), state anxiety occurs
“in reaction to stimuli, including novel situations and the potential
for undesirable outcomes” (p. 44). Furthermore, research on terrorism management suggests that experiences of mortality cause
feelings of anxiety and, as a consequence, damage individuals’
well-being (Burke et al., 2010). There is a link between exposure to
death and the triggering of anxiety, which consequently initiates
self-protection and withdrawal behavior and, in an organizational
context, reduces job engagement (Grant & Wade-Benzoni, 2009;
Sliter et al., 2014). Recent research in the context of the COVID19 pandemic in China and the U.S. has confirmed the negative
influence of state anxiety on job engagement (J. Hu et al., 2020),
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showing that the mortality salience triggered by the pandemic
enhanced state anxiety, and servant leaders helped anxious people
to stay engaged in their jobs. Hence, we hypothesize:
H3: The stronger the employees’ job-specific state anxiety during the
COVID-19 pandemic, the stronger their disengagement with their
job.

The Influence of Employees’ Organizational Trust on Job
Engagement
During a crisis, employees’ welfare depends on the decisions made
by their corporate management who have to quickly introduce
measures under high levels of uncertainty. In a victim crisis elicited by a health disaster, organizations suffer through no fault of
their own (Coombs, 2007). Nevertheless, they bear the responsibility to manage the uncertain situation, which includes providing
trustworthy information. As Veil et al. (2011, p. 111) noted: “Once
an organization is no longer considered a source of trustworthy
information, management of the crisis is lost.” Based on Hon and
Grunig (1999), Rawlins (2008) defined organizational trust as
“one party’s willingness to be vulnerable to another party based on
the confidence that the latter party is competent and dependable,
has integrity, and acts with goodwill” (p. 5). Integrity is the belief
that an organization acts fairly and justly; dependability refers to
the belief that an organization does what it says it will do; and
competence is the belief that the organization is able to do what
it says it will do (Hon & Grunig, 1999). All three dimensions are
considered important in a crisis context where individuals lack the
knowledge to make their own decisions (Gillespie et al., 2020) and
depend on the provision of relevant resources from their organization (Blau, 1964). In the internal organizational context, trust
has been shown to foster openness to change (Yue et al., 2019)
and organizational affective commitment (Xiong et al., 2016).
Moreover, good employee–organization relationships during a
crisis have a positive effect on internal reputation and employees’
behavioral intentions—favoring new tasks with extra responsibility and even the sacrifice of privileges, risks, or discomfort (Kim
et al., 2019; Mazzei et al., 2019). Several studies have investigated
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trust in various contexts as a key antecedent of employees’ engagement (e.g., Ugwu et al., 2014). With regard to a pandemic, Siegrist
and Zingg (2014) highlighted the importance of trust in different
institutions, organizations, or actors. They concluded that trust
can positively influence people’s acceptance of the rules and their
adoption of recommended behaviors, like the willingness to vaccinate. For the COVID-19 context, Lee and Li (2021) showed the
importance of organizational trust in order to create risk awareness and influence social distancing behavior in the general public.
In view of these arguments and previous findings, we conclude
that employees’ trust in their organization fosters job engagement
because they feel confident that their organization has the competence and the integrity to find good and fair solutions, thus allowing the employees to attend to and absorb their role. Hence:
H4: The stronger the employees’ trust in the organization during the
COVID-19 pandemic, the stronger their job engagement.

The Influence of Transparency on Organizational Trust and
Job-Specific State Anxiety
During a crisis, employees have considerable needs for information and high expectations for adequate and timely information
from management (Heide & Simonsson, 2014; Johansen et al.,
2012). Effective internal crisis communication is vital for safeguarding trust in the relationship between an organization and
its employees (Mazzei & Ravazzani, 2015; Ulmer et al., 2017),
as it can signal competence and integrity; this, in turn, elicits a
sense of safety in employees, which is an important condition
for engagement (Kahn, 1990). Siegrist and Zingg (2014) recommended a transparent crisis communication approach during
a pandemic, which includes informing individuals about what
is known and unknown about the pandemic “without triggering unnecessary fears and anxiety” (p. 20) by discussing uncertainties. They argued that failure to inform about the pandemic
transparently can abruptly undermine trust toward the responsible institutions or organizations. Additionally, management
research has indicated that a lack of information during a crisis
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can generate negative outcomes, such as a loss of trust in management (DiFonzo & Bordia, 2000). According to Jahansoozi (2006),
transparency during crises functions as “a relational condition or
variable that promotes accountability, collaboration, cooperation
and commitment” (p. 943) and “a critical condition for rebuilding
trust” (p. 954). Research has already confirmed this relationship
(Rawlins, 2008; Yue et al., 2019), highlighting the expanded role of
transparent communication as a key driver for a good, sustainable
organizational climate (Men, 2014; Men & Stacks, 2014), which is
essential also after a crisis. Furthermore, research on the COVID19 pandemic has indicated the need to increase transparency
efforts toward employees to increase trust (Spalluto et al., 2020).
This assumption is confirmed by Lee and Li (2021) for the external institutional context by showing that transparent information
during the COVID-19 pandemic increases public trust in health
institutions. Therefore, we hypothesize:
H5: The higher the employees’ perceived transparency of organizational communication during the COVID-19 pandemic, the stronger
their trust in the organization.
H6: Organizational trust mediates the positive effect of transparent
communication on job engagement.

Effective crisis communication is crucial to improve employees’ perceptions about uncertainties (Mazzei & Ravazzani, 2011),
and effective crisis communication is essential to reduce anxiety
and uncertainty (Bordia et al., 2014). As Kim et al. (2019) showed,
a good organizational-employee relationship can reduce anxiety
during a crisis. Moreover, ambiguous messages from management
and/or confusing information from external media can negatively
affect employees’ organizational trust. A transparent approach
can help reduce anxiety, as it includes two-way symmetrical communication where management is willing to listen and respond
to concerns (Men & Stacks, 2014). According to the uncertainty
reduction theory, in an unknown situation, individuals actively
collect information to reduce their uncertainty and alleviate their
concerns (Hogg & Belavadi, 2017). Thus, a communication style
that contains substantial information allows participation and
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holds organizations accountable, thus reducing feelings of anxiety
triggered by the pandemic. On the other hand, if transparency is
lacking in communication, anxiety persists. Thus, we hypothesize:
H7: The lower the employees’ perceived transparency of organizational communication during the COVID-19 pandemic, the higher
their job-specific state anxiety.
H8: Job-specific anxiety mediates the negative effect of transparent
communication on job disengagement.

Method
Procedure
To test the hypotheses, an online survey among people employed
in organizations in Austria was conducted between March 8 and
12 of 2021, almost 1 year to the date after the Austrian government
mandated the first shutdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Participants were recruited with the assistance of the market
research service provider Dynata. Invited panelists were employed
for more than 1 year in an organization with 250 or more employees, so that respondents’ evaluations of internal crisis communication were based on a comparable timespan. In total, 436 people
fulfilled these criteria and completed the questionnaire. Of those,
26 were excluded from the final sample because they were categorized as “speeders” (i.e., they spent less than 50% of the median
response time (= 512 sec) on the questionnaire). The survey was
structured as follows: After an introduction, which broadly introduced the COVID-19 pandemic and its impacts on organizations and employees as the topic of the survey, respondents were
asked for their informed consent. Next, some general questions
about current employment (e.g., tenure, share of remote working
during the pandemic) were presented to focus the respondents’
minds on their work situation during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Participants were then asked to think about the past year and evaluate their organizations’ internal communications (transparency)
during this time span. The following section was introduced by a
clear instruction indicating that the subsequent questions would
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address how respondents feel and think at the moment. In this
section, the respondents’ perception of job-specific state anxiety,
organizational trust, and job engagement/disengagement were
measured. The questionnaire closed with sociodemographic questions.
Sample
The final sample comprises 410 respondents, of whom 51%
identified as female and 49% as male. The average age was 43.7
(SD = 10.8). Asked for their highest educational qualification,
29.5% stated to have a high school diploma, 29.2% held a university degree, 25.9% had completed an apprenticeship, 12.8% had an
intermediate educational qualification, and 2.5% stated they had
compulsory schooling. The respondents were employed across a
variety of industries and sectors (public administration/service:
16.8%, healthcare and social assistance: 15.9%, manufacturing:
15.4%, retail/trade: 8.8%, transportation and logistics: 7.8%, media,
information and communication: 6.1%, educational services:
5.9%, finance and insurance: 5.1%, science and research: 2.7%,
construction: 2.4%; accommodation and food services: 2.2%, utilities: 2.0%, and other sectors: 8.9%). The majority (71%) worked in
an organization with more than 1,000 employees. Organizational
tenure was distributed as follows: 15.6% had been employed with
the organization for up to 3 years, 14.6% for 3–5 years, 18.1% for
5–10 years, and 51.5% for more than 10 years. A position with
managerial responsibility was held by 31% of the employees in the
sample. More than half (57.3%) of the respondents stated that they
had worked at least partially from home during the past year due
to the pandemic.
Measurements
If available, measures to gauge the variables were taken or adapted
from established scales. All items were rated on 7-point rating
scales.
Perceived transparency of organizational communication
during the crisis was measured in accordance with previous studies (e.g., Jiang & Luo, 2018; Men & Stacks, 2014; Yue et al., 2019)
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that had operationalized transparent communication as a secondorder construct comprising the three dimensions of substantiality,
participation, and accountability (Rawlins, 2008). However, our
data revealed violations of discriminant validity between transparent communication and organizational trust.2 Such violations
need to be addressed, because “a lack of discriminant validity
calls into question whether statistically significant parameters are
really supported by the data or are simply an artifact of modeling
the same constructs twice in one model” (Voorhees et al., 2016,
p. 120). Possible remedies for the issue are revisiting data collection or dropping redundant constructs from the model, if conceptually appropriate (Voorhees et al., 2016). The study presented
here is already the result of revisiting data collection after the
issue of a lack of discriminant validity between transparency and
trust had come up in data collected earlier during the pandemic
(in April 2020). As documented in the Appendix (see Appendices A1 and A2), attempts to refine the measurements (particularly
by supplementing the trust measurement with the three items to
gauge employees’ overall willingness to trust their organization
and by more precisely defining a different time reference for the
two measurements) did not fix the problem.3 As a remedy, we
finally excluded the accountability and participation dimensions
from the measurement of transparency, focusing on substantiality
only. This solution ensured discriminant validity between employees’ perception of transparency of organizational communication
and their trust in the organization. From a theoretical perspective,
this narrower operationalization is appropriate, as, for example,
Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2016) limited their conceptualization of organizational transparency to perceived information
2. Rawlins proposed a fourth dimension of transparency, which he termed

secrecy. A closer look at this dimension reveals that it means the opposite of
dissemination of substantial information; therefore, it is not separately integrated in the model.

3. Beside the lack of discriminant validity between transparency and trust, results
from an exploratory factor analysis did not support the three-dimensional structure
of transparency, because accountability and participation are loaded on one common
factor. This is reflected in a lack of discriminant validity between these two dimensions
(see Appendices A1 and A2).
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disclosure, clarity, and accuracy, aspects that are all reflected in the
measurement of substantiality.
For the measurement of employees’ trust in their organization,
we adapted items from the scale by Rawlins (2008) that captures
employees’ overall willingness to trust the organization and perceived trustworthiness (i.e., the perceived goodwill, integrity, and
competence of the organization). Job-specific state anxiety was
measured with items from the short form of the Spielberger statetrait anxiety inventory (Marteau & Bekker, 1992). Four items from
the scale by Saks (2006) were used to measure job engagement
in our study context. Job disengagement was measured by three
negatively valenced items: one taken from Saks and two developed
by the authors in order to gauge respondents’ deficient job role
performance.
Detailed information on the wording of questions, scale endpoints, and items can be found in Table 1.
TABLE 1

Measurement Model

Construct/Items

SL

Transparent Organizational Communication
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree
with the following statements about the internal
communication of your organization during the
corona time. (Scale from 1 “strongly disagree“ to 7
“strongly agree”)
My organization…
… provides information in a timely fashion to people
like me.

0.86

… provides information that is relevant to people like
me.

0.88

… provides information that is complete.

0.92

… provides information that is easy for people like me
to understand.

0.85

… provides accurate information to people like me.

0.90

… provides information that is reliable.

0.92

… provides detailed information to people like me.

0.80

… provides information that can be compared to
previous performance.

deleted

α

CR

AVE

0.96

0.96

0.77
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Job-Specific State Anxiety

0.84

0.85

0.65

0.95

0.95

0.73

0.80

0.81

0.59

Please tell us how you feel at the moment with
respect to your job. (Scale from 1 “not at all” to 7
“very much so”)
I feel tense.

0.77

I feel upset.

0.88

I feel worried.

0.75

Organizational Trust
Below you will find several statements about your
organization. Please indicate how strongly you agree
or disagree with each of these statements. (Scale
from 1 “strongly disagree” to 7 “strongly agree”)
I trust the organization to take care of people like me.

0.90

I feel confident that my organization acts in the best
interest of people like me, even if I cannot monitor its
actions.

0.90

Whenever this organization makes a decision, I know it
will be concerned about people like me.

0.83

I believe this organization takes the opinions of people
like me into account when making decisions.

0.79

The organization treats people like me fairly and justly.

0.87

The organization can be relied on to keep its promises.

0.87

I feel very confident about the skills of this
organization.

0.81

I’m willing to let the organization make decisions for
people like me.
I think it is important to watch this organization closely
so that it does not take advantage of people like me.
This organization has the ability to accomplish what it
says it will do.

deleted
deleted
deleted

Job Engagement
Finally, here are some statements about how you
are currently doing with your work. Please indicate
again how strongly you agree or disagree with each
of these statements. (Scale from 1 “strongly disagree”
to 7 “strongly agree”)
I really “throw” myself into my job.

0.72

I am totally into my job.

0.79

I am highly engaged in my job.

0.80

Sometimes I am so into my job that I lose track of time.

deleted
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Job Disengagement

0.82

At the moment I can hardly concentrate on my work.

0.83

I often think of other things when doing my job.

0.75

I am not very productive at my job at the moment.

0.75

0.82

0.60

Note: SL = standardized loading; α = Cronbach’s alpha; CR = composite reliability;
AVE = average variance extracted; all loadings are significant at the .001 level.

Results
In accordance with Kline (1998), we executed a two-step structural equation modeling analysis using AMOS 26 software under
maximum likelihood estimation (see Table 2). First, the measurement model was tested based on the a priori theoretical conceptualizations of the constructs. Second, we tested the structural model
and the hypothesized relationships between the variables. In both
steps, the cutoff criteria proposed by L. T. Hu and Bentler (1999)
served as a reference point for the evaluation of the data-model fit.
TABLE 2

Discriminant Validity of Construct Measurements
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(1) Transparent communication

0.88

0.79

0.32

0.48

0.25

(2) Organizational trust

0.79

0.85

0.36

0.52

0.21

(3) Job-specific state anxiety

-0.32

-0.38

0.81

0.33

0.51

0.49

0.52

-0.34

0.77

0.68

-0.25

-0.22

0.51

-0.67

0.77

(4) Job engagement
(5) Job disengagement

Note: Diagonal and bold elements are the square roots of the AVE (average variance
extracted). Below the diagonal elements are the correlations between the constructs’
values, and above the diagonal elements are the HTMT (heterotrait-monotrait ratio
of correlations) values. All bivariate correlations are significant at the p < .001-level.

Measurement Model
After deleting a few indicators that showed unsatisfactory factor
loadings during initial confirmatory factor analysis (see Table 1),
the final measurement model showed a good model-data fit (χ2 =
438,564 [p < .001]; df = 218; CFI = .973; TLI = .969; RMSEA = .049
[90% CI: .042, .055], SRMR = .042). Standardized factor loadings
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are reported in Table 1 and exceeded, in all cases, the ideal threshold of .70 (Chin, 1998). Strong reliability and convergent validity
were indicated for all constructs (see Table 1): Cronbach’s alpha
scores ranged from .80 to .96 and composite reliabilities from .81
to .96, all exceeding the minimum threshold of .70. In addition,
all AVE (average variance extracted) scores were above the cutoff criterium (> .50) for convergent validity (Hair et al., 2009).
For a rigorous assessment of discriminant validity, we applied
two techniques: the common Fornell-Larcker-criterion (Fornell
& Larcker, 1981) and the more recently proposed heterotraitmonotrait (HTMT) ratio of correlations (Henseler et al., 2015;
Voorhees et al., 2016). For all dyads of constructs, the FornellLarcker criterion was fulfilled, and the HTMT ratio was below the
conservative threshold of .85, which indicates discriminant validity across all measurements (see Table 2). Overall, the constructs
exhibit sound measurement properties.
Structural Model
Based on previous literature (e.g., Yue et al., 2019), age, gender,
organizational tenure, position, and company size could potentially affect the endogenous variables and were included as controls in the structural model. Additionally, we assumed that
whether an employee was working from home or at the regular
workplace could possibly impact the endogenous variables (especially job-specific anxiety, job engagement, and job disengagement). Consequently, the share of time working from home due
to the pandemic was included as a further control variable in the
structural model. For reasons of model parsimony, only the significant paths from the control variables to the endogenous variables
were retained in the final model (significant effects are reported in
the annotations of Figure 1). Overall, the structural model demonstrated an acceptable fit (χ2 = 659.963 [p < .001]; df = 285; CFI =
.953; TLI = .946; RMSEA = .057 [90% CI: .051 to .062], SRMR =
.069) and all hypothesized relationships were significant (p < .05).
Hence, the hypothesized model was retained as the final model
(see Figure 1).
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FIGURE 1 The structural model with standardized path coefficients

-.33***

Job-specific
State Anxiety

.50***

Job
Disengagement

-.11*

Transparent
Organizational
Communication

.21*
.79***

Organizational
Trust

.36***

Job
Engagement

Note: χ2 = 659.963 [p < .001]; df = 285; CFI = .953; TLI = .946; RMSEA = .057 [90%
CI: .051 to .062], SRMR = .069. Job-specific state anxiety: R2 = .14; organizational trust:
R2 = .62; job disengagement: R2 = .31; job engagement: R2 = .29. The following
significant effects emerged for the control variables: age
job-specific state anxiety:
β = –.21***; working from home
disengagement: β = .15**; gender
organizational trust: β = .09**; ***p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.

Hypothesis Testing
The data reveal a positive relationship between transparent
organizational communication and employees’ job engagement
(β = .21, p < .05), supporting H1. As assumed in H2, transparent
organizational communication had a significant negative effect
on employees’ job disengagement (β = –.11, p < .05). Beside these
direct effects, a main interest of the study was to assess the mediating influence of job-specific state anxiety and organizational trust.
In support of H3, job-specific state anxiety had a positive effect
on job disengagement (β = .50, p < .001). Furthermore, the proposed attenuating effect of transparent organizational communication on job-specific anxiety (H7) was significant (β = –.33,
p < .001). To examine whether job-specific anxiety mediated the
effect of transparent communication on job disengagement, we
conducted a mediation test using the bootstrapping procedure
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(N = 2,000 samples). A bias-corrected bootstrap interval completely below zero indicated a significant negative indirect effect
(β = –.17, p < .001, [95% CI: –.25 to –.10]) and supported H8. Thus,
the lower the perceived organizational transparency, the higher
the participants’ job-specific state anxiety, which then enhanced
the level of job disengagement. For job-specific state anxiety,
R2 was .14, and for job disengagement, R2 was .31.
In support of H4, organizational trust had a positive and significant effect on job engagement (β = .36, p < .001). Also, the
positive effect of transparent organizational communication on
organizational trust proposed in H5 was supported (β = .79, p <
.001). The bootstrapping procedure resulted in a bias-corrected
confidence interval completely above zero and supported a significant positive indirect effect (β = .24, p < .001, [95% CI: .11 to .38])
of transparent communication on job engagement via employees’
organizational trust. This supports H6. For organizational trust,
R2 was .62, and for job engagement, R2 was .29. To substantiate
the above findings, we also estimated the model based on the data
from the earlier study—all the hypothesized effects showed significance (see Appendix A3).

Discussion
Grounded in the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Kahn,
1990) and the concept of organizational transparency (Rawlins,
2009), the purpose of this research was to examine the relationship between transparent organizational communication and job
engagement, particularly job disengagement during the COVID19 pandemic in Austria. Specifically, this study investigated the
role of transparent organizational communication as a resource
needed by employees during a crisis for engendering organizational trust and reducing job-specific anxiety, which were hypothesized to be important mediators explaining job (dis)engagement
in employees.
The results emphasize the value of relevant, clear, complete,
accurate, reliable, and verifiable information in a timely manner
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during this health crisis to stimulate job engagement and protect
employees and organizations from job disengagement. Contrary
to the theoretical and empirical assumptions by Rawlins (2009),
transparent communication is—at least in this study context—
more adequately represented just through the dimension of substantial information (see also Schnackenberg & Tomlinson, 2016),
as participation and accountability are insufficiently discriminant
to organizational trust. With this adaptation to the transparency
construct, the study confirmed the role of organizational trust as
a relevant mediator of the relationship between transparent communication and job engagement (Yue et al., 2019). This suggests
that transparent internal communication and trust are crucial to
uphold employees’ willingness to provide resources in the form
of job engagement throughout the crisis, when the environment
is full of divergent information, negative reporting, and the risk
of becoming infected by a potentially deadly virus. However,
when employees do not perceive that they are receiving adequate
resources from their employer in the form of transparent communication, the likelihood of disconnecting with work roles (Wollard,
2011) increased, as employees experienced enhanced job-specific
anxiety. Yet, anxiety only weakly mediated the influence of transparent organizational communication on job disengagement,
indicating that there are other factors that influenced job-specific
anxiety during the crisis. Interestingly, younger employees perceived more job-specific anxiety during the COVID-19 pandemic
than older employees, which is indicated by a significant effect
of age on job-specific state anxiety (β = –.21, p < .001). This may
be due to more unstable and precarious working conditions of
younger people. The results further reveal that employees working
in remote conditions were more disengaged from their jobs (β =
.15, p < .01), which can be explained by their greater isolation and
disconnection from their work environment. This finding points
to the necessity for more resources than merely substantial information to prevent those working remotely from home to disconnect from their jobs.
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Theoretical and Practical Implications
The study contributes to the current literature on crisis communication and the discussion about antecedents to protect organizations and employees from disengagement during a crisis.
Additionally, the results of the study question the multidimensional conceptualization of transparent communication (Men &
Stacks, 2014; Rawlins, 2009).
Above all, the study also confirmed the importance of transparent organizational crisis communication (Kim, 2018) for the
context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The results complement
prior research on organizational transparency (Jiang & Shen, 2020;
Men & Stacks, 2014; Men et al., 2020; Yue et al., 2019) and support the theoretical relationship of transparency and engagement
(Kahn, 1990). The research confirms the importance of socioemotional resource information as a relevant driver for desired reactions during an uncertain situation (Foa & Foa, 1980), thereby
expanding the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) to the context of a health crisis. Furthermore, the results are also consistent
with findings from prior research on the value of organizational
trust during crises (Siegrist & Zingg, 2014; Spalluto et al., 2020).
Importantly, this research contributes to the scarce findings on
job disengagement during crises and fosters the debate about this
construct (Kahn, 1990; Wollard, 2011). As shown, disengagement is influenced by transparent communication but not very
strongly. During the COVID-19 pandemic, external stressors were
most likely important causes of anxiety and, subsequently, disengagement. As J. Hu et al. (2020) already assumed in their study
conducted in China and the U.S., the pandemic has mental and
emotional influences that require sensitivity from crisis management. As the crisis context has most likely had a strong influence
on people’s emotional state, including job-specific state anxiety,
appeasing communications and supportive management behaviors are likely antecedents that will help reduce stress and anxiety and, subsequently, disengagement over and above transparent
communication. We can further assume that if a crisis originates
from within the organization, the stressors may also be more
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internal, and transparent communication may play an even bigger
role in reducing disengagement. As noted by Kim et al. (2019),
more research is needed to explore “the roles of emotions for
internal crisis communication studies” (p. 13).
The research also contributes to the discussion on the conceptualization of transparency. As shown across two data sets, transparency may be more adequately conceptualized in a narrow way,
as suggested by Schnackenberg and Tomlinson (2016) and as captured by Rawlins’s (2008, 2009) dimension of substantial information. The participation and accountability dimensions suggested
by Rawlins may not adequately discriminate against other constructs like trust, as revealed by our research. Thus, we encourage
scholars studying transparency to recognize this finding and pay
close attention to the dimensionality and discriminant validity of
the dimensions suggested by Rawlins.
With regards to practice, our research suggests that organizations should communicate substantial information that is
related to the crisis situation and relevant for the organization and
employees to encourage their workforce to reciprocate helpful
resources, especially job engagement. In particular, this includes
crisis-related information on safety measures, changes in working
routines, the organization’s condition and its development, and
what this means for employees with respect to their work and wellbeing. When such information is communicated in a way that fulfills the aspects of substantiality (Rawlins, 2009), employees will be
intent on relying on management because they believe that their
leaders are competent to take the right actions and have integrity
and their best interests in mind. If this is met, organizations will
be able to maintain an engaged workforce, even in an uncertain
situation. If transparent organizational communication is missing,
however, the risk of employees’ physical, emotional, and cognitive
removal from work increases. Therefore, to minimize the potential
loss of attentive and absorbed individuals, organizations should
strengthen the efforts to meet employees’ needs during the crisis,
which is possible through a transparent approach.

296

STRANZL, RUPPEL, and EINWILLER

Limitations and Future Research Directions
This study has several limitations. First, the results are limited to
the context of the COVID-19 pandemic in Austria. Nevertheless,
the Austrian case does not differ significantly from several other
countries in Europe that tried to contain the spread of the virus
by shutting down public life since mid-March 2020, thereby causing a big strain on the economy and on employees. As the data
were collected at one point in time—in the middle of the third
shutdown in March 2021—the results represent a snapshot in time
during this elongated crisis situation. This also means that a rigorous test of causality is not possible by means of the chosen design.
Applying an experimental design could, therefore, be a next step.
In addition, a mixed method approach combining quantitative
and qualitative research would be valuable to better understand
the role, value, and implementation of transparent organizational
crisis communication in the work context during a pandemic.
This study relied on self-report survey data collected from single source individuals. Although a check of common method variance using Harman’s single factor test did not indicate any issues,
future research can broaden the basis of data sources in order
to gain more nuanced and thorough insights into the effects of
transparent organizational communication during a crisis. Specifically, a case study approach would allow the triangulation of selfreported data about employees’ cognitive and emotional processes
with content analysis data about an organization’s communication
measures as well as observational data concerning actual job/organizational performance. Such a design would require a fully transparent research approach within an organization and cooperation
with organizational members.
Another limitation results from the rather low influence of
transparent organizational communication on job-specific state
anxiety. It raises the question of further variables that influence
job-specific state anxiety and, eventually, job disengagement. As
indicated by the influence of age on anxiety, job-specific stability may have influenced job-specific state anxiety. Anxiety levels
may have also increased over time with the developments of the
COVID-19 pandemic becoming more severe (e.g., rising unemployment rates, business closures). Therefore, results have to be
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interpreted in light of the specific situation one year into the pandemic. Job disengagement was also likely to be influenced by other
factors like stressors at home, including responsibilities for children, home schooling, or social isolation in the case of people living alone. Disengagement may have also been caused by reduced
wages that were introduced in sectors with slumps in orders. Thus,
an investigation of the role of transparent crisis communication
across industries can also be valuable, as different industries were
differently affected by the pandemic.
Finally, another limitation is certainly the focus on a limited
number of antecedents and mediators to explain job engagement
and disengagement. Previous research has already shed light on
the role of a servant leadership style to guide employees through
the crisis and increase their willingness to stay engaged (J. Hu
et al., 2020). While the research by J. Hu et al. was set in China
and the United States, further research could explore the role of
leadership styles and leadership communication during the crisis
in Europe. In major organizational crises like those triggered by
the COVID-19 pandemic, organizational leaders are particularly
challenged to manage the situation and comfort their co-workers
to prevent them from disengaging from their job. Lastly, we would
like to encourage future research to take a closer look at different
kinds of social resources used in crisis communication that stimulate reciprocation in employees in terms of cognitive, emotional,
and behavioral outcomes.
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Appendix
Study 2 refers to the survey that is presented in the main body of
this paper, whereas study 1 refers to the original study that was
conducted earlier in the pandemic and that first raised concerns
about discriminant validity.
A1. Lack of discriminant validity between transparent communication and organizational trust (Study 1)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(1) Substantiality

0.81 0.76 0.74

0.76 0.37 0.46 0.28

(2) Participation

0.77 0.82 0.94

0.86 0.28 0.47 0.20

(3) Accountability

0.72 0.96 0.79

0.86 0.26 0.45 0.28

(4) Transparent communication
(5) Organizational trust
(6) Job-specific state anxiety
(7) Job engagement
(8) Job disengagement

0.92 0.88 0.33 0.50 0.24
0.76 0.88 0.86 0.90 0.86 0.33 0.50 0.24
-0.35 -0.26 -0.23 -0.28 -0.31 0.75 0.20 0.37
0.45 0.47 0.45 0.49 0.50 -0.18 0.77 0.56
-0.27 -0.19 -0.16 -0.20 -0.22 0.37 -0.54 0.75

Note: Diagonal and bold elements are the square roots of the AVE (average variance
extracted). Below the diagonal elements are the correlations between the constructs’
values, and above the diagonal elements are the HTMT (heterotrait-monotrait ratio
of correlations) values. All bivariate correlations are significant at the p < .001-level.
Highlighted values raise concern about discriminant validity.
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A2. Lack of discriminant validity between transparent communication and organizational trust (Study 2)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(1) Substantiality

0.89 0.83 0.74

0.77 0.29 0.47 0.24

(2) Participation

0.78 0.81 0.88

0.84 0.26 0.44 0.18

(3) Accountability

0.74 0.89 0.85

0.84 0.26 0.39 0.09
0.90 0.87 0.29 0.47 0.19

(4) Transparent communication
(5) Organizational trust
(6) Job-specific state anxiety
(7) Job engagement
(8) Job disengagement

0.77 0.83 0.84 0.90 0.85 0.31 0.52 0.20
-0.30 -0.27 -0.29 -0.31 -0.33 0.80 0.32 0.50
0.48 0.44 0.40 0.47 0.52 -0.33 0.77 0.68
-0.24 -0.17 -0.10 -0.17 -0.21 0.51 -0.67 0.77

Note: Diagonal and bold elements are the square roots of the AVE (average variance
extracted). Below the diagonal elements are the correlations between the constructs’
values, and above the diagonal elements are the HTMT (heterotrait-monotrait ratio
of correlations) values. All bivariate correlations are significant at the p < .001-level.
Highlighted values raise concern about discriminant validity.

A3. The structural model with standardized path coefficients (based
on the data from Study 1)

-.34***

Job-specific
State Anxiety

.31***

Job
Disengagement

-.17***

Transparent
Organizational
Communication

.23***
.77***

Organizational
Trust

.31***

Job
Engagement

Note: All measurements are the same as in study 2 with the exception that for
organizational trust the three items for overall trust have not been measured in this
study. χ2 = 940.895 [p < .001]; df = 291; CFI = .955; TLI = .946; RMSEA = .047 [90%
CI: .043 to .050], SRMR = .050. Job-specific state anxiety: R2 = .14; organizational trust:
R2 = .61; job disengagement: R2 = .20; job engagement: R2 = .27; ***p < .001, ** p < .01,
* p < .05; n = 1,030.
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A Brief Background to Singapore’s Response to the Pandemic
On January 23, 2020, Singapore announced its first imported case
of the COVID-19 virus (Abdullah & Salamat, 2020). A nationwide partial lockdown, which is known as the Circuit Breaker, was
imposed on April 7, 2020, to curb the rapid rise of COVID-19
community and dormitory cases in Singapore (Ministry of Health,
2020), which had grown to over 200 cases at the time. For example, during the Circuit Breaker, non-essential workplaces had to
be closed and adopt telecommuting (Ministry of Health, 2020).
Dine-ins at food establishments were not allowed, except for takeaways and deliveries (Abu Baker, 2020).
The measures worked, and the number of new cases had
dropped significantly after August 2020 (Nurhayati-Wolff, 2021),
and commentators credited it to the community’s role in complying with the measures announced by the government to combat
the pandemic (Turrell, 2021). Singapore also had the lowest death
rate in the world, which has been attributed to a combination of
detection measures, an adaptable healthcare system, and a culture
that was quick to adopt mask-wearing and other protective measures (Aravindan, 2020).
In terms of health risk communications, the local authorities used multiple channels of communication such as Facebook, Twitter, Telegram, and WhatsApp to provide frequent and
timely updates about what people should do during such times
as well as to inform them about the various restriction measures
(e.g., mask-wearing, limitations in group-gatherings) that were
implemented (Gov.sg, 2020; Leong, 2020). The government also
leveraged local media outlets to spread the messages about precautionary measures that need to be taken (Koh, 2020).
Understanding Public Concerns on Social Media
The ability of individuals to carry out the recommended actions
(e.g., practicing physical distancing) is critical in limiting the
spread of the disease outbreak. Identifying the concerns that people can have toward government precautionary measures during a
pandemic can have practical and conceptual significance for disease control. Furthermore, understanding the social-psychological
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processes that characterize communities’ reactions to a pandemic
is the first step toward formulating risk communications that can
lead to better health outcomes.
Examining social media posts is important as social media has
been used by the public as an immediate source of information not
just during the COVID-19 pandemic but also disease outbreaks in
the past (Jang & Baek, 2019). In the context of a health epidemic,
there is a strong influence of an individual’s sources of information
on their behaviour. For instance, researchers found that changes in
media attention mirrored changes in the willingness of individuals
to adopt precautionary actions during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic
(Ibuka et al., 2010). During the COVID-19 pandemic, more Singaporeans turned to traditional news media and social media for
swift and important crisis-related information (Rekhi, 2020). Chua
(2020) found that while news of the outbreak has been featured in
the local news since late 2019, a considerable spike in reactions
on Facebook occurred when Singapore’s first case was announced.
Comments found on such platforms can provide clues for understanding what the public’s concerns are and what should be done
to address them.
Hence, the current study analyzed Facebook comments toward
the Singapore government’s precautionary measures, which were
collected from the pages of five Singapore media outlets. Approximately 10,000 comments collected from the Facebook pages of
five Singaporean media outlets from January 2020 to June 2020
were analyzed to identify common concerns that surfaced. Consequently, identifying the concerns that led to the formation of
pandemic-related health beliefs as well as the cultural factors
behind the public’s reactions can widen the existing evidence base
for existing health communication theories and policymaking.
Health Belief Model in Pandemic Response
According to the Health Belief Model (HBM), perceptions such
as the perceived susceptibility to the disease or perceived selfefficacy are relevant in influencing the public’s beliefs toward
the precautionary measures they should take during a health
crisis. HBM posits that health-seeking actions are influenced
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by individuals’ perceptions of the health risk and efficacy of the
behaviours intended to address the threat (Rosenstock et al., 1988).
In the current COVID-19 pandemic context, the HBM has been
used as a framework for guiding effective risk communications to
the public (Carico et al., 2020), educational interventions (Elgzar
et al., 2020), recommendations for developing contact-tracing
apps (Walrave et al., 2020), and understanding public perception
about the virus (Jose et al., 2020).
According to HBM, the constructs proposed to predict
health-seeking behaviour are: perceived threat (comprised of perceived susceptibility and perceived severity), perceived benefits,
perceived barriers, and perceived self-efficacy. When assessing
whether to act or not (i.e., complying with precautionary measures
proposed by the government), the public is likely to need information related to the components in the HBM to inform their risk
judgments—the likelihood of contracting COVID-19, the severity
of contracting COVID-19, how effective the precautions are, and
assurance that they would be able to carry out the proposed precautions.
HMB has been widely used in other public health campaigns
as it can identify the main barriers to people’s intention to adopt a
health behavior—often informing policies that create better health
outcomes across various contexts such as increased physical activity, reduced smoking, and improved adherence to prescribed
medications (Ng et al., 2012; Ryan et al., 2008). According to the
HBM, people are more likely to perform health-seeking actions to
address the threat when they perceive a health risk and have the
self-efficacy to perform these actions.
Health risk communications that addressed the concerns that
people have can affect an individual’s interpretations of the risk as
well as their willingness and ability to act timely (Ryan et al., 2008;
Vaughan & Tinker, 2009). These psychological concerns can range
across various psychological needs such as autonomy over one’s
decisions, feelings of being trusted and understood, and feeling
able to manage the situation (Porat et al., 2020).
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The Role of Collectivism in Pandemic Response
Cultural factors also play a role in pandemic response. During
a pandemic, there are likely to be trade-offs between the collective and individuals in response to the threat. Members of more
individualistic cultures, such as the United States, are socialized
to value independence, autonomy, and being distinct from others.
On the other hand, those in more collectivistic societies, such as
Singapore and China, view the self as interdependent with other
members, emphasize group cohesiveness, and give priority to
group goals over individual goals (Triandis, 2001).
Cultural factors may impact individuals’ attention and perceived importance of stressors when assessing the threat, which
in turn influences their psychological needs and behavioural
response (Guan et al., 2020). Unsurprisingly, there have been multiple studies examining the influence of collectivism on several
aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic, including infection transmission (Jiang et al., 2020), prevention intention (Huang et al., 2020),
and compliance with precautionary measures (Huynh, 2020; Kasdan & Campbell, 2020).
Individual risk perception, psychological maladjustment, and
emotional and behavioural responses during disease outbreaks
have been found to differ across cultures (Germani et al., 2020).
The individualism-collectivism dimension of culture, in particular, has often been used to understand the difference in responses
and risk communication needs across different countries dealing
with health crises (Kim et al., 2016; Willis & Painter, 2019).
The following research questions (RQs) were developed from
the review of the literature on HBM and collectivism to understand the public’s concerns that were made in response to precautionary measures implemented by the government.
RQ1: What are the concerns that the Singapore public surfaced in
response to the measures announced by the government?
RQ2: How does collectivism shape some of these concerns?

Hence, in order to contribute to the evidence base for risk
communications during a health pandemic, the current study

314

CHEN, ANG, LEE, WONG, SENG, ONG, and KHADER

examines the public’s reactions to government precautionary measures to identify their concerns from a psychological perspective.
Approximately 10,000 comments collected from the Facebook
pages of five Singaporean media outlets from January 2020 to
June 2020 were analyzed to identify common topics discussed in
these groups. The psychological concerns of the public were then
inferred from these topics to help answer RQ1 and RQ2.

Method
Data Collection and Cleaning
Data from January 2020 to June 2020 was collected from the following Facebook pages of five media outlets reporting on events
in Singapore: Channel News Asia, Mothership, The Straits Times,
TODAY, and Yahoo Singapore. According to Statista (2020b), these
media brands were the top five online sites used by Singaporeans.
Furthermore, due to the heavy usage of Facebook in Singapore
(Statista, 2020a), examining Facebook comments of these media
brands over other social media platforms would provide a more
reliable gauge of public concerns.
A set of keywords (e.g., “COVID,” “social distancing,” etc.) was
used to obtain the relevant posts from the Facebook pages (see
Figure 1). These keywords were selected by the authors based on
the high face validity in extracting posts related to the topic of precautionary measures implemented by local authorities during the
COVID-19 crisis. Posts with no comments were then removed to
form a collection of 248 posts containing 40,686 comments. Inclusion and exclusion criteria (e.g., a post must reference a precautionary measure announced by Singapore to combat COVID-19)
were used to determine if a post was relevant to the study. Then
data cleaning (e.g., removing spam comments and conducting text
preprocessing) was conducted. After the data cleaning was done, it
reduced the number of posts to 118, containing 10,287 comments.
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Data Analysis
Due to the volume of data and the nature of extremely short messages inherent in Facebook comments—a topic modelling technique, Anchored Correlation Explanation (Anchored CorEx) was
used to analyze and identify topics that best describes the 10,287
Facebook comments. Anchored CorEx has been used in various
areas of research, such as consumer purchases of vitamins (John et
al., 2019), as well as to detect COVID-19 related stress symptoms
(Li et al., 2020).
Anchored CorEx (Gallagher et al., 2017; Ver Steeg & Galstyan,
2014) is a semi-supervised approach, which was used to identify
the topics in the dataset. Anchored CorEx is a topic modelling
algorithm that examines how words are used in the messages that
are being examined, and they pick up on patterns and estimate
what the documents convey with little direct supervision from the
researcher. As a semi-supervised approach, Anchored CorEx also
allows the user to provide the topic model with “anchor words”
that represent potential topics that the model should converge
upon (see Figure 1).

Results
Description of the Topics Discussed on Facebook
Twenty-one topics were generated using Anchored Corex (see
Table 1). Finally, a close reading of the messages in each topic
was conducted in order to identify and group the topics into the
themes of psychological concerns during public discussion of
COVID-19 measures in Singapore. The inferred topics were then
based on the analysis of the five most representative words as well
as the comments for each topic. Figure 2 shows the histograms
of topics for Facebook comments. As seen in Figure 2, the top
three most discussed topics (Topic 14, 13, and 1) were inferred
to be about: (1) Strong public support for the mobilization of law
enforcement officers; (2) many people want to know more epidemiological information about the virus; (3) debate over the safety
benefits versus privacy concerns of contact tracing devices. Next,
the 21 topics were subsequently categorized and manually organized into seven broad themes of psychological concerns, which
are surfaced by the public.

FIGURE 1 The workflow of collection and cleaning of Facebook comments and the use of Anchored Correlation
in topic modeling
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Inferred topic

The debate over privacy concerns on
contact tracing devices and if health
concerns take priority over privacy concerns

Desire for the allocation of resources to
more useful measures than contact tracing
tokens

Concerns over foreign workers’ welfare and
predicament

Promoting the usefulness of masks in
reducing infection risks

Need for government consistency in crisis
response, especially over masks

Need for the public to be thankful to and
cooperate with frontliners

Seeking for everyone to play their part in
taking protective action to reduce infection
risks for the community

Unhappiness over people’s irresponsible
exercising decisions which threatens the
safety of others

Topic no.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

‘public’, ‘exercise’, ‘park’,
‘idiot’, ‘jogging’

‘home’, ‘stay home’,
‘listen’, ‘healthy’, ‘stay’

‘thank’, ‘keep’, ‘take care’,
‘doctor’, ‘team’

‘mask’, ‘gov’, ‘change’,
‘shield’, ‘flip’

‘mask’, ‘wear mask’,
‘wear’, ‘solution’, ‘drop’

‘make’, ‘dormitory’,
‘foreign’, ‘small’, ‘foreign
worker’

‘device’, ‘trace’, ‘waste’,
‘token’, ‘throw’

‘track’, ‘phone’, ‘privacy’,
‘location’, ‘data’

Five most
representative words

1—Health takes priority over other needs like
privacy, exercise and outdoor activity, and
elections

4—Stressing the importance of individual
responsibility for reducing community risks

5—Expectations for the authorities to be better
at crisis response like consistent communications
and faster crisis response
4—Stressing the importance of individual
responsibility for reducing community risks

4—Stressing the importance of individual
responsibility for reducing community risks

6—Showing concern to vulnerable populations
like children, elderly, and foreign workers

1—Health takes priority over other needs like
privacy, exercise and outdoor activity, and
elections

1—Health takes priority over other needs like
privacy, exercise and outdoor activity, and
elections

Themes (Psychological concerns)

TABLE 1 Topics inferred by CorEx (Post-anchoring) and top five most representative words for each topic
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Inferred topic

Worry about the risks of infection in public
transport

Need for more suitable protective measures
in supermarkets to reduce infection risks

Support for more severe punishment for
non-abiders

Desire for greater priority on local
Singaporeans’ safety before addressing
economic concerns

Desire to disseminate scientific information
about the virus

Desire for the mobilization of the army and
police to strictly enforce measures

Worry for the well-being of children

Fear of quarantine facilities spreading
the infection to nearby workplaces and
buildings

Topic no.

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

‘quarantine’, ‘island’,
‘isolate’, ‘army camp’,
‘john island’

‘school’, ‘kid’, ‘student’,
‘teach’, ‘teacher’

‘make’, ‘talk’, ‘action’,
‘enforce’, ‘police’

‘virus’, ‘spread’, ‘wuhan’,
‘coronavirus’, ‘type’

‘china’, ‘first’, ‘control’,
‘travel’, ‘border’

‘still’, ‘fine’, ‘enforce’,
‘handle’, ‘serious’

‘time’, ‘control’, ‘crowd’,
‘market’, ‘supermarket’

‘train’, ‘bus’, ‘public
transport’, ‘transport’,
‘distance’

Five most
representative words

3—Need for safety in public areas like public
transport, supermarkets, and workplaces

6—Showing concern to vulnerable populations
like children, elderly, and foreign workers

2—Willingness to support fines and increased law
enforcement for the sake of safety

7—Sensemaking about coronavirus situation

5—Expectations for the authorities to be better
at crisis response like consistent communications
and faster crisis response

2—Willingness to support fines and increased law
enforcement for the sake of safety

3—Need for safety in public areas like public
transport, supermarkets, and workplaces

3—Need for safety in public areas like public
transport, supermarkets, and workplaces

Themes (Psychological concerns)
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Concern over the elderly’s ability to cope
during the crisis

Dissatisfaction over the authorities’ response
time and the need for more timely measures
to curb the infection spread

Desire for a successful solution to the crisis
via mass testing

General fear of a second wave of disease
outbreak

Safety worries concerning the election
during a crisis

17

18

19

20

21

‘election’, ‘vote’, ‘win’,
‘like’, ‘singaporean’

‘wait’, ‘wave’, ‘prepare’,
‘second’, ‘wait till’

‘test’, ‘mass’, ‘case’, ‘kit’,
‘covid’

‘start’, ‘late’, ‘begin’,
‘early’, ‘mistake’

‘home’, ‘old’, ‘elderly’,
‘senior’, ‘alone’

Five most
representative words

Note: ‘john island’ refers to St. John Island, an island in Singapore

Inferred topic

Topic no.

1—Health takes priority over other needs like
privacy, exercise and outdoor activity, and
elections

2—Willingness to support fines and increased law
enforcement for the sake of safety

2—Willingness to support fines and increased law
enforcement for the sake of safety

5—Expectations for the authorities to be better
at crisis response like consistent communications
and faster crisis response

6—Showing concern to vulnerable populations
like children, elderly, and foreign workers

Themes (Psychological concerns)
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FIGURE 2 Histogram of topics in the dataset and the number of
Facebook comments per topic

Theme 1: Protection from the Threat of the Pandemic Takes
Priority over Other Concerns Like Privacy, Exercise, and
Elections
This theme focused on the public’s concern of focusing on protecting oneself from the health threat posed by COVID-19. For
example, for some members of the public, privacy infringements
(Topic 1) are considered relatively trivial, as seen in a comment
like this: “Privacy is not an issue because cctv is everywhere . . .
already tracking our movement . . . This device government-issued
contact-tracing device] . . . can save lives and allow our economy
to stay open, why oppose? . . .” However, these arguments are still
contested by others, who counter that by stating that “. . . do people
want it to be even more invasive being tracked by local authorities
. . . may even come with built-in listening devices . . . track all citizens’
movements in the future . . .” Others have wondered if resources can
be better spent in other more effective measures besides contact
tracing tokens as seen in comments such as: “Will we end up creating more digital junk and wasting the money that could have gone
to a more useful purpose?” (Topic 2). The public was also quick to
express unhappiness over others who go to public spaces to exercise (Topic 8), which could increase the spread of the disease, as
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seen in the comment here: “. . . people still go to East Coast Park.
Lots of them . . . Just because it was stated that we could exercise
. . . we exploit the ruling . . . What does it take to drill it into our thick
skull that this is a situation that our lives are at stake?”
It was also during 2020 where Singapore’s general elections
were held. Prior to the elections, the public was surfacing their
concerns about a possible spread of COVID-19 if an election were
to be held (Topic 21).
Theme 2: Willingness to Support Fines and Increased Law
Enforcement for the Sake of Safety
This theme showed that the public was willing to support fines
(Topic 11; e.g., the comment here, “. . . implement fine and jail sentence for people who just won’t listen to social distancing . . . the
Mentality of Singaporeans and How you can make us listen—We
Fear Fines.”) and greater law enforcement (Topic 14; e.g., “Why
keep on talking and no action? Can’t you deploy the NEA, Police
Force and the Active Soldiers, to enforce/make sure all Singaporean
and Foreigners do their part and comply with the Circuit Breaker
Measures.”) to prevent a worsening of the situation, such as a second wave of infections. Some even desired the government to take
strong actions (Topic 19, 20) such as implementing mass testing
and preventing people who are tested positive from further spreading the disease (e.g., “Pls look into saliva test kits . . . If everyone has
this available in their household and make to test every day and stop
them from going out to public places if they are tested positive”).
Theme 3: Need for Safety in Public Areas Like Public
Transport and Supermarkets
This theme focuses on the worry over potential vectors for disease
outbreaks and the public’s concerns about the safety of these public areas, such as public transport (Topic 9; e.g., “How to do social
distancing . . . The most easy area virus spreading is in the enclose
area like MRT and Buses. Never focus root cause”), supermarkets
(Topic 10, e.g., “It’s the structural concept of the supermarket—the
width of the alleys are not wide . . . You can control the traffic outside
the supermarket . . . but it’s not possible to control traffic of customers
within the supermarket bcos there are alot of movements.”).
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Theme 4: Stressing the Importance of Individual
Responsibility for Reducing Community Risks
The fourth theme is about the role of an individual’s actions in
safeguarding the community. The importance of individual
responsibility in fighting the virus for the collective good has
been consistently stressed, such as wearing of masks (Topic 4; e.g.,
“Source or self MFG face mask is the solution . . . mask can prevent
droplet from entering their nose and mouth. Give free mask when
a person goes into a building or MRT . . .”) or to self-isolate (Topic
7; e.g., “Let us just do our part and stop criticising, complaining for
now . . . The crucial part is we should all stay at home . . . Stay safe
and stay healthy.”). Additionally, frontline staff were appreciated
for their role in the pandemic fight, and some have urged others
to help them by staying at home (Topic 6; e.g., “Thank you all the
doctors, nurses n those in the hospital helping to prevent the COVID19 virus and we will do our part to STAY AT HOME!”)
Theme 5: Expectations for the Authorities to Be Better at
Crisis Response Like Consistent Communications and Faster
Crisis Response
The fifth theme illustrates dissatisfaction with the government’s
handling of the situation and reflects the public’s expectations for
the authorities to safeguard them from harm. Some have claimed
that much more stringent efforts should have been done much
earlier by the authorities, (Topic 18; e.g., “If u and your colleagues
were more determined n resolute in your approach in March, waited
for new developments day by day, Singapore would be in better
position today. Never wait for the storm. Drastic measures like Safe
Distancing n Circuit Breaker could have initiated earlier in March.”).
Policy U-turns, especially regarding advice on masks, can create anxiety and show how the public desires consistent messaging (Topic 5; e.g., “. . . the mark of an incompetent set of leaders
is flip-flopping of policies . . . First wear mask only when unwell,
now wear . . . DEAR LEADERS, THINK THOROUGHLY FIRST
CAN BEFORE OPENING YOUR MOUTHS CAN?”). During the
pandemic, some expressed dissatisfaction with the easing of travel
restrictions implemented, stating that there is no need to rush to
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open up until the situation is completely normal (Topic 12; e.g.,
“. . . government so eager to open to China first when Singaporeans
have not even gone back to normal life! . . . there is no need to rush
to open to them first! Stop making the citizens pay for the mistake!”).
Theme 6: Showing Concern to Vulnerable Populations Like
Children, Elderly, and Foreign Workers
The sixth theme reflects the concerns that the public has for vulnerable populations such as the elderly, children, and foreign
workers. For the elderly, there were concerns about their ability to
adopt protective actions to keep themselves safe during the crisis
(Topic 17; e.g., “Please spare a thought for elderly with dementia. It
is hard to keep them cooped up at home and also hard to get them to
wear a mask all the time when they are taken out for a short walk.
They will not understand the need for a mask and will yank out the
mask.”). For the children, there were concerns over infection risks
in schools and preventing them from potential exposure to the
virus (Topic 15; e.g., “But remember Teachers. What you are teaching are theory only . . . The correct thing to do now is close all schools
and do e-learning. Prevent the kids from exposure.”). For the foreign workers living in dormitories, there is the worry of infection
risks due to communal living (Topic 3; e.g., “. . . living conditions of
the dormitories too crowded, plus the poor hygiene knowledge of the
workers . . . dormitory management group who must implement the
corrective plans and actions for the dormitories”).
Theme 7: Sensemaking about Coronavirus Situation
The final theme (Topic 13) concerns how the public makes sense
of the pandemic by discussing the epidemiological characteristics of the virus (e.g., “Virus have ZERO mobility. It has no legs,
wings or fins. It relies on humans to transport them from host to
host. If humans stop transporting them, the transmission of COVID
WILL STOP”) as well as discussion and rumors of the origins of
the pandemic (e.g., Coronavirus may have originated in lab linked
to China’s biowarfare program.).
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Discussion
To address RQ1, the topic modelling approach has helped to quickly
and empirically identify psychological concerns in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic. As seen in Table 1, the top three most discussed topics were inferred to be about: (1) Strong public support
for the mobilization of law enforcement officers; (2) many people
want to know more epidemiological information about the virus;
(3) debate over the safety benefits versus privacy concerns of contact tracing devices. Subsequently, the topics were grouped into
seven themes. The pattern of the themes was consistent with the
HBM and collectivism, which will be discussed below.
Perceived Susceptibility and Public Concerns
The findings indicate that one construct found within HBM, perceived susceptibility, can be mapped onto some of the themes.
Perceived susceptibility to health risk is seen in Theme 3, reflecting the public’s concern about the risks in public areas like public
transport, supermarkets, and workplaces. People may feel the need
for better health and safety measures taken during the COVID19 pandemic, especially in public areas where there is a perceived
high likelihood of viral transmission due to high human traffic and
interaction. Likewise, how other people in the public spaces comply with the precautionary measures would also influence their
perceived vulnerability of contracting the virus. Taken together, it
is important to provide reassurance to the public that the authorities have put in place and reinforced safety measures in the public
areas and that others are complying with these measures.
Theme 7, which is about sensemaking during a coronavirus
situation, shows the public’s need to gather information on the
measures taken to manage the spread of the virus. As a sensemaking activity, information gathering helps them to understand the
COVID-19 situation better, as well as the risk of contracting the
COVID-19 virus and the actions they should take to protect themselves and others (Rosenstock et al., 1988). During the COVID19 pandemic, Singaporeans are likely to turn to mainstream news
media (e.g., The Straits Times and Channel News Asia) and social
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media sites (e.g., Facebook) for swift and important crisis-related
information.
Collectivism in Response to a Pandemic
Moreover, the themes were also consistent with how people in
collectivistic culture respond to a crisis. Singapore is considered
a collectivistic culture, and the public’s values and priorities may
manifest as psychological concerns during a pandemic and when
the local authorities issue risk warnings. To address RQ2, themes
on placing priority on safety benefits over privacy concerns and
looking to authorities for more information and mobilization of
precautionary measures explored how collectivism shapes some of
these public concerns.
For example, in Theme 1, the protection from the pandemic
threat is given more priority over other issues like privacy, exercise, and elections. This is consistent with existing research on how
people in collectivistic cultures tend to prioritize the collective
interests of the group (Hofstede, 2001). During a health crisis, the
public will be more concerned about whether the nation can sufficiently protect its citizens from the COVID-19 threat. Hence, the
public in Singapore likely expects authorities to put the nation’s
health at the forefront in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic, at the expense of individual interests (e.g., desire to socialize in public places, inconvenience of wearing masks, etc.).
There are also expectations for individuals to be responsible
for reducing the risk of COVID-19 transmission in the community, as seen in Theme 4. These expectations are consistent with the
understanding that people in collectivistic cultures are more likely
to perceive their own health outcomes as dependent on the actions
taken by other people, especially if those people are in their close
social circle (Germani et al., 2020). They are more likely to stress
the need for individuals to put collective interests at the forefront
to feel that they are protected from the COVID-19 virus.
Furthermore, Theme 6 is about showing concern to vulnerable
populations like children, the elderly, and foreign workers. As people in collectivistic societies tend to perceive themselves as highly
interdependent and connected with others in their communities,
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during periods of heightened threat like the COVID-19 pandemic,
feelings of collectivism rise, along with the need to protect other
members of society. This manifests as the public’s need for reassurance that their ingroup members, especially those who are particularly vulnerable to the threat, will be taken care of.
In a similar vein, the willingness to support stiffer penalties and
law enforcement for the sake of safety from the disease, as seen in
Theme 2, is consistent with research that people from high power
distance societies tend to respect and accept what the authorities
propose is best for the country (Schermerhorn & Bond, 1997).
Individuals are expected to act according to social norms in collectivistic cultures. During a pandemic, these norms include preventive health behaviors such as maintaining good personal hygiene,
physical distancing, and wearing a mask in public. In tight societies like Singapore, there is a low tolerance for deviating from these
norms and not adhering to proposed measures for the collective
good of society. Hence, this translates to individuals wanting and
being more accepting of stringent precautionary measures, government surveillance, and more serious punishments for deviance
(Gelfand et al., 2011; Guan et al., 2020).
Implications
We found that HBM proved to be a valuable tool for identifying
perceived susceptibility as one of the public’s concerns during a
pandemic. According to HBM, people are more likely to perform
health-seeking actions to address the threat when they perceive a
health risk and have self-efficacy to perform these actions.
Before they assess whether to act or not, the public needs to
gather information related to the threat, which is the COVID-19
pandemic in this context. Hence, to aid the public in making sense
of the COVID-19 situation, authorities need to provide information related to the components in the HBM: the likelihood of contracting COVID-19, the severity of contracting COVID-19, the
effectiveness of the measures that are used to tackle COVID-19
transmissions, and assurance that they would be able to perform
the proposed measures to minimize the spread of COVID-19.
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Analyzing the information shared on social media platforms
can be helpful to local authorities for assessing and addressing the
public’s concerns. Existing work has demonstrated the value of
social media in communicating crisis information to the public
during a pandemic (Chua, 2020; Kaila & Prasad, 2020).
The possibility of combining HBM and cultural factors such
as collectivism can provide a more holistic picture of the public’s
concerns during a pandemic. More collectivistic societies such as
Singapore are more likely to support actions to protect the collective interest. Individuals are expected to engage in health behaviors like mask-wearing or self-isolation for the collective good over
any perceived benefits to themselves. For collectivistic societies,
there is greater support for punitive actions against behaviors that
undermine the collective good and for authorities to police such
behavior. During times of crisis, the public has greater expectations of the authorities to be able to effectively manage the crisis.
Given the role that collectivism plays in shaping public concerns,
this highlights that in a pandemic response, it is important to consider the role of cultural factors in shaping the public’s willingness
to adopt a recommended health behavior.
Limitations and Future Directions
First, this study examined Facebook comments of Singapore
media brands, which means that this study’s findings may not be
fully generalizable to other countries due to differences in cultural
factors. More work can be done in terms of exploring cultural
differences in risk communications during a health pandemic by
comparing data from different countries.
As the working language for Singapore is English, the study
was done using English-language posts and comments. However,
Singapore has four official languages as well as media brands that
serve news content in these languages. Future work can capture
the comments of the public in these other media brands as it can
provide a more comprehensive understanding of public concerns
by segments of society who do not use English-language sources
of news.
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Finally, the current study analyzed comments in response to
government precautionary measures on social media in the first
6 months to infer the psychological concerns that the public may
have by using a topic modelling approach. However, as the pandemic situation is still ongoing, there may be unforeseen situations
that can appear, which would create new topics for analysis. More
work can be done to explore how these topics emerge and change
over time to better understand how these needs can shift over time.

Conclusion
The current study analyzed comments in response to government
precautionary measures on social media to infer the psychological concerns that the public may have. A better understanding
of these concerns can help authorities communicate risks more
effectively, leading to more accurate risk perceptions and desirable
behavioral responses during crises.
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ABSTRACT
Government trust is generally helpful for societies, especially in crisis situations, such
as during the COVID-19 pandemic, because governments rely on citizens to follow
directives. Worldwide, with supporting evidence accumulating, a key directive has
been to wear face masks. However, in Sweden, the government has questioned their
usefulness. On other behavioral recommendations, such as handwashing, the government has taken a conventional path. We rely on this non-recommendation of face
masks to examine the causal impact of government trust on behavior. Based on a
large Swedish survey fielded during the pandemic, we find that higher government
trust reduces the likelihood of wearing face masks. In contrast, higher trust increases
the likelihood of handwashing. The findings qualify the conclusion about the beneficial consequences of trust.
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A long-held truth in the social sciences is that high levels of citizen trust in government is conducive for democracy, in large
part because it helps in generating legitimacy for authoritative
decision-making (Hetherington, 2005; Marien & Hooghe, 2011;
Rothstein, 1998). The importance of trust is particularly acute
during crises, when citizens are expected to follow instructions
from government authorities (Christensen & Laegreid, 2005;
Siegrist & Zingg, 2014). Thus, in order to manage crises, including
the COVID-19 pandemic, governments rely on citizens to agree to
even far-reaching restrictions on their personal freedoms (Devine
et al., 2020; Van Bavel et al., 2020).
Taking the trust-compliance relationship as the point of departure, our paper makes two contributions to this literature. The
first concerns are to address the need for closer examination of
the direction of causality between trust and compliance (Siegrist
& Zingg, 2014). As will be developed, we leverage a case in which
government authority instructions on protective measures deviated from the recommendations of international expertise on a key
aspect, and map how citizens adopted the instructions depending on their levels of government trust. This design, with its high
external validity due to the real-world situation, allows us to infer
what is likely a causal impact of government trust on voluntary
compliance with government instructions.
Second, the empirical case we study highlights a previously less
discussed boundary condition for the trust-compliance relationship needed to facilitate crisis management. As explained below,
high levels of citizen trust only help to mitigate a crisis when
government recommendations are accurate and helpful. In other
words, high trust in government might actually be harmful for
citizens’ ability to cope with a dangerous situation if the recommended measures are inadequate.
Our case is the Swedish strategy to handle the COVID-19
pandemic. Just like in other countries, Swedes were implored
to follow a number of protective measures to stop the spread
of the virus, whereof social distancing and handwashing were
the most important. However, the instructions from the Swedish government authorities stand out with regard to the use of
face masks (PHA, 2020; see also https://www.bbc.com/news/
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world-europe-55371102). International crisis management institutions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO, 2020) and
the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC,
2020), had repeatedly promoted face masks as a helpful protective
measure, and this policy was gradually adopted by governments
across the globe. By the early fall of 2020, the Swedish government
was the only government in the developed world that did not recommend, or require, its citizens to wear face masks in any context
(Andersson & Aylott, 2020; Petherick et al., 2020). In fact, in the
spring, statements were made that face masks could be counterproductive in certain circumstances (Expressen, 2020; PHA, 2020). If
the trust-compliance relationship works as suggested in the literature, high trust in Swedish government authorities would lead to
a higher likelihood of citizens complying with certain recommendations such as to wash hands carefully, but simultaneously a lower
likelihood of wearing face masks.
For empirics, we draw on a web survey with a large sample
of adult Swedes (n > 10,000) conducted in the fall of 2020, just
before and at the beginning of the second wave of the COVID-19
pandemic in Sweden. For some key variables, we also have panel
data information that goes back to the first phase of the pandemic
in the spring of 2020.

Literature Review
Trust in Government, Adoption of Protective Measures, and
Crisis Communication
Trust in government and government institutions is often
treated as a crucial element when dealing with crises and disasters (Christensen & Laegreid, 2005; Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2003;
Siegrist & Zingg, 2014; Van der Weerd et al., 2011). A lack of general government trust may influence risk perceptions and undermine people’s willingness/ability to mitigate risks and support risk
management (Devine et al., 2020; Siegrist & Zingg, 2014; Van der
Weerd, 2011).
Health communication research conducted during previous pandemics, such as the Ebola outbreak in 2014–2016 (Blair

338

JOHANSSON, SOHLBERG, ESAIASSON, and GHERSETTI

et al., 2017; Morse et al., 2016), the SARS pandemic, the avian
influenza, and the H1N1 (swine flu) pandemic (Siegrist & Zingg,
2014), confirm that respondents with high government trust are
more inclined to take precautionary actions to protect themselves
and abide recommendations to mitigate the spread of the disease.
However, as Siegrist and Zingg conclude in their overview of the
field, the causal interpretation of these studies is questioned since
they build on weak designs for causal inferences. For example,
they mainly rely on cross-sectional data without persuasive identification strategies.
Also, with regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, research indicates that trust is conducive for compliance with government
recommendations, although there are exceptions (Ling Wong
& Jensen, 2020). Studies from the early phases of the pandemic
observe that high trust in government institutions is associated
with willingness to adopt protective measures such as social distancing, washing hands, testing for infection, and wearing face
masks (Devine et al., 2020). Further, higher trust is related to
higher levels of obeying regulations and recommendations (Han
et al., 2020; Olsen & Hjorth, 2020), lower mortality rates (Oksanen
et al., 2020), and intention to get vaccinated (Parson Leigh et al.,
2020).
To sum up, previous research theorizes that there is a causal
relationship between trust in government and its institutions and
citizens’ compliance with protective measures. However, confidence in this assumption would be strengthened if it rested on
studies using research designs more suited at establishing causality. By analyzing the contrasting government recommendations in
Sweden regarding the use of face masks and handwashing during
the COVID-19 pandemic, we can more precisely address the
causal relationship.
Our design rests on the peculiarities of the Swedish case, where
the crisis communication from the government is consistent with
almost all other countries in the world regarding the importance
of handwashing, but stands out when it comes to the use of face
masks, which also has caused intense public debate and critique.
By analyzing this contrast in recommendations, we are better

Why Swedes Don’t Wear Face Masks During the Pandemic

339

positioned to explore what is presumably a causal effect of compliance on protective measures.
Sweden: Risk Culture, COVID-19 Strategies and Crisis
Communication
Sweden is characterized by a pronounced state-oriented risk culture (Cornia et al., 2016). Government institutions are expected to
effectively administer disaster prevention, mitigate ongoing crises,
and to guide and inform citizens through a crisis. Furthermore,
Swedish governance relies on highly independent government
authorities, and the Swedish government early announced that
it would follow the advice of the Public Health Agency (PHA)
during the COVID-19 pandemic (Pierre, 2020). Accordingly,
Sweden’s strategy for handling the pandemic was designed and
communicated by the PHA through frequent press conferences,
interviews, and information campaigns. When we address the
trust-compliance relationship in Sweden during the COVID-19
pandemic, we thus refer to trust in government authorities, not
the political dimension of government. This distinction is not
emphasized in previous research on trust and crisis management,
mostly because government control over authorities is stronger in
many countries, but also because governments in most countries
may declare a state of emergency and centralize authority during
a crisis. State of emergency can only be declared in Sweden during
wartime (Pierre, 2020).
A prerequisite for the Swedish state-oriented risk culture is
trust, and in international comparison, Sweden has high levels of
both institutional and interpersonal trust (Martinsson & Andersson, 2019; Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2020), levels that increased even
higher due to the rally effect during the first months of the coronavirus crisis (Esaiasson et al., 2020; Johansson & Vigsø, 2021).
The high levels of trust were also the cornerstone in the Swedish
coronavirus strategy; the public was expected to voluntarily follow
the recommendations of the experts (Johansson & Vigsø, 2021).
Compared to other countries, the Swedish response to the
COVID-19 pandemic was less invasive, and without a lockdown
(Andersson & Aylott, 2020; Petherick et al., 2020). Rather than
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coercive measures, the strategy has relied on advice and recommendations, many of which were similar to those in other countries. People were encouraged to wash their hands frequently and
avoid social contacts, especially indoors. Importantly, the PHA
never recommended, leave alone mandated, the use of face masks
in Sweden. The arguments being that masks did not protect against
being infected, that wearing a mask risked inducing false security
and lower people’s caution, and that incorrect handling of the mask
might even lead to increased spreading of the virus (PHA, 2020).
Even as more scientific evidence accumulated on the usefulness of
masks, especially in reducing the spread from infected people to
others (Chu et al., 2020), the PHA maintained that the evidence
was insufficient. In this respect, Sweden’s strategy differed remarkably from countries worldwide (see Figure 1).
FIGURE 1 Face Covering Policies During the COVID-19 Pandemic,
Oct 26, 2020
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While we do not have specific evidence from the survey, based
on previous research on information seeking and news media consumption, we can assume that Swedes were aware of the specific
recommendations by the PHA. Not only were the agency’s press
conferences followed directly by large audiences, but they were
also reported on widely in the news media. With Swedes being
high news consumers in general, and especially during a crisis
(Andersson, 2020), it is likely that people knew of the recommendations and how they diverged from those in other countries. Not
at least since citizens could compare the non-use of face masks in
Sweden with media reporting of people using face masks in other
countries. In addition, the PHA’s position on the use of face masks
was publicly debated, and the non-use of face masks was the most
frequently recurring question from journalists during the daily
press conferences (Dahlgren, 2021).
Hypotheses
Against this background, we can explicate the logic of our research
design. Since trust generally increases compliance, and since governments want their citizens to protect themselves from the coronavirus, we expect that Swedes with higher trust in government
will willingly comply with the action recommended by the government authorities, such as frequent handwashing. However,
and this is why the Swedish case is informative about the potential causal character of the trust-compliance relationship, when
it comes to wearing face masks, trust in government is expected
to lead to other behavioral consequences in Sweden than in the
rest of the world. Since there is no recommendation from the government authorities to wear face masks in public places, trusting
Swedes will not make the extra inconvenience of wearing them.
More formally, our hypotheses are:
H1: Swedes with higher trust in government are more likely to
wash their hands more frequently than Swedes with lower trust in
government.
H2: Swedes with higher trust in government are less likely to wear face
masks in public than are Swedes with lower trust in government.
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Method
Participants
Our data is from the Citizen Panel, which is maintained by the
Laboratory of Opinion Research (LORE) at the SOM-institute,
University of Gothenburg. The panel includes around 75,000 adult
members from all over Sweden. A smaller portion of the panel has
been recruited through probability-based methods, but an overwhelming majority are self-recruited. Most panelists participate
in surveys and experiments twice a year (www.gu.se/som-institute). We invited a portion of the panel to our survey. The survey was fielded between September 15 and October 26, 2020, and
was completed by 10,226 respondents. We also leverage that some
survey questions were asked to the same individuals in a previous
panel-wave in February and March 2020.
As with the panel at large, our sample is made up of opt-in
participants. For example, the sample has a higher educational
attainment than the Swedish population and is therefore not representative in this respect. Therefore, point estimates should be
interpreted with caution. However, what is more important is that
there is variation in the variables, enabling us to examine the relationship between our key factors. Descriptive statistics are available in Appendix A1.
Measures and Analytical Strategy
Our outcome variables are two pandemic-relevant behaviors:
handwashing and face mask wearing. Handwashing was measured by asking, “Last month, were you more careful with hand
hygiene?” To measure the usage of face masks, we asked the
respondents, “Last month, did you wear a face mask?” For both
types of behavior, respondents could choose between “yes” or “no”
as response options. Eighty-eight percent said they were more
careful with handwashing while 12 percent reported that they
were not. Nineteen percent had worn a face mask and 81 percent
had not. In the analysis below, yes is coded as 1 and no as 0.
One way of thinking about the analytical approach is that it
shares similarities with a within-subjects design that has occurred
naturally in the Swedish context. In one treatment, subjects are
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given the recommendation that they should do something to
reduce the spread of COVID-19 and, in another treatment, they
are not recommended to act in a certain way. Obviously, in a within-subjects design, the outcome variable should be the same. In
our case, it is admittedly not—one is about handwashing and the
other about wearing face masks—but to the extent that they are
both behaviors that aim at reducing the spread, they are equivalent.
Still, since we are cognizant that logic of the within-subject
design might not apply in this case, we include variables in the
models that aim at reducing omitted variable bias. Specifically, we
estimate three models for each outcome. First, we report the effect
of government trust while including interpersonal trust as a covariate in the model. Interpersonal trust is included since the two trust
concepts are related (Vallier, 2019), and we want to reduce the risk
of omitted variable bias due to this factor. Second, we add other
covariates as controls. They include several background factors
such as age, sex, education, and so on. Moreover, we control for
left-right ideology, party support, and news consumption (domestic and foreign). Third, we study the effects of government trust
while controlling for pre-crisis levels of government trust. Here,
we rely on the panel components of the data. In addition, we test if
the effects on the two dependent variables are different.
We measured trust in government, our main independent
variable, with the following question: “Generally speaking, how
much trust do you have in Swedish government authorities?” Five
response options were available (“Very low,” “Rather low,” “Neither low nor high,” “Rather high,” and “Very high.”). Unless otherwise noted, this and other variables have been re-coded to range
from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating more trust (M = 0.70,
SD = 0.24).
Interpersonal trust was measured with the following question: “In your opinion, to what extent is it generally possible to
trust people?” The endpoints were labelled with “People cannot
generally be trusted” and “People can generally be trusted.” Five
response options were available (M = 0.75, SD = 0.24). We measured exposure to foreign media on the coronavirus by asking
respondents the extent to which they search for information about
the coronavirus in foreign media. Five response options were
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available, ranging from several times a day to never. Exposure to
domestic media on the coronavirus was measured with a similar
question and response option, but it asked about domestic media
instead. Higher values indicate more information search. Leftright ideology was measured by asking respondents to place themselves on an 11-point scale where endpoints (far left and far right)
and the midpoint (neither left nor right) were labelled. Higher values indicate more right-leaning. Party support is dummy coded
where government supporters are the baseline. Opposition party
support and other party/don’t know/ref are dummies in the model.
Sex is dummy coded where female is the baseline and male = 1.
Age of the respondent is measured with six categories. Education
indicates the respondent’s highest educational attainment. The
variable has nine categories, with higher values indicating more
education. Location is dummy coded with “Large city (central)”
as the baseline. Dummy categories are “Large city (suburb),” “City
(central),” “City (outskirts),” “Town,” “Small town,” and “Countryside.” Foreign-born is a dummy variable indicating the country
of birth, where born in Sweden is the baseline. Government trust
lagged is trust in institutions measured the same as above, but in
February or March 2020 (M = 0.64, SD = 0.25). Interpersonal trust
lagged measures social trust, also in February or March with the
same questions and options as above (M = 0.73, SD = 0.23). Table
A1 has additional details on frequency distributions by variables.

Results
We expect that government trust will have contrasting effects on
washing hands and wearing face masks. Because of the binary
outcome variables, we rely on logistic regression for estimates.
Turning first to handwashing, our results show that higher government trust is associated with greater likelihood of more careful
hand hygiene, which yields support for H1. For example, we find
that the average likelihood of careful hand hygiene at the lowest
level of trust is 0.82 while it is 0.91 at the highest level of trust. The
odds ratio is 2.108 (95% CI [1.618, 2.748], p < 0.001) according to
the results in model 1 of Table 1. The results are also illustrated by
Figure 2. There seems to be somewhat of a reduced effect when we
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include more covariates (models 2 and 3), but the effect of government trust is largely the same, and still statistically significant
(p < 0.05) in both models. As expected, people who trust government authorities tend to follow its recommendations.
FIGURE 2

Probability of Careful Hand Hygiene by Government Trust

Next, we turn to H2 and the likelihood of wearing face masks.
Figure 3 shows that higher government trust is associated with a
lower likelihood of wearing face masks. For example, an individual at the lowest end of the trust scale (“Very low”) had a probability of 0.33 whereas someone at the highest end (“Very high”)
had a probability of 0.14. The odds ratio of the estimate is 0.335
(CI: 0.270 – 0.417, p < 0.001). This provides support for H2. In
other words, for this type of behavior, trust in government authorities has the opposite effect compared to the effect on handwashing. These results are robust to the inclusion of additional control
variables, as the results in models 2 and 3 show. The figure is based
on the first model of Table 2, where only interpersonal trust is
included as a control variable. It is especially noteworthy that the
effect is substantially the same even when prior levels of trust are
taken into account (model 3) since this model reduces the risk of
omitted variable bias.

Large city (suburb)

Education

Age

Male

Other party, dk/ref

Opposition party supporter

Left-right ideology

Domestic media on the coronavirus

Foreign media on the coronavirus

Interpersonal trust

0.746***
(0.135)
0.221
(0.137)

(1)
Logit coef

(2)
Odds ratio
2.108
(1.618 - 2.748)
1.247
(0.953 - 1.632)

Determinants of Careful Hand Hygiene

Government trust

TABLE 1

0.368**
(0.153)
0.149
(0.142)
0.266*
(0.140)
1.386***
(0.143)
-0.073
(0.171)
-0.036
(0.010)
-0.107
(0.103)
-0.066
(0.073)
-0.409***
(0.133)
0.075
(0.138)
0.047
(0.099)

(3)
Logit coef
1.445
(1.069 - 1.951)
1.161
(0.880 - 1.532)
1.304
(0.992 - 1.715)
3.998
(3.023 - 5.289)
0.929
(0.665 - 1.299)
0.964
(0.793 - 1.172)
0.898
(0.734 - 1.100)
0.937
(0.811 - 1.082)
0.664
(0.512 - 0.862)
1.078
(0.822 - 1.413)
1.049
(0.863 - 1.273)

(4)
Odds ratio
0.428**
(0.189)
0.333*
(0.179)

(5)
Logit coef
1.534
(1.059 - 2.220)
1.396
(0.982 - 1.983)

(6)
Odds ratio
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10,131

Observations

3.886
(3.169 - 4.766)

(2)
Odds ratio

9,999

1.163***
(0.244)

0.073
(0.112)
-0.037
(0.114)
0.335*
(0.178)
0.044
(0.113)
0.074
(0.118)
0.440
(0.319)

(3)
Logit coef

3.200
(1.985 - 5.161)

1.076
(0.863 - 1.340)
0.964
(0.771 - 1.205)
1.399
(0.987 - 1.981)
1.045
(0.837 - 1.304)
1.077
(0.855 - 1.357)
1.552
(0.831 - 2.900)

(4)
Odds ratio

10,097

0.479***
(0.184)
-0.271
(0.189)
1.392***
(0.111)

(5)
Logit coef

1.614
(1.126 - 2.314)
0.763
(0.526 - 1.105)
4.024
(3.235 - 5.006)

(6)
Odds ratio

Note: The first column of each model are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and the second column are odds ratios with
confidence intervals (95%) in parentheses. For measurement and coding of control variables, see appendix. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

1.357***
(0.104)

Constant

Interpersonal trust lagged

Government trust lagged

Foreign-born

Countryside

Small town

Town

City (outskirts)

City (central)

(1)
Logit coef
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Probability of Wearing Face Mask by Government Trust

We are studying two behavioral outcomes where the government has given contrasting recommendations. Besides finding that
the effects are statistically significant on their own and in opposing
directions, we complement this analysis by simultaneously estimating the models and testing if the coefficients are different. The
χ2-test is statistically significant at p < 0.001, thus rejecting the null
hypothesis that they are similar, which again affirms the contrasting effects noted above.
Other Determinants of Washing Hands
and Wearing Face Masks
Besides government trust, other factors also appear to play a role
in handwashing. Table 1 (model 2) shows that people who pay
more attention to domestic media’s coverage of the coronavirus are more likely to engage in careful handwashing (OR: 3.998,
p < 0.001). Given that domestic media have devoted a substantial
portion of their coverage to the importance of hand hygiene, mirroring the position of relevant institutions, this finding has a plausible explanation. In addition, this exploratory analysis of statistically
significant results indicates that older individuals are less likely to
wash hands than younger individuals are (OR: 0.664, p = 0.002).

Large city (suburb)

Education

Age

Male

Other party, dk/ref

Opposition party supporter

Left-right ideology

Domestic media on the coronavirus

Foreign media on the coronavirus

Interpersonal trust

-1.093***
(0.111)
-0.028
(0.114)

Logit coef
0.335
(0.270 - 0.417)
0.972
(0.778 - 1.216)

Odds ratio

(1)

Determinants of Wearing Face Mask

Government trust

TABLE 2

-0.945***
(0.129)
-0.153
(0.122)
1.746***
(0.108)
0.012
(0.127)
0.282**
(0.144)
0.115
(0.083)
-0.095
(0.090)
-0.229***
(0.060)
0.040
(0.108)
0.474***
(0.128)
-0.078
(0.075)

Logit coef
0.389
(0.302 - 0.501)
0.858
(0.676 - 1.090)
5.730
(4.638 - 7.079)
1.012
(0.789 - 1.296)
1.326
(1.000 - 1.758)
1.121
(0.953 - 1.320)
0.910
(0.763 - 1.085)
0.795
(0.707 - 0.895)
1.041
(0.842 - 1.287)
1.607
(1.251 - 2.065)
0.925
(0.798 - 1.071)

Odds ratio

(2)
-1.116***
(0.157)
-0.148
(0.149)

Logit coef

0.328
(0.241 - 0.445)
0.862
(0.644 - 1.154)

Odds ratio

(3)
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-0.694***
(0.087)
10,141

0.500
(0.421 - 0.592)

Odds ratio

(1)

-1.177***
(0.208)

-0.515***
(0.093)
-0.571***
(0.100)
-0.175
(0.134)
-0.458***
(0.095)
-0.635***
(0.102)
0.202
(0.205)

Logit coef

10,013

0.308
(0.205 - 0.463)

0.598
(0.498 - 0.718)
0.565
(0.465 - 0.687)
0.839
(0.645 - 1.091)
0.633
(0.525 - 0.762)
0.530
(0.434 - 0.648)
1.223
(0.818 - 1.829)

Odds ratio

(2)

-0.008
(0.153)
0.203
(0.156)
-0.734***
(0.093)

Logit coef

10,107

0.992
(0.735 - 1.340)
1.225
(0.902 - 1.664)
0.480
(0.400 - 0.576)

Odds ratio

(3)

Note: The first column of each model are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses and the second column are odds ratios with
confidence intervals (95%) in parentheses. For measurement and coding of control variables, see appendix. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Observations

Constant

Interpersonal trust lagged

Government trust lagged

Foreign-born

Countryside

Small town

Town

City (outskirts)

City (central)

Logit coef
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As for other factors associated with wearing face masks, we
find that men seem less likely to wear masks than women (OR =
0.795, p = 0.001) and that individuals who consume a great deal of
foreign media appear more likely to wear masks than those who do
not (OR = 5.730, p < 0.001). Moreover, mask wearing seems more
common among highly educated people (OR = 1.607, p < 0.001)
and among people on the right of the ideological spectrum (OR =
1.326, p = 0.05). In addition, the findings indicate that individuals
living outside the centers of large cities (the baseline category) are
generally less likely to wear masks.
Of these findings, it is perhaps the relationship between foreign media consumption and wearing face masks that is the most
intriguing. It seems as people who get their information from
abroad, where face masks are generally recommended, tend to
adjust their face mask behavior accordingly.

Discussion
To investigate the causal effect of government trust on compliance with government instructions, we leverage a peculiarity in
the Swedish strategy in response to the COVID-19 pandemic: citizens are recommended to wash their hands frequently, but are
not encouraged to wear face masks. From this, we derive two predictions about differential behavior: If government instructions
impact causally upon the precautionary measures individuals are
willing to undertake, citizens with higher trust in government will
be more likely to be careful with hand hygiene than citizens with
lower trust in government, but less likely to wear face masks. Our
findings from a large and diverse sample of Swedish adults generate precisely this pattern. The results hold under control for prior
levels of trust in government, and a host of potential confounding
variables like interpersonal trust, partisanship, news media use,
education, age, and gender.
However, as trust levels are observed and not induced at random, our findings are not conclusive, but with the logic of the
within-subjects design and statistical adjustments, they strengthen
the belief in a causal interpretation of the trust-compliance relationship that frequently appears in the literature on risk and crisis
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management/communication. It does indeed seem that high levels
of government trust is conducive for the citizens’ willingness to
follow government recommendations during crises.
Consequently, the government’s crisis communication will
have extensive possibilities to change citizen behavior during a
crisis, at least in a state-oriented risk culture like Sweden. Further,
the government can then even recommend and effectively implement protective measures, which contradict advice given by international health organizations like the WHO/ECDC, and citizen’s
mediated experiences of the situation in other countries.
In relation to this, we return to the prerequisite for effective
crisis management that we mentioned in the introduction—that
the government provides the best possible advice to its citizens.
When citizens put their trust in the government and follow its
recommendations, they rely on the government’s ability to both
evaluate risks and to put citizen’s interest first (Hamm et al., 2019).
In essence, people use the government as a source cue to simplify
a complex information environment. For this approach to work,
enabling a form of low-information rationality (see Popkin, 1991)
the quality of the recommendations is crucial. If recommended
protective measures turn out to be ineffective, or even detrimental,
high trust becomes counterproductive in citizens’ attempts to cope
with a crisis. High trusting citizens will consequently be less capable compared with low trusting citizens to protect themselves and
others if they follow government recommendations, which underlines the normatively problematic aspects of blind trust.
The possible harm of giving inadequate advice also relates to
the literature on risk and crisis communication ethics. According
to the precautionary principle, measures should be taken to eliminate risks (Leslie, 2006) and significant choice so that citizens,
based on accurate and relevant information, may be able to protect
themselves, or at least make an informed choice about what to do
(Ulmer et al., 2011). Since trust is such a powerful tool in risk and
crisis communication, practitioners should acknowledge the great
responsibility that comes with this mechanism. What if the given
recommendations are inaccurate? And if so, what are the consequences for government trust and future possibilities of effective
crisis communication?
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There are, of course, several limitations of this study. The
question of causality in the trust-compliance relation has already
been discussed, so also consequences of the non-probability sample. Further, while the study has variation in measures of recommended and non-recommended behavior, we lack appropriate
questions about other types of behavior. For example, additional
measures of adopting recommended social distancing would have
strengthened the analysis of the trust-compliance relationship.
Furthermore, the investigation of the trust-compliance relationship in this study is limited to a state-oriented risk culture and one
could assume that the effectiveness of communicating protective
measures is lower in risk cultures with lower institutional trust
(Cornia et al., 2016). Also, one should acknowledge the Swedish
system of governance, having independent government authorities. The combination of independent government authorities and
a tradition of these agencies being responsible for managing the
crises might have strengthened the citizens’ willingness to follow
recommendations. Since government authorities are independent
from the political side of government, the issue of face masks was
never politicized in a way as we have seen in other countries, like
the United States. In order to understand the effectiveness of trust
in crisis communication, we need therefore investigate how the
trust-compliance relationship plays out in countries where crisis
management is more strongly connected to the prime minister/
president and the cabinet. Therefore, even if the Swedish case gives
us some important takeaways on the trust-compliance relationship, and the ethical implications of this relationship, we need to
further investigate the scope and limitation of trust in crisis communication.
ORCID
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8980-1677
Bengt Johansson
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3195-6895
Jacob Sohlberg
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8572-5462
Peter Esaiasson
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9670-8983
Marina Ghersetti

354

JOHANSSON, SOHLBERG, ESAIASSON, and GHERSETTI

References
Andersson, S., & Aylott, N. (2020). Sweden and coronavirus:
Unexceptional exceptionalism Soc. Sci., 9(12), 232. https://doi.
org/10.3390/socsci9120232
Andersson, U. (2020). Nyhetsvanor under coronapandemin [News consumption during the corona pandemic]. The
SOM-Institute: University of Gothenburg. https://web.archive.
org/web/20210125024708/https://www.gu.se/nyheter/
forandrade-nyhetsvanor-under-corona
Blair R. A., Morse, B. S., & Tsai, L. L. (2017). Public health and
public trust: Survey evidence from the Ebola Virus disease
epidemic in Liberia. Social Science & Medicine, 172, 89–97.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2016.11.016
Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (2005). Trust in government: The
relative importance of service satisfaction, political factors,
and demography. Public Performance & Management Review,
28(4), 487–511. https://doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2005.11051
848
Chu, D. K., Akl, E. A., Duda, S., Solo, K., Yaacoub, S., &
Schünemann, H. J. (2020). Physical distancing, facemasks,
and eye protection to prevent person-to-person transmission
of SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19: A systematic review and
meta-analysis. The Lancet, 395(10242), 1973–1987. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(20)31142-9
Cornia, A., Dressel, K., & Pfeil, P. (2016). Risk cultures and dominant approaches towards disasters in seven European countries. Journal of Risk Research, 19(3), 288–304. https://doi.org/
10.1080/13669877.2014.961520
Dahlgren, P. M. (2021). Ställde journalisterna kritiska frågor under
Folkhälsomyndighetens presskonferenser? [Did the journalist
ask critical questions during PHA:s press conferences?]. In B.
Johansson, & L. Truedson (Eds.), Journalistik i coronans tid
[Journalism in the age of Corona], (pp. 56–72). Institutet för
Mediestudier.
Devine, D., Gaskell, J., Jennings, W., & Stoker, G. (2020). Trust
and the coronavirus pandemic: What are the consequences of
and for trust? An early review of the literature. Political Studies
Review, 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929920948684

Why Swedes Don’t Wear Face Masks During the Pandemic

355

ECDC. (2020). Infographic: Using face masks in the community.
https://web.archive.org/web/20200414134154/https://www.
ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications-data/infographicusing-face-masks-community
Esaiasson, P., J. Sohlberg, M. Ghersetti, and B. Johansson.
2020. “How the Coronavirus Crisis Affects Citizen Trust in
Government Institutions and in Unknown Others—Evidence
from the Swedish Experiment.” European Journal of Political
Research. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12419
Expressen. (2020). https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/tegnell
sagar-munskydd-i-tysk-intervju-farligt/
Hamm, J. A., Smidt, C., & Mayer, R. C. (2019). Understanding
the psychological nature and mechanisms of political trust.
PLOS ONE 14(5), e0215835. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0215835
Han, Q., Zheng, B., Cristea M., Agostini, M., Belanger, J.,
Gutzkow, B., Kreienkamp, J., PsyCorona Team, & Leander, P.
(2020). Trust in government and its associations with health
behaviour and prosocial behaviour during the COVID-19
pandemic. PsyArXiv. Epub ahead of print 29 June. https://doi.
org/10.31234/osf.io/p5gns
Hetherington, M. J. (2005). Declining political trust and the demise
of American liberalism. Princeton University Press.
Johansson, B., & Vigsø, O. (2021). Sweden: Lone hero of stubborn
outlier? In D. Lilleker, I. A. Coman, M. Gregor, & E. Novelli
(Eds.), Political Communication and COVID-19: Governance and
Rhetoric in Times of Crisis (pp. 155–164). London: Routledge.
Leslie, M. (2006). Fear and coughing in Toronto: SARS and the
uses of risk. Canadian Journal of Communication. 31, 367–389.
https://doi.org/10.22230/cjc.2006v31n2a1544
Ling Wong, C. M., & Jensen, O. (2020). The paradox of trust:
Perceived risk and public compliance during the COVID19 pandemic in Singapore. Journal of Risk Research, 23(7–8),
1021–1030. https://doi.org/10.1080/13669877.2020.1756386
Marien, S., & Hooghe, M. (2011). Does political trust matter? An
empirical investigation into the relation between political trust
and support for law compliance. European Journal of Political
Research, 50(2), 267–291. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14756765.2010.01930.x

356

JOHANSSON, SOHLBERG, ESAIASSON, and GHERSETTI

Martinsson, J., & Andersson, U. (2019). Swedish trends 1986–
2018. https://web.archive.org/web/20200210000059/https://
som.gu.se/digitalAssets/1732/1732590_7.-swedish-trends1986-2018.pdf
Morse, B., Grépin K. A., Blair R. A., & Tsai, L. (2016). Patterns
of demand for non-Ebola health services during and after the
Ebola outbreak: Panel survey evidence from Monrovia, Liberia.
BMJ Global Health, 1:e000007. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjgh2015-000007
Oksanen, A., Kaakinen, M., Latikka R., Savolainen, L., Savela, N.,
& Koivula, A. (2020). Regulation and trust: 3-month follow-up
study on COVID-19 mortality in 25 European countries.
JMIR Public Health and Surveillance, 6(2): e19218. https://doi.
org/10.2196/19218
Olsen, A. L., & Hjorth, F. (2020). Willingness to distance in the
COVID-19. OSF Preprints. https://osf.io/xpwg2/
Ortiz-Ospina, E., & Roser, M. (2020). Trust. Our world in data.
https://web.archive.org/web/20200225142410/https://
ourworldindata.org/trust
Parsons Leigh, J., Fiest, K., Brundin-Mather, R., Plotnikoff, K., Soo
A., Sypes E. E., Whalen-Browne, L., Ahmed, S. B., Burns, K. E.
A., Fox-Robichaud, A., Kupsch, S., Longmore, S., Murthy, S.,
Niven, D. J., Rochwerg, B., & Stelfox, H. T. (2020). A national
cross-sectional survey of public perceptions of the COVID-19
pandemic: Self-reported beliefs, knowledge, and behaviors.
PLoS ONE, 15(10), e0241259. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0241259
Petherick, A., Hale, T., Phillips, T., & Webster, S. (2020). Variation
in government responses to COVID-19. https://www.bsg.
ox.ac.uk/research/publications/variation-governmentresponses-covid-19
PHA 2020: What is your advice regarding face masks? https://
web.archive.org/web/20200814045353/https://www.folk
halsomyndigheten.se/the-public-health-agency-of-sweden/
communicable-disease-control/covid-19/prevention
Pierre, J. (2020). Nudges against pandemics: Sweden’s COVID-19
containment strategy in perspective. Policy and Society, 39(3),
478–493. https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2020.1783787

Why Swedes Don’t Wear Face Masks During the Pandemic

357

Poortinga, W., & Pidgeon, N. F. (2003). Exploring the dimensionality of trust in risk regulation. Risk Analysis, 23, 961–972.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1539-6924.00373
Popkin, S. L. (1991). The reasoning voter: Communication and persuasion in presidential campaigns. University of Chicago Press.
Rothstein, B. (1998). Just institutions matter: The moral and political logic of the universal welfare state. Cambridge University
Press.
Siegrist, M., & Zingg, A. (2014). The role of public trust during
pandemics. European Psychologist, 19(1), 23–32. https://doi.
org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000169
Ulmer, R. R., Sellnow T. L., & Seeger, M. W. (2011). Effective crisis
communication: Moving from crisis to opportunity. SAGE.
Vallier, K. (2019). Social and political trust: Concepts, causes, and
consequences. https://web.archive.org/web/20210412155633/
https://www.niskanencenter.org/wp-content/uploads/
old_uploads/2019/05/Vallier-Social-and-Political-TrustNiskanen.pdf
Van Bavel, J. J., Baicker, K., Boggio P. S., Capraro, V., Cichocka, A.,
Cikara, M., Crockett, M. J., Crum, A. J., Douglas, K. M.,
Druckman, J. N., Drury, J., Dube, O., Ellemers, N., Finkel, E. J.,
Fowler, J. H., Gelfand, M., Han, S., Haslam, S. A., Jetten, J. . . .
Willer, R. (2020). Using social and behavioural science to support COVID-19 pandemic response. Nature Human Behaviour
4, 460–471. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-020-0884-z
Van der Weerd, W., Timmermans, D. R., Beaujean, D. J., Oudhoff,
J., & van Steenbergen, J. E. (2011). Monitoring the level of government trust, risk perception and intention of the general
public to adopt protective measures during the influenza A
(H1N1) pandemic in the Netherlands. BMC Public Health 11,
575. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2458-11-575
WHO. (2020). Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) advice for the
public: When and how to use masks. https://web.archive.org/
web/20201202031042/https://www.who.int/emergencies/
diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/advice-for-public/whenand-how-to-use-masks

358

JOHANSSON, SOHLBERG, ESAIASSON, and GHERSETTI

APPENDIX TABLE A1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable/Options

Freq.

Percent

Used face mask last month
No
Yes
Total

8,229
1,919
10,148

81.09
18.91
100.00

Careful with hand hygiene
No
Yes
Total

1,181
8,957
10,138

11.65
88.35
100.00

Government trust
Very low
Rather low
Neither low nor high
Rather high
Very high
Total

293
940
1,416
5,472
2,088
10,209

2.87
9.21
13.87
53.60
20.45
100.00

Interpersonal trust
1 People cannot generally be trusted
2
3
4
5 People can generally be trusted
Total

212
562
1,850
3,971
3,598
10,193

2.08
5.51
18.15
38.96
35.30
100.00

Government trust (Feb/Mar)
Very low
Rather low
Neither low nor high
Rather high
Very high
Total

377
1,356
1,773
5,323
1,374
10,203

3.69
13.29
17.38
52.17
13.47
100.00

Interpersonal trust (Feb/Mar)
1 People cannot generally be trusted
2
3
4
5 People can generally be trusted
Total

137
630
1,839
4,482
3,103
10,191

1.34
6.18
18.05
43.98
30.45
100.00

Coronavirus info search: Foreign media
Never
Rarely
Once a week
Daily
Several times a day
Total

3,209
3,534
2,057
1,104
232
10,136

31.66
34.87
20.29
10.89
2.29
100.00

Coronavirus information search: Swedish media
Never
Rarely
Once a week
Daily
Several times a day
Total

307
1,543
2,910
4,322
1,090
10,172

3.02
15.17
28.61
42.49
10.72
100.00

Variable/Options

Freq.

Percent

Left-right ideology
0 Far left
1
2
3
4
5 Neither left nor right
6
7
8
9
10 Far right
Total

399
519
1,142
1,326
1,158
1,332
1,075
1,409
1,204
368
268
10,200

3.91
5.09
11.20
13.00
11.35
13.06
10.54
13.81
11.80
3.61
2.63
100.00

Party support
Government
Opposition
Other, Don’t know, Refusal
Total

5,282
3,591
1,305
10,178

51.90
35.28
12.82
100.00

Sex
Female
Male
Total

3,230
6,981
10,211

31.63
68.37
100.00

Age
< 30
30-39
40-49
50-59
60-69
≥ 70
Total

189
650
1,005
2,829
2,585
2,968
10,226

1.85
6.36
9.83
27.66
25.28
29.02
100.00

Highest level of education
Not completed elementary school
Completed elementary school
High school, < 3 years
High school, ≥ 3 years
Post-secondary education, < 3 years
Post-secondary education, ≥ 3 years
College/University, < 3 years
College/University, ≥ 3 years
Doctoral degree
Total

9
287
640
763
727
267
1,064
5,813
655
10,225

0.09
2.81
6.26
7.46
7.11
2.61
10.41
56.85
6.41
100.00

Location
Large city (central)
Large city (suburb)
City (central)
City (outskirts)
Town
Small town
Countryside
Total

1,887
2,434
1,482
1,323
468
1,414
1,216
10,224

18.46
23.81
14.50
12.94
4.58
13.83
11.89
100.00

Country of birth
Sweden
Foreign
Total

10,079
146
10,225

98.57
1.43
100.00
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health-related information in their specific communities. Such a strategy made the
information accessible and attainable, but potentially reinforced place-based tensions
and inequalities. Our study has implications for preventative sensemaking research
as well as for crisis communicators attempting to better reach specific communities
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States began to revisit their crisis plans for handling a pandemic.
The experiences of hospitals as they prepared for COVID-19 were
not uniform; these hospitals and the communities they serve
have well-established narratives that incorporate their unique
situations, tensions, and ideals into their pre-crisis planning and
crisis communication. For example, because of a lack of testing
infrastructure in rural areas, confirmed case numbers may not be
accurate in these areas (Weinberg, 2020). Also, larger hospitals in
urban areas can see large influxes of patients, and these hospitals
must treat their patients while using resources wisely and keeping
workers safe (Chowdhury et al., 2020). In this study, we examined
how the different challenges of rural and urban hospitals led to different approaches to COVID-19 crisis communication efforts that
were particularly suited to each hospital’s unique environment.
Crisis communication researchers, healthcare practitioners,
and hospital administrators must better understand the ways in
which rural and urban hospitals shape narratives to make sense
of the pandemic and communicate with their stakeholders. Individuals perceive reality through narratives and often communicate
their perceptions to others through stories (Fisher, 1984). Narrative sensemaking, as explored by Weick (1995) and Brown (2004),
provides a useful theoretical foundation to investigate the methods used by rural and urban hospitals to plan for the COVID19 pandemic. Previous work on the need for anticipatory crisis
management in order for an organization to respond effectively
with crisis communication also has implications for our study, as
we find that the cultivating of place-based exposition is essential
to pre-crisis planning (Olaniran & Williams, 2001). The storied
past of hospitals and the communities in which they serve impacts
every step of the pre-crisis planning stages and beginning stages
of crises.
In this study, we examined online press releases using closetextual analysis in conjunction with contextual rhetorical criticism
to compare the communication strategies implemented by two hospitals in Texas at the pre-crisis and early months of the COVID-19
pandemic in the United States. The two hospitals selected for this
study include the Comanche County Medical Center (CCMC),
a regional hospital serving rural communities in Comanche and
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Erath county, and the Methodist Health System (MHS), a large
hospital system serving the Dallas-Fort Worth metropolitan area.
In this study, we examine the use of place-based narratives as
sensemaking tools, used in press releases of a rural and urban hospital as they attempted to manage the then-developing spread of
the COVID-19 crisis. We argue that effective, preemptive placebased narrative exposition within crisis communication allows
for better perceptions of legitimacy and relationship-building
between an organization and its publics (Clementson, 2020;
Lee & Jahng, 2020; Yang et al., 2010). However, at the same
time such narratives can also reinforce place-based tensions and
inequalities that oversimplify or misrepresent multidimensional
crises (Peterson, 2010). Through this comparative rhetorical analysis, we hope to better understand the unique place-based narrative sensemaking strategies used by rural and urban hospitals in
preparation for the COVID-19 pandemic.
Cases: Rural and Urban Hospitals Face COVID-19
The impact of the COVID-19 global pandemic might be unprecedented, but researchers, practitioners, and doctors on the frontlines of healthcare in the United States were preparing for the
crisis for months prior to its spread to the United States. Hospitals
took several recommended steps to slow the outbreak and ease
the pressure of treating COVID-19 patients (Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention [CDC], 2020; Marx et al., 2020). Hospital
preparedness can include strategies for using resources effectively
and securing necessary funding, promoting organizational legitimacy, and fostering a trusting relationship with the public through
pre-crisis communication. Despite early efforts to prepare for crises (CDC, 2018), hospitals in the United States were ill-prepared
for such a long-term and wide-reaching crisis as COVID-19
(Cagliuso et al., 2008). The continued improvement of crisis communication strategies can help hospitals and other community
leaders better prepare to reach out to their communities during
future crises.
Previous literature in the fields of crisis communication and
management has explored the importance of local context on crisis
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response. The situational crisis communication theory (SCCT)
outlined the importance of context for how members of the public
respond to crises, arguing that organizations should respond to
crises based on how responsible they were for the crisis and how
much their reputation hinges on their response (Coombs, 2007).
Given such a theoretical foundation, the response of hospitals to
a public health crisis is highly important to their legitimacy and
reputation as organizations and impacts how they will respond
to crises in the future. Further, construal level theory notes the
importance of psychological distance on how the public responds
to crises, as a person will not worry as much about an event perceived as far away as they will an event perceived as nearby or
imminent (Liberman & Trope, 1998; Spence et al., 2012). The
foundational assumptions of crisis communication—that context
matters—provides a helpful framework for understanding the different challenges shaping public perceptions in the early months
of the pandemic, due to the differences in perceived distance
between their communities and the crisis.
Rural and urban hospitals respond differently to crisis because
of unique struggles, communities, and resources. During a crisis,
rural hospitals like the CCMC must consume limited resources
quickly. The planning and preparation process of an emergency
situation is essential to rural hospitals because of limited access
to equipment, supplies, personnel, and infrastructure (Office of
Rural Health Policy, 2002). In the event of a long-term crisis such
as COVID-19, rural hospitals have been brought to the brink of
bankruptcy because of the quick depletion of resources without
financial payouts. Even before the global pandemic, since 2010,
120 rural hospitals have had to shut down due to lack of funds,
and over 21% of rural hospitals were found to be financially unstable (Topchik et al., 2020). Texas hospitals have not been immune
from the issues facing rural hospitals. Many Texas hospitals were
already struggling to stay financially afloat, and the COVID-19
pandemic did little to ease the pressure on limited staffing and
resources (Walters, 2020). Texas rural hospitals’ lack of personnel,
funding, and resources created an urgent need for assistance in the
response to COVID-19.
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Urban hospitals, such as the hospitals that comprise the MHS,
faced their own unique challenges in response to COVID-19.
Because of their multifaceted public as well as their larger internal
membership and structure, urban hospitals must be transparent,
correct rampant misinformation, and establish partnerships with
diverse local communities in order to be effective with their crisis
communication (Liu et al., 2018). Despite similar funding being
set aside for disaster preparedness, rural and urban hospitals differ significantly in their available resources, crisis training, plan
development, perceptions of preparedness, and surge capacity—
especially essential during a pandemic (Vick 2019). Diffusing
health information also faces different challenges in rural and
urban areas. For instance, 25% of rural Americans do not have
regular access to broadband internet, compared to less than 2%
of urban Americans; 47% of rural hospitals are losing money with
their operations; and 25% of rural hospitals are at a high risk of
closing—leading to the hospitals having to limit some of their
operations, such as public relations personnel and initiatives (Dornauer & Bryce, 2020). Within the hospitals included in our analysis, the personnel difference in communications is striking—MHS
has four individuals dedicated as media contacts and a full marketing department, while CCMC has only two on-staff individuals
working on community outreach. In short, rural hospital emergency response requires a different response than urban hospitals
due to differences in funding, location, and personnel.

Literature Review
Narratives, Place, and Pre-Crisis Management
Throughout history, people have used stories to make sense of the
world around them, giving order to chaotic reality, navigating complicated life events and social systems through narrative structure
(Fisher, 1984; Fisher, 1985). Narrative sensemaking theory examines such use of storytelling, attempting to explain how and why
people use stories to make sense of social structures, relationships,
crises, and other notable environments and events. Our analysis
of press releases from CCMC and MHS during the COVID-19
crisis operates within the framework of narrative sensemaking
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theory, attempting to shed light on how rural and urban hospitals
set up narrative structures within their rhetoric to build a trusting relationship, founded on legitimacy, with the members of their
communities—a relationship that can withstand the tests of a crisis situation.
Crisis communication is a complex phenomenon central
to the ability of organizations to survive and sustain themselves
through uncertainty. Crisis response calls for three main goals:
(a) disseminating instructing information, (b) disseminating
adjusting information, and (c) reputation management (Coombs,
2015). One way organizations can simplify complex happenings to
provide needs for action and avenues to act that lead to reaching
crisis response goals and broader organizational goals is through
establishing stories about environments and events. Brown (2004),
expanding on Weick (1995), included narratives as an effective
sensemaking strategy for organizations, as stories use hindsight to
structure events for both individuals and a community. Sensemaking can be defined as the process of trying to explain and give
meaning to a confusing or complex object or event in a more simplified and approachable manner, literally “making of the sense”
(Weick, 1995, p. 4). Because narratives are so central to the human
experience, they are especially apt in making sense of crisis events.
Prior scholarship on sensemaking focuses on the individual
process of retrospectively sorting through crises. Sensemaking as
originally outlined by Weick (1995) involves retrospection, a process of individuals looking back and sorting out past experiences.
However, scholars such as Sandberg and Tsoukas (2015) have
pointed out the need to examine prospective sensemaking that
allows room for organizational change and can be more actively
guided to shape future action. Within this study, we use the term
preventative sensemaking, which we define as making sense of
future action through communicating, interacting, and storytelling about a past action, to take a prescriptive approach. Under
our conceptualization, preventative sensemaking involves recursive storytelling, recycling narratives to give meaning to future or
developing events. These narratives do not spring from nowhere;
they are inherently social and contextualized by nature. As
explained by Weick (1995) sensemaking is always a social activity,
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as it involves an ongoing process of sorting through experiences
and giving them meaning through a collective process of interaction within a social context. For this study, we focus not on how
individuals recursively sort through crises through sensemaking,
but, rather, on how organizations can guide a preventative sensemaking process for their members and the public through effective storytelling.
Narrative sensemaking scholars have generally identified narratives according to three criteria: (a) involvement of characters,
(b) action ordered to create causal inferences, and (c) a setting that
constrains the action (Abolafia, 2010; Boje et al., 2016; Boudes &
Laroche, 2009). Within this study, we focus particular attention
on settings and social contexts, including place-based details and
invocations of place, that guide the preventative sensemaking
process.
Place-Based Storytelling
Organizational stories are not one-size-fits-all constructions—
they reflect and respond to the community that surrounds and
circulates them. Tisch and Galbreath (2018) noted a phenomenon
they called “community sensegiving,” in which an organization’s
social connection to the surrounding public plays a large role in
organizational resiliency and the ability to survive through crisis.
Recently, scholars such as Clementson (2020) and Lee and Jahng
(2020) have noted the importance of narratives in crisis communication, as stories are powerful persuasive tactics, can shift blame
and act as vehicles for essential information, and can build legitimacy and trust for an organization. Further, organizational communication, including crisis communication, cannot be separated
from its surrounding context, as risk itself is socially produced and
shaped by the culture that surrounds it (Masuda & Garvin, 2006).
As Peterson (2010) found, in order to be effective, crisis and health
communicators must consider the place-based nature of the information and assurance they are trying to communicate. Long before
a crisis event occurs, public relations practitioners should be carefully shaping sensemaking stories that reflect a deep knowledge of
the specific community that surrounds the organization.
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Crisis sensemaking narratives involve rhetoric that fits the situational context and a shared sense of meaning perceived by the
public and members of an organization (Gephart, 2007). Although
not much work has examined the important dimension of place
in sensemaking narratives, scholars have found that consideration
of context is essential to encouraging effective sensemaking (Ingle
et al., 2011). Further, setting is often identified as a central ingredient of narratives that constrains the actions of characters and
the progress of characters. Many rhetorical analyses of sensemaking narratives focus on characters and causal action, determining
how blame can be shifted within a text, or the specific persuasion tactics of organizational communicators (Boje et al., 2016;
Boudes & Laroche, 2009). The important constraints and impact
of setting, especially placed-based exposition or backstory, is an
underexplored topic in rhetorical crisis communication studies
on sensemaking, but one that needs much further research, given
the importance of context to crisis communication as well as the
need for crisis communicators to reach specific communities with
information.
Place-based storytelling includes narratives that invoke specific dimensions and qualities of the setting where the characters
live and action happens. Rather than a macro-narrative that offers
an omnipresent, god-like view of the larger forces behind a story,
placed-based storytelling is micro-focused, explaining small dayto-day details of life in that specific place. At times, place-based
stories are essential to fully explaining a larger narrative, as Moors
(2019) noted with the Flint water crisis, because public media stories do not always capture the full experience of everyday citizens.
Further, place-specific details can act as unifying rallying points
to build legitimacy for a movement or organization (Endres &
Senda-Cook, 2011). In crisis communication, a situation when
making information accessible is key, close attention to constructing and reflecting setting through the use of place-based narratives
can better reach multifaceted and dispersed communities.
We argue that invocations of place are central to preventative
sensemaking storytelling. An extension of place-based storytelling, in which small details about the specific geographical context are used to describe the setting of narratives, invocations of
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place occur when rhetors, such as crisis communicators, recall
past action and behavior of a place’s community in order to guide
future or developing action. The term invocations is often used in
the context of ancient Greek rhetoric, such as the work of Homer,
when ancient rhetors used invocations, calls to deities or spiritual
forces, to boost their own credibility as speakers and offer a cue for
the story pattern to follow (Minchin, 1995; Minton, 1960). Going
beyond simple inclusion of setting, context, or place-based details,
an invocation of place is a call to action or request for help from
the forces of the place itself. It is recalling the recycled narratives
of a place to be used to make sense of future or developing action,
and is, therefore, a central feature of preventative sensemaking.
Exposition and Crisis Preparedness
We focus our rhetorical analysis for this study on press releases
during the early months of the COVID-19 crisis in the United
States before a surge of COVID-19 patients began reaching either
CCMC or the MHS. Our focus is on pre-crisis communication
and management, specifically the narratives that the press releases
presented to the public in an effort to guide the hospitals’ communities through a sensemaking process for the imminent pandemic.
To inform our interpretations of the impacts of the pre-crisis narratives, we use the Anticipatory Model for Crisis Management as
outlined by Olaniran and Williams (2001). Particularly, we accept
the idea that crisis management begins long before an actual crisis occurs, and effective crisis communication hinges on the many
steps taken to manage a crisis preemptively and ethically.
Narrative sensemaking as a process relies on hindsight using
story structures to sort out confusing events or complex circumstances that have been confronted in the past (Boudes & Laroche, 2009; Brown, 2004; Bute & Jensen, 2011). However, the press
releases we analyzed show that organizations can offer placedbased expository narratives and invocations of place that encourage members of the public to use similar stories to make sense of
crisis events that may occur in the future. In other words, crisis
communicators can offer pre-planned structures to guide the public’s sensemaking process, as long as the narratives used are specific to the public’s setting and meet each community’s individual
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needs. Previous studies show that narratives are not a handy
sensemaking technique that springs from nowhere following a
crisis. Rather, narratives need to be cultivated around and within
organizations in order to be used in crisis situations to maintain
the legitimacy and stability of an organization (Auvinen et al.,
2013; Golant & Sillince, 2007; Patriotta, 2003). Such past research
implies the possibility of crisis communicators fostering anticipatory narrative sensemaking strategies.
Practitioners of organizational communication should keep in
mind that they are perpetually building potential exposition for
future narratives that will be used to make sense of crises and the
organization itself. Exposition is backstory, a pause in the action
of a narrative during which the narrator explains past events.
Exposition frames a narrative, giving it both context and meaning, and, as found by Alexander (1997), exposition guides the
motivations and knowledge-seeking of the audience. The previous
goals of crisis response all require effective, but different, application of expository details within communications. Instructing
information, by nature, must communicate specifics about place
in order for the public to understand what to do to protect themselves during a crisis, while reputation management can include
reminding the public of the organization’s positive past action in
the community (Coombs, 2015). Such an understanding of the
goals of crisis response emphasizes that, to sustain themselves,
organizations must have a positive backstory of some kind that
can be reinforced during a crisis. Using the concepts of setting and
exposition, our analysis of CCMC and MHS press releases during
the early COVID-19 crisis emphasizes that pre-crisis placed-based
activities set up the success or failure of the public’s eventual narrative sensemaking strategies. The research questions guiding our
analysis include:
RQ1: How are (a) invocations and (b) characterizations of place used
in the press releases of CCMC and MHS during the early months of
the COVID-19 crisis in the United States?
RQ2: What is the rhetorical impact of characterizations of place in
the press releases of CCMC and MHS during the early months of the
COVID-19 crisis in the United States?
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Method
For this study we conducted a rhetorical analysis, specifically a
close-textual analysis that examined particular persuasive and
narrative features of each included artifact. Although we look at
the text of each press release in isolation to determine rhetorical
features at work within the text, we also consider the larger social
and organizational context of each crisis communication artifact,
guided by our research questions. The analysis was comparative
in nature—six press releases from CCMC were analyzed in isolation, then four press releases from the MHS were analyzed.
The press releases under analysis were chosen as the only press
releases on the organizations’ websites, directly before and within
the early months of the COVID-19 crisis in the United States,
published between January 2020 and early June 2020. Following
the close-textual analysis of the press releases themselves, we then
studied the larger social context for how CCMC and the MHS faced
the COVID-19 pandemic. In the tradition of other rhetorical analyses, such as Carpenter (1977) and others (Crines, 2013; Hamlet,
2011), we conceptualize “rhetorical impact” as highly interpretive,
determined through examination of the texts themselves and their
surrounding historical and cultural context.
Because around eight in ten questions about health start
through seeking information online (Fox & Duggan, 2013), we
chose to analyze only press releases readily available on hospital
websites. Although many sensemaking studies examine how individuals both within organizations and in the public retrospectively
sort through crisis situations, we instead focus on how the CCMC
and MHS attempted to guide their communities through a preventative sensemaking process. Therefore, we are focused more on
the organizational statements themselves, rather than public perception of how the organizations handled the crisis. Press releases
are by their nature meant to guide the narrative surrounding
organizational events, both when published online by the organization or sent directly to journalists, and press releases serve as
a foundation on which members of the media can build a larger
story (Lassen, 2006). As we are attempting to analyze the preventative sensemaking process and how an organization can guide the
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narratives that individuals may later use to make sense of an event,
press releases are appropriate artifacts for analysis.
Although we include case study contextual information in our
analysis, the bulk of our analysis takes a rhetorical approach. A
rhetorical approach to studying crisis communication examines
the development, framing, and interpretation of messages created by organizations, as pre-crisis threats and crises task organizations to create messages that demonstrate the organization’s
wisdom and position the organization as ethical in a strategic way
(Heath & Millar, 2003). In this analysis of the pre-crisis management of CCMC and MHS, we view press releases released during
the pre-crisis planning phase as “rhetorical statements designed
to demonstrate the commitment, trustworthiness, and alignment
of a company with community interests” (Heath & Millar, 2003,
p. 7). Given the limited number of press releases analyzed by this
study, we attempt not to make broad claims about the effects of the
pre-crisis communication of these organizations—rather, the limited amount of artifacts allows us to analyze deeply the narrative
sensemaking strategies within the text, aligning with our study’s
exploratory aim to better understand how place-based narratives
can be used in pre-crisis communication to guide the sensemaking process for the public when a crisis does occur.

Analysis
Place-based indicators act as the setting dimension of the narratives that press releases tell and are essential in guiding members of the public toward sensemaking strategies that allow the
community to both accept a crisis and respond well to a crisismanaging organization. Scholars have studied the textual dimensions of press releases as a genre, outlining their common format
as well as the importance of their context to understanding their
structure (Catenaccio, 2008; Lassen, 2006). Despite the importance of contextual considerations with press releases, scholars
and crisis communicators have overlooked the importance of
place-based signals within effective press releases.
To answer RQ1, we argue that in the press releases we analyzed, invocations of place and characterizations of place, or setting
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details, were used in a similar fashion as with social movements, to
build legitimacy and community (Endres & Senda-Cook, 2011).
Although press releases are often used as vehicles to get organizational and/or emergency information to the media and, ultimately,
the public (Lassen, 2006), we find that in the CCMC and MHS
press releases place-based information worked on several layers,
advancing information but also building legitimacy for the organizations and providing a foundational frame to guide readers’
sensemaking process. First, invocations of place ground the reader,
reinforcing a sense that the crisis communicators were speaking
directly to and from a community that they know well. Secondly,
characterizations of place offer a space for narrative exposition, in
which the crisis communicators could explain to readers all the
pre-crisis steps taken in order to maintain stability and keep individuals safe. Even without concrete evidence of any kind, the use
of setting fleshes out expository descriptions, making past actions
seem justifiable and concrete. Third, place-based appeals within
the rhetoric of the press releases we analyzed make the steps
offered to manage the COVID-19 crisis feel attainable, as they are
grounded in a specific location well-known to the hospitals’ publics and placed in the accessible context of previous organizational
actions.
Invocations of Place
RQ1a asked how invocations of place were used within the rhetoric of CCMC and MHS press releases. Invocations of place call
directly to the culture and values of the community in its specific
geographic location. The CCMC relied heavily on invocations of
place, emphasizing the small-town community atmosphere of the
CCMC public, situating COVID-19 in the context of local values such as neighbors helping out neighbors. The CCMC press
releases contained several calls to action, specific lists and information to help “flatten the curve” in the spread of COVID-19
(CCMC, 2020b, para. 2). “Recipients are asked to follow volunteer directions during the event, wear a face covering or mask,
remain in their car, leave windows up and have trunks open,” one
press release states in the context of a regularly held community
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food pantry (CCMC, 2020d, para. 3). Another asks all residents
of Comanche County to follow seven steps to contain the virus
(CCMC, 2020b), and yet another outlines, “Calling ahead and
notifying medical staff of recent travel and symptoms will help
CCMC better accommodate patient care needs” (CCMC, 2020c,
para. 1). The CCMC press releases outline specific actions that the
community members themselves can take to help each other survive the crisis.
Such specific calls to action in crisis communication are not
especially noteworthy, as emergency situations require the organizations involved to attempt to diffuse potentially lifesaving
instructing information. However, the way such calls to action
are contextualized within the rhetoric of the CCMC press releases
sheds light on how CCMC attempted to guide a preventative
sensemaking process with their narratives, using invocations of
place. All calls to action, detailing specific action members of the
public can take to slow the spread of the virus, are situated within
stories about regular community initiatives that take place even
in non-crisis periods. The food pantry in which social distancing
protocols are outlined, the press releases remind readers, are “normally held on the CCMC campus,” regular instances of volunteers
from the community coming together to help the less fortunate
(CCMC, 2020d, para. 1). Even the official statement included by
Dr. L. G. Troxell, CCMC Chief Executive Officer, applauds healthcare staff for “answering the call to serve” the community during
the crisis, realizing “CCMC’s vision statement” (CCMC, 2020e,
para. 5). Any calls to action to help guide behavior and perception
during the COVID-19 crisis do not spring from nowhere—rather,
they are grounded in the specific community CCMC serves,
reflecting and reinforcing small-town neighborly values.
Characterizations of Place
RQ1b focused on how characterizations of place were used in
CCMC and MHS press releases. Although still using place-specific
details within their press releases, MHS differs in their rhetoric,
focusing less on invocations of place and more on characterizations
of place. CCMC calls on the community to come together to fight

The Role of Place-Based Sensemaking in COVID-19 Communication

373

the COVID-19 crisis, emphasizing past community initiatives
and noting the steps that residents can take to slow the spread of
the virus. On the other hand, MHS instead emphasizes their own
actions as an organization, using setting-specific details to show
how they have cared for their community in the past, using placebased details to advance reputation management within their crisis rhetoric. For instance, one press release mentions education
resources offered by the hospital system to one community (MHS,
2020a) while others detail the organization’s work in South Dallas
(MHS, 2020c; MHS 2020d). MHS provides “the only two hospitals and trauma centers south of downtown Dallas,” according to
one of the press releases (MHS, 2020d, para. 5). Such an emphasis
builds rhetorical credibility in their press releases, establishing the
organizational legitimacy so important for an organization hoping
to sustain themselves through a crisis (Clementson, 2020; Gephart,
2007; Golant & Sillince, 2007). The press releases characterize the
MHS community through focusing on the agency and actions of
the organization, MHS providing the scaffolding to the everyday
functions of the geographic places the hospital system serves.
Despite differences in the context and use of place-based
descriptions and appeals, both CCMC and MHS used settingspecific details to flesh out exposition in the stories they told about
themselves as organizations and the COVID-19 crisis. Such expository place-based descriptions could be interpreted as adjusting
information, setting readers’ minds at ease by assuring them that
the hospitals care for their communities. One press release boasts,
“CCMC already had a best practice cleaning and maintenance system in place,” which happened to also help contain COVID-19
(CCMC, 2020e, para. 4). An MHS press release describes an “ageold method” of treatment that “is new again” when describing
their current use of the antiviral drug Remdesivir (MHS, 2020b,
para. 11). An MHS press release also contextualizes current collaboration between North Texas hospitals to expand COVID-19
testing by noting past initiatives and collaborations to aid southern Dallas county (MHS, 2020c). Within the press releases during
the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, despite the unprecedented nature of the crisis, no actions taken were described as
unprecedented—rather, organizational action was backed up with
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descriptions of past action specific to the organizations’ communities. Such exposition reminds readers of past strategies and initiatives specific to their communities, thus cultivating the social
meaning-making context through which individuals can interpret
future events, such as the then-developing pandemic. In other
words, use of expository setting details provides the foundation
for a preventative sensemaking process, in which the organizations offered a narrative frame on which the public could build
their interpretations, perceptions, and, ultimately, actions during
developing future events.
Place-Specific Impact
The rhetorical impact of characterizations of place in the press
releases of CCMC and MHS during the early months of the
COVID-19 crisis in the United States varies according to each hospitals’ situation and community. The different implications of the
different narrative frames and contextualization of setting details
is explained further in the Discussion section. However, rhetorically, for both CCMC and the MHS, place-based details bring
credibility to the rhetoric of the crisis management press releases.
Given the central role of discourse to building organizational
legitimacy, and, in turn, the central role of discourse-built organizational legitimacy to institutional stability (Cornelissen et al.,
2015), effective use of expository setting details to manage developing or forthcoming crises is essential to crisis communicators
effectively navigating a crisis situation, especially in the long term.
Assumptions about the hospitals’ communities appear in the
rhetoric of the press releases, with large implications about who
can and should access the crisis management information. One
CCMC release, touching on ways to access health information
through technology, clarifies that the “applications . . . downloaded
on a patient’s computer or mobile device” can also be called “apps,”
signaling that not every reader of the release will be thoroughly
familiar with digital technology (CCMC, 2020e, para. 2). Such a
clarification displays effective knowledge of CCMC’s rural community, especially given the digital divide and limited access to
broadband internet in many rural areas across the United States

The Role of Place-Based Sensemaking in COVID-19 Communication

375

(Dornauer & Bryce, 2020). In contrast, the MHS assumes access
to digital technology and the internet, stating at the end of their
May 7 release: “Those who have recovered from COVID-19 are
encouraged to consider donating plasma. Visit Carter Blood Care
to request eligibility” (MHS, 2020b, para. 16). Although both
CCMC and MHS press releases point to specifics of setting to contextualize the developing crisis, those specifics are placed in very
different narrative frames with very different assumptions about
which members of the public are consuming the crisis-related
information.

Discussion
The MHS faces the challenge of serving a very diverse community with varying cultural norms, beliefs about healthcare, and
ability to access digital resources. There are notable differences
between the community CCMC serves and the community MHS
serves, including differences in education level and racial demographics. The Dallas/Fort Worth area has a higher percentage of
high school graduates and individuals with at least a bachelor’s
degree than Comanche and Erath counties served by CCMC (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2018a & 2018b). Such a holistic higher education
level might explain the tone of the MHS’s press releases, which
speak in clinical language to an assumed audience that is internetconnected and able to seek out resources on their own. The holistic higher education level might also explain why most community
initiatives, when they are specified in the releases, focus on education projects.
However, despite the higher education level of the DFW area
as compared to Comanche and Erath counties, in which 95.6% of
persons identify racially as White alone, around 20% of DFW individuals identify as Black, around 40% as Hispanic or Latino, and
only around 63% as White alone (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018a &
2018b). Given that Pew Research Center identified Black and Hispanic individuals as more likely to distrust the medical profession
and see medical misconduct as an important problem (Funk et
al., 2019), that the MHS speaks within their press releases in such
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a clinical tone with non-transparency in deliberation and action,
brings attention to the identity of their assumed audience, and
weight to the possible implications that such rhetoric—especially
in the context of a crisis—further alienates individuals in their
community. Such implications are further tragic when faced with
the increasing rates at which COVID-19 deaths and cases are disproportionately impacting Black, Hispanic, and Latino individuals
(Godoy & Wood, 2020). Left out of the narratives included in the
MHS press releases directly prior to and during the initial stages of
the COVID-19 outbreak, communities of vulnerable population
groups are left unable to get the resources they direly need.
Implications
The findings of this research can be used by researchers, crisis communication practitioners, and hospital administrators to inform
the use of press releases for shaping ideas about place through
narrative sensemaking. Practitioners and hospital administrators
working in rural and urban hospitals can use this research to bolster their efforts to not only reach out to the communities they serve
with timely, helpful information, but to help the communities and
themselves create and shape a narrative about how the organization and community will manage the crisis together. Press releases
and external communication that intentionally frame information
to best appeal to the communities to which they serve might help
hospitals maintain strong relationships with their communities as
COVID-19 continues to impact daily life. More research is needed
to better understand the impact of crisis communication messaging on the community’s perceptions of the organization within the
context of COVID-19 and other epidemic and endemic viruses
and diseases (Kim et al., 2009; Malecki et al., 2020).
Our study has implications for previous work on narrative
sensemaking. Specifically, we offer an argument for preventative
sensemaking—while much sensemaking research examines how
individuals use narratives to sort out past events, our study examines how organizations can offer sensemaking narratives to guide
perceptions of developing crises. Given the long-term, complex
nature of the COVID-19 crisis, such preventative sensemaking
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could have huge implications for crisis communicators attempting to guide the perceptions of the public during crises without
easily or quickly attainable conclusions or solutions. Our study
also begins to shed light on not only the exotextual process of
sensemaking, but the textual dimension—focusing not just on
how people perceive crises, but the textual and rhetorical elements
of content that can shape individuals’ perceptions.
Assumptions presented by narrative frames, especially when
those narrative frames are presented in order to help the community make sense of a crisis, can lend rhetorical credibility to crisis
communication initiatives. However, such use of setting-specific
stories can also trigger place-based tensions and inequalities, limiting who gets access to sensemaking narratives as well as crucial
health-related information. Scholars of crisis response narratives
such as Heath (2003) and Clementson (2020) have noted the centrality of stories to shaping organizational legitimacy and trust
following a crisis. Crisis communicators must also consider how
the use of setting-specific narratives helps flesh out and make
more effective crisis communication while considering how such
place-based details can also oversimplify a larger crisis into a tale
reinforcing community tensions (Peterson, 2010). Part of such
consideration involves the continued pre-crisis development of
community relationships that can be used as place-based exposition should a crisis occur. By bringing close analysis of literary elements such as exposition and setting to the study of sensemaking
narratives, scholars and practitioners can better begin to understand the nuances in language that contribute to preventative
sensemaking narratives about crises.

Conclusion
Organizations are constantly building the beginnings of sensemaking narratives that crisis communicators could later offer to
the public. Key to such narratives is a deep knowledge of the place
where the organizations are situated and where the members of
their communities live. In this study, we found that place-based
setting details are rhetorically powerful in press releases meant to
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help manage a developing long-term crisis. The press releases of
CCMC and the MHS during the first few months of the COVID19 crisis in the United States display narrative strategies that the
organizations offered their communities to make sense of the
imminent crisis. Expository setting details in these sensemaking
stories allowed for the communities to brace themselves for the
crisis and grounded crisis management actions in the circumstances attainable and accessible for members of each hospitals’
public. However, such narratives also place limiting place-based
frames on the developing crisis, constraining how the crisis was
ultimately managed by each community.
Despite the limitations of an exploratory rhetorical analysis such as this one, including a small sample size and a focus on
only digital press releases, our study sheds light on a preventative
sensemaking process, which is especially important for crisis
communicators to foster relationships with the community as a
long-term crisis is just beginning to develop, or before the crisis
develops at all. A crucial element of preventative sensemaking
involves the use of setting details to make essential information
attainable and accessible to the particular public the organization
serves. Our analysis suggests that such details do not need to be
elaborate descriptions, but rather specific expository instances
of the organization helping the community in the past or understanding the past nature of the community. Although these setting
details are important rhetorically to build credibility for the organization, crisis communicators must carefully consider the details
they choose, as narrative frames can guide and constrain the public’s sensemaking process in ways that fall prey to already-existent
community tensions and inequalities. Further research on setting
details in crisis communications of other cases, how place-based
details are used differently within instructing and adjusting information and reputation management, as well as longitudinal studies that consider real-world effects of such rhetoric, could further
illuminate this topic.
The press releases used in this analysis did not extend past July
2020 as CCMC and MHS were in the crisis phase of managing
COVID-19. As COVID-19 continues to spread through communities, more research is needed to understand the prolonged crisis
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response of hospital officials and practitioners. In addition, future
research could longitudinally analyze the crisis response of hospitals as they eventually shift to a post-crisis response.
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This paper examines the crisis management strategies
used by the Greek government in response to the spread of the
COVID-19 pandemic in Greece. The article focuses on the nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) of pandemic management
and does not take into consideration the medical aspects like vaccine development or medical treatment. In addition, it examines
the crisis communication procedures and the rhetorical strategies
used by the Greek authorities.
The theoretical framework of the study draws on crisis management theory and practice-based models of the WHO and
evaluates the management of the pandemic during the two major
waves in Greece (i.e., March and November 2020). Through the
comparison of both waves, the study aims to examine the strategies and evaluate the models used for both phases by the Greek
Government. The findings add to the growing literature on effective crisis response strategies for COVID-19 pandemic management (Christensen & Lægreid, 2020; Habersaat et al., 2020; Hale
et al., 2020; Manokara et al., 2020) and show the close relation of
crisis management and non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs)
of pandemic management.
The first section contains the theoretical part including crisis
management theory, pandemic management theory, and practicebased models of the WHO and formulates a combination of
both theoretical and practical models. The final section examines
the case study of Greece and its overall pandemic management
throughout the two major COVID-19 waves in Europe.

Literature Review and Theoretical Frameworks
Crisis Management
Crises come in many shapes and forms. Conflicts, human-made
accidents, and natural disasters chronically shatter the peace and
order of societies (Boin et al., 2005). Typically, they are defined as
untimely, but predictable events (Heath & Millar, 2004, p. 33) that
include the element of surprise (Richardson, 1994), and generally
marks a phase of disorder in the seemingly normal development
of a system (Boin et al., 2005). Besides, they create high levels of
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uncertainty and threat or perceived threat to an organization’s
high-priority goals (Seeger et al., 1998).
Crisis management is the approach an organization takes to
handle emerging troubles and rapidly emerging issues of contention, risk, disasters, accidents, emergencies, and characteristically
uncontrollable problems (Bowen & Lovari, 2020). There are several
models of effective crisis management and communication (e.g.,
Coombs, 2004; Coombs & Holladay, 2002, 2008; Hearit, 2006;
Heath, 1998; Pearson & Mittroff, 1993). Some relate the crisis with
the attribution of responsibility that emerges from the crisis itself
or stakeholders (Coombs, 2004; Coombs & Holladay, 2002, 2008),
whereas others focus more on mitigating or minimizing the challenges and damages caused by the crisis (Benoit, 1995; Dezenhall,
2011; Gilbert & Lauren, 1980; Hearit, 2006; Heath, 1998).
A crisis unfolds through three main stages: the pre-crisis phase,
the crisis phase, and the post-crisis phase (Bowen & Lovari, 2020).
Those three main phases form the crisis cycle. The pre-crisis phase
involves the prevention of, and preparation for, crises in order to
minimize damage to the organization (Coombs & Laufer, 2018).
“It allows time to research and plan for broad types of crises so that
response can be expedited” (Bowen & Lovari, 2020, p. 3). Therefore, issues management is a process that helps organizations to
search and early detect problems and proceed to preemptive resolutions (Bowen & Lovari, 2020; Heath, 2002, 2018).
Although issues management in the pre-crisis phase cannot
always prevent a crisis from happening, the main objective is to
minimize or mitigate the risks or negative effects of a potential crisis (Coombs & Holladay, 2010). Subsequently, risk assessment and
management contribute to the timely identification of the potential danger an event can bring, so that it can be managed on time
(Comfort, 2007; Rickard et al., 2013; Sellnow et al., 2017).
The crisis phase represents the response to the crisis, including the organization’s response and the response of its stakeholders (Coombs & Laufer, 2018). There are several crisis management
models like Heath’s (1998) 4R model where the four “R’s” represent a stage: Reduction, Readiness, Response, and Recovery.
Diers-Lawson’s (2017, 2020) Stakeholder Relationship Model,
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which emphasizes the role of stakeholders during a crisis and the
management according to their attitudes. Coombs’s (1998, 2007)
Situational Crisis Communication Theory and Benoit’s (1995)
Image Restoration Theory focus mainly on the reputational and
communicational aspect of a crisis but can also be implemented
in general crisis management procedures, especially in situations
that evolve attribution of blame. These models cover both communicational and operational crisis management.
Effective crisis management can be summarized in five basic
strategic steps: (a) the timely identification of the type of crisis,
where and when it is possible (Coombs, 2014; Diers-Lawson, 2017,
2020); (b) the swift reduction of the main crisis effects (Heath,
1998); (c) damage control (Dezenhall, 2011) in case the situation becomes or is already uncontrollable; (d) narrative control
through strategic communications (An et al., 2010; Benoit, 1995;
Coombs, 2007; Hearit, 2006); and (e) building resilience against
crisis regeneration (Heath, 1998).
Pandemic Crisis Management Strategies and
WHO’s Practice-Based Model
This section focuses on pandemic management strategies from
literature and practice-based models and combines them to shed
further light on the general crisis management theory and practice.
According to Pan and Meng, “Health crises appear to be
increasingly preoccupied with invisible, unpredictable, and
uncontrollable risks in a global society” (2016, p. 95). Globally,
human populations are more urbanized, which may allow viruses
to be transmitted within populations more easily (Reissmann et
al., 2006). Pandemics and epidemics are proven to be a threat to
countries because they may produce megacrises like the COVID19 pandemic. A pandemic example apart from COVID-19 is the
H1N1 influenza pandemic, a global outbreak of a new influenza
A virus, completely different from the previous ones (Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2016).
Pandemics occur when a new virus emerges that can easily
infect humans and spread from person to person in an effective
and permanent way; very few are going to be immune and there is
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no vaccine available (CDC, 2016; WHO, 2018a). Until a vaccine or
effective treatment becomes available, public behavior and adherence to national and subnational response strategies—notably
social, physical, and social distancing measures—will continue to
be key measures for controlling the virus (Habersaat et al., 2020).
Especially during a pandemic period given the limited response
time, dynamic infectious conditions, and intense public pressure,
lead health agents are supposed to be capable of sensemaking, evaluating the nature and scope of the pandemic, and searching for
an appropriate response (Lai, 2012). During the SARS outbreak
contact tracing as well as other strategies like the involvement of
the public in maintaining good health habits reinforced a sense of
control in an otherwise difficult and confusing time (Tiong, 2004).
The management and dissemination of public information during
any crisis are critical (Glantz, 2014).
Pandemic crisis management mainly depends on the epidemiological data provided by scientists and the main operational
response measures are directed by the capacity of a country’s
healthcare units. Limiting the basic reproductive number, or the
number of secondary infections from an ill person, is a tremendous opportunity for local communities (Glantz, 2014, p. 563).
Epidemiological models for monitoring the evolution of the pandemic (e.g., Froese, 2020; Luo, 2020) determine the operational
crisis management measures a government needs to implement.
In the pandemic crisis management literature as well as in
the practice-based models of the WHO, the non-pharmaceutical
interventions (NPIs) include restrictions and reductions of social
gatherings and crowds, restrictions of movement, the closing of
department stores, bars, commentary, university institutions, as
well as public awareness campaigns on hand hygiene, use of protective equipment and observance distances in social gatherings
(Bell et al., 2009; Cadogan & Hughes, 2021; Peng, 2008; Reynolds & Quinn Crouse, 2008). The CDC and WHO’s plans have
primarily focused on detection and disease control through (1)
surveillance and early detection, (2) community containment
strategies (movement restrictions, facility closure, and healthcare
service continuity) that would decrease disease transmission, and
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(3) mass prophylaxis strategies using vaccines and antiviral medication, when available (Reissman et al., 2006).
More severe measures include travel restrictions and the closure of the borders (Cadogan & Hughes, 2021; Manokara et al.,
2020). Containment measures may prevent transmission, or at
least suppress or slow the spread of a pandemic, allowing time
for targeted use of medical interventions (Reissman et al., 2006).
During the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020 most of those NPI measures were taken by most countries to contain and delay the transmission of the virus (Cadogan & Hughes, 2021). NPIs serve to
delay the spread of infection, buy time, decrease the total number
of infections, and reduce the spread of infection by each individual
(Glantz, 2014, p. 563).
The WHO has developed a series of plans and proposals for
pandemic management (WHO, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b). The
WHO’s model (2010a, 2018a) for influenza pandemic management
is divided into six main phases which follow the model of phases
of development of a pandemic influenza crisis (WHO, 2010a).
According to this model (WHO, 2010a), the first phase concerns
the quiet period before the outbreak of a disease. The second and
third phase involves detecting a virus that has been transmitted
from animals to humans and poses a potential pandemic threat
without, however, having sufficient human-to-human transmission capable of causing an outbreak at the community level. The
fourth phase is characterized by the confirmation of the ability of
the disease to spread from person to person who can cause spread
in the community. The ability of the disease to spread in the community is a significant risk increase for developing a pandemic,
but it does not mean that it is certain or inevitable. In the fifth
phase, the human spread affects at least two countries in one geographical area. Finally, a pandemic begins by an outbreak at the
community level in at least one country other than the geographical area of the virus’s origin. The last two phases concern the phase
of de-escalation of a pandemic crisis (WHO, 2010b).
Combining Theory and Practice for Pandemic Management
The general pandemic model of WHO is being combined with the
crisis management theory. The WHO model shows the stages for
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the development of a pandemic. On the other hand, crisis management theory includes models that elaborate on management processes in each crisis stage. The combination of both models may
provide insights that help identify the effective and timely application of pandemic management strategies based on the pandemic
crisis cycles and crisis management procedures. For example, issue
management is a delayed response when a crisis has entered its
main phase. Respectively, precautionary measures like obligatory
masks or contact tracing as a main measure during the heat of the
crisis would be an ineffective approach.
The first three phases of the WHO pandemic model are being
identified with the corresponding pre-crisis phase of crisis management, which contains issues management and search for
potential risks or threats. A pandemic environmental monitoring
and regular risk assessments are of high importance to regulate
the transmission rate and fortify the health system of a country.
The main crisis phase relates to phases 4–6 of the WHO pandemic
model, where the identification of human transmission has been
confirmed, while there is a significant spread in the community.
The sixth phase is a particular turning point in a pandemic crisis,
in which a disease is widely spread and somewhat uncontrollable.
Crisis management at this level requires the application of strict
NPIs as a damage control strategy. Resilience building can be identified with the possibility of mass vaccination or fortification of the
health system.
Grounded in pandemic management theory and practice, this
study explores the following research questions:
RQ1: What were the main pandemic containment measures used in
managing the first and the second waves of the COVID-19 pandemic
in Greece?
RQ2: What were the differences between the first and the second
waves of pandemic management in Greece in terms of crisis management and crisis communication?
RQ3: What were the main (a) rhetorical strategies and (b) dominant
frames used by Greek authorities for crisis communication management during the two pandemic waves?
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Methodology
The methodology used is qualitative content analysis with elements
from rhetorical and discourse analyses. Qualitative content analysis is appropriate for a relatively small amount of textual matter
(Krippendorff, 2004; Van Evera, 1997). Besides, qualitative content analysis allows the liberty of viewing the case from the inside
out and seeing it from the perspective of those involved (Gillham,
2000). The qualitative content analysis was mainly used to identify
the NPI strategies used for the containment of COVID-19, drawn
from the official Greek governmental internet pages (i.e., gov.gr,
eody.gr, and covid19.gov.gr).
The rhetorical analysis focuses on how messages are delivered
and with what effects (Krippendorff, 2004). For this reason, it was
used in the examination of the crisis communication discourse
of three main crisis management authorities. However, the analysis did not focus on argumentation building but on rhetorical
strategies through the examination under existing rhetorical
typologies and tools. Therefore, discourse analysis, especially
political discourse analysis (Filardo-Llamas & Boyd, 2018), was
also applied. In particular, the pre-existing typologies and rhetorical tools used for the analysis included framing theory and
the image restoration theory by Benoit (1995) that consists of five
main strategies to avoid blame or restore one’s image (i.e., denial,
evading responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action,
and mortification).
The crisis communication analysis was conducted on
(1) speeches from daily press briefings of two main public figures
at the front line of the Greek government’s pandemic communication: President of the Experts Committee, Professor Sotiris Tsiodras; Undersecretary of Civil Protection and Crisis Management
Nikos Chardaliasand and (2) the regular official addresses from
the Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, gathered during the first
and the second waves of COVID-19 pandemic management in
Greece. The time frame of the research was from March 3 until
May 4, 2020 (Wave 1), and from the end of September until the
end of October 2020 (Wave 2). A total of 60 transcripts of the
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press briefings containing the speeches of Professor Tsiodras and
Undersecretary Chardalias with the Q&A section as well as the
public addresses of the Prime Minister Mitsotakis were analyzed.
A total of 388 rhetorical strategies were coded and analyzed.

Case Study:
Managing COVID -19 Pandemic Crisis in Greece
Managing the First Wave of COVID-19 Pandemic in Greece
Pre-Crisis Phase

The first wave of COVID-19 arrived in Greece almost 2 months
after the outbreaks reported in China in January 2020. From
January 22, Greece entered the pre-crisis phase where issues and
risk management measures were taken. Until mid-February 2020
the Greek Ministry of Health monitored the situation in China.
The risk of imminent contamination in Greece was very low at
that time; therefore, the measures taken focused mostly on preparations in case an infected person was identified.
During this preparatory phase, an expert committee of epidemiologists was established to monitor the situation and to advise
the government. At the end of February, given the outbreak situation in Italy, the danger for Greece became very imminent. The
National Organization of Public Health (EODY) applied contact
tracing for the cases coming from Italy when a person developed
symptoms. The organization also issued an information package
advising regular temperature testing to those who traveled recently
and developed a list of countries that were at risk.
Since the imported cases from Italy were unavoidable, the
Greek Government suspended all carnival festivities that were
programmed until March 7. Furthermore, the Ministry of Public
Health published a series of information regarding personal protection against coronavirus, the 13 reference hospitals throughout
the country, and the new telephone line of EODY for the coronavirus with a 24/7 operation (Onmed.gr, 2020). The suspension of
carnival events together with the informative measures prepared
the citizens psychologically and informatively for the impending
crisis and saved time for an uncontrollable outbreak.
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Main Crisis Phase

The first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Greece was reported
on February 26; however, the main crisis phase began after the
return of a tourist group from Israel (Iefimerida.gr, 2020). From
that point on, the situation evolved rapidly. On March 16, the
Secretary-General of General Secretariat for Civil Protection
Nikos Chardalias was promoted to the Undersecretary of Civil
Protection and Crisis Management and became head of the operational aspect of the COVID-19 crisis. Τhe newly appointed
Undersecretary joined the press briefings together with the
President of the Experts Committee, Professor Sotiris Tsiodras,
steadily at 6:00 every afternoon to inform the public on the evolution of the outbreak. The professor focused on the medical developments concerning the pandemic and the Undersecretary on the
governmental decisions and the operational crisis management
measures.
The main goal of the government at that time was “to save time
to further strengthen the national health system, and to protect
the most vulnerable” (Petsas, 2020). The initial measures taken for
that purpose included the closure of all educational institutions,
the suspension of any kind of conferences and events that gather
more than 1,000 people, the prohibition of sport events gatherings, and strong advice on hygiene measures at any gathering of
more than 50 people.
Two days later, on March 13, the implementation of the measure “We Stay Home” began. All citizens are invited to stay at home
as long as possible and go out only when necessary. At the same
time, special permits were given to working parents, so that they
could take care of their children at home and avoid contact with
their grandparents, who belong to vulnerable groups.
On March 22, in a televised public address, the Prime Minister
Mitsotakis announced his decision to proceed with “a prohibition
on all unnecessary movement of citizens throughout the territory”
(Mitsotakis, 2020). Citizens needed to have a special permit by
SMS or signed by themselves which included only six reasons for
leaving their house. In essence, this permission was not given by
an official government body nor was its truthfulness checked by
the authorities but was more an enhancement of the “individual
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responsibility.” An absence of the document or the SMS would
result in a fine.
The severe lockdown measures were maintained for 6 weeks
and included school closure; distance working; and closure of all
marketplaces, bars, cafés, and the international borders. In the
meantime, a lot of public services went digital to facilitate transactions with the public sector.
The lockdown measures were stricken toward the Easter holidays, where people were expected to move to nearby villages or
holiday homes. The measures included a strong justification for
the reason for movement and prohibition of domestic travels.
Besides, police controls rose during the holidays. The main reason
was to avoid further spreading of the virus to the provinces since
until that time the main spread of the disease was restricted in the
two big cities of Greece, Athens and Thessaloniki.
Crisis Communication

In parallel with the operational crisis management measures
undertaken during the first coronavirus outbreak in Greece, a
major communication campaign was established to inform the
public about the threat and danger of COVID-19. The communication was centrally planned and executed. As the crisis
unfolded, the daily Press Briefings held by Professor Tsiodras and
Undersecretary Chardalias became a routine in the everyday life
of the lockdown citizens.
These regular press briefings were important communication and managerial tools which showed the Greek citizens the
constant presence of the state and potentially acted as a stress
reliever for the situation. Besides, the profile of Professor Tsiodras
became a symbol of leadership in the crisis management process
and quickly gained the trust of the citizens. Nevertheless, for serious decisions and changes in strategy, Prime Minister Mitsotakis
directly addressed the public about the situation and the decisions
made and actions taken by the government.
Furthermore, the communication slogan of “We Stay at Home/
Menoume Spiti” with the logo1 (showing a nice, lovely home), was
liked by the public and immediately began to circulate by all TV
1. “We Stay Home” Logo: https://menoumespiti.gr/
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channels. In effect, the General Secretariat of Civil Protection
took effort in developing strategic messaging and advertisements
to inform the public of the new everyday life and precautionary measures that the people must take. In the advertisements
beloved TV actors or doctors participated to give the right tone
to the message.2
The strategic communication messaging was very coherent
among the three main frontline figures: Prime Minister Mitsotakis, the President of the Expert Committee Professor Tsiordas,
and Undersecretary of Civil Protection Chardalias. Prime Minister Mitsotakis represented the political side of the crisis management procedure giving a tone of unity; Undersecretary Chardalias
represented the decision-making body, and the executive aspect of
crisis management; and Professor Tsiodras represented the scientific and medical aspects of management. Besides, the latter tried
to promote a more human profile during the press briefings, most
likely due to his character, which helped convince the public to
listen to him and maximize the approval rating for the crisis management procedure institutionalized by government authorities.
The main frames that were mobilized rhetorically during the
whole time of the main crisis were the war frame, and the individual social responsibility frame. The War Frame was introduced by
the Prime Minister in his first address to the public on March 11.
“We are at War! With an enemy that is invisible but not invincible.
Because if we succeed to limit the transmission of the virus, we can
give time to our Health System to deal with the emergency calls.”
(Mitsotakis, March 11, 2020)

Words like “frontline,” “enemy,” “weapons against the virus,”
“battle,” “sacrifices,” “target,” and metaphors as “forts of life” constructed the semantic ecology of the war frame. The political managers (Prime Minister Mitsotakis and Undersecretary Chardalias)
used both the war frame; however, not in the same capacity. Prime
Minister Mitsotakis used it as his main strategic frame, whereas
Undersecretary Chardalias used it as a support frame. Professor
Tsiodras, on the other hand, did not use this frame almost at all.
2. Civil Protection Information Kit: https://www.civilprotection.gr/en/media-gallery
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The individual social responsibility frame was being used by all
three leading public figures/leading authorities during their public
briefings on the pandemic. Contrary to the war frame, this individual frame seems to be the main frame used by Professor Tsiodras and Undersecretary Chardalias. This frame included mainly
a call to the citizens to protect their hygiene and keep social distancing to limit the spread of the disease. Indirectly through this
frame, Prime Minister Mitsotakis pointed out the citizens as the
primary safeguards of national health.
It all depends on us all and our behavior whether the government
needs to take even more drastic control measures. (Mitsotakis,
March 19, 2020)

Consequently, this frame was often used to blame directly or indirectly individual citizens and the general public for not following
the public health measures to contain the spread of the disease.
Also, at this point, I want to emphasize that any discussion or various
excuses for moving during those days (means the eastern vacations),
is a completely irresponsible and anti-social attitude and I want to
explain why . . . (Chardalias, April 7, 2020)

Nevertheless, the individual responsibility frame was used by
Professor Tsiodras more as an incentive to motivate the public and
offer an explanation for the reasons why social distancing is vital
for the containment of the virus spread and why social responsibility is a sign of freedom.
Our collective thinking, so as not to burden the neighbor with the
spread of the virus, not to overload the health structures, is and
remains in the coming weeks our main goal. The virus ( . . . ) reminds
us that free societies thrive on rules of social responsibility. (Tsiodras,
April 6, 2020)

This frame was used almost under the same conditions by all
three leading authority figures. The rhetorical justification of the
frame was threefold: (a) Ideology: Democracy and Freedom as
vital parts of the Western society “demand” the participation of
the citizens and thus social responsibility; (b) Hygiene—practical
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use: social responsibility as a pandemic containment measure;
(c) Scapegoat—blame shifting accusing those who do not follow
the precautionary measures as socially irresponsible and dangerous for society.
The only way to protect our loved ones, our way of life, our neighborhoods, our homeland, is the path of individual responsibility. And
that means one thing: we follow the instructions. We stay at home.
We faithfully apply the rules of hygiene. (Chardalias, March 16, 2020)

Another strategy used frequently by the three main crisis
actors was the strategy of bolstering. All three public figures used
this strategy to praise both the work of the government
The Government will do everything necessary, when necessary and
often earlier than necessary. Nevertheless, believe me: No massive
measure can replace individual responsibility. And in our open democratic societies, no central decision works, unless it is shared first by
all citizens. (Mitsotakis, March 11, 2020)

and the quick reaction of measures taken
The government is facing an unprecedented crisis. And it reacted
quickly. (Mitsotakis, March 13, 2020)

as well as to praise the people for practicing “social responsibility”
or for the healthcare workers for doing a good job.
And I want to thank them (the healthcare workers), once again, on
behalf of all the citizens. Our biggest gain, however, from this unprecedented crisis has a name. And it’s called Trust. Trust in the State, the
Government the fellow citizen! Because, in 50 days, myths of decades
were dispelled. And conclusions were drawn, which will accompany
us for a long time. It has been shown, for example, that the state must
be evaluated primarily based on its effectiveness. And that, when the
state does not become a slave of power, then it becomes a real “State.”
(Mitsotakis, March 13, 2020)

The strategy of bolstering was used several times by all three
main public health authority figures in almost all their speeches
and press briefings. The main aim, as can be concluded, was to bolster their image or the image of the government to show strength
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and liability to the institutional pandemic management. There are
several explanations for its frequent use. Comparing bolstering
strategy with the individual social responsibility frame, it provides
strategic advantage by emphasizing on the one hand, the government has done anything in its power to manage the crisis; on the
other, it is the people’s responsibility to follow the measures and
remain healthy. This way, the government tries to construct, preemptively, a possible scapegoat to shift the blame for a possible
failure in the future. Another explanation for the frequent use of
bolstering strategy may lie with the past failures of governments’
attempts of handing public crises, which indicated the need of
restoring the image of the government in order to gain the trust
of the people.
The first pandemic wave in Greece practically ended with the
easing of lockdown measures after May 4. During the Summer
(May–October) of 2020, the cases were kept low, and it was possible to fully reopen the economy. This interim crisis phase consisted
of the post-crisis phase of the first wave and the early pre-crisis
phase of the second wave.
Managing the Second Wave of COVID-19 Pandemic in Greece
Pre-Crisis Phase

The second wave began in October when suddenly the cases began
to increase rapidly. Nevertheless, this time the problem occurred
only when the intensive care units began to increase. The difference
with the first wave can be summarized in that living with COVID19 became normal and the healthcare system was strengthened to
deal with more cases. This led to a more relaxed pre-crisis phase
compared to the first wave.
October was the pre-crisis month. Although precautionary
measures should have been taken, the first new measures to stop
the spread during the second wave came only in mid-October
when the government announced the obligatory use of masks
everywhere. At that time, the daily confirmed cases were around
300–400 a day according to EODY. However, as the numbers
increased the circumstances also changed. The situation got out
of hand particularly in northern Greece. At the end of October,
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the reported cases reached almost 3,000 a day, putting enormous
pressure on the health system, especially in northern Greece.
Main Crisis Phase

The main crisis stage came from Northern Greece when
Thessaloniki (the second-largest city in Greece) and Serres,
a nearby city, witnessed a major outbreak. On November 3 the
country was divided into two zones: to the regions with imminent
danger and with excessive danger. For the latter, the lockdown
measures imposed included closing of theaters, businesses, restaurants, borders, and free movement to and from without any excuse
or a justified reason. For the regions in the imminent danger zone,
the restaurants and theaters closed but other retail businesses and
shops remained open.
Two days later and as the situation escalated, a general
lockdown for the whole country was decided. Beginning on
November 7 and for almost 3 weeks (initially planned but was
extended later) everything closed except for schools, which closed
eventually 1 week later, and free movement was prohibited without an SMS or special license. Until that time the main message of
the government was the denial of a potential lockdown.
The severe measures were taken too late and could not stop
the spread in time. In Northern Greece, hospitals were on the
edge and patient transportation to other cities including Athens
was deemed necessary. In addition, the pre-crisis phase was not
exploited in taking mild measures in time to avoid deteriorating
the situation.
Crisis Communication

Communication during the second wave was slightly different
than the first. The press briefings returned to a regular basis in
October. However, Professor Tsiodras did not return, and other
members of the committee took his role in a rotation. Prime
Minister Mitsotakis addressed the public four times from the end
of September until the announcement of the general lockdown at
the beginning of November.

Managing COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis: The Case of Greece

403

These slight changes in the communication strategy of the government together with the adaptation of the citizens to the pandemic lifestyle contributed to minimizing the public’s feeling of an
upcoming second crisis. The rotational change of the epidemiologists in the press briefings also minimized the coherence of the
messages and the effects of continuity to the first wave, including
the connection/identification with leadership figures as well as the
cohesion of the government strategic communication.
In the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in Greece,
the strategic orientation of the messages slightly differed in the
speeches given by Prime Minister Mitsotakis. The war frame,
which was the master frame during the first wave period in his
speeches, was replaced by the individual social responsibility frame.
The reason for that change was apparently the fact that during
the pre-crisis phase in October the basic response strategy was to
mobilize the citizens to keep the precautionary measures to avoid
the spread of the disease and eventually a lockdown.
To enhance the frame but also to highlight a new risk for the
upcoming crisis, the Prime Minister Mitsotakis used strategies of
rhetorical risk increase.
After a long period of stability, the cases are increasing exponentially
in our country as well. And scientists warn that, soon, the new pandemic will shake the resilience of the National Health System. Challenging not only patients but also our doctors and nurses. (Mitsotakis,
October 31, 2020)

However, the main rhetorical strategy used by Prime Minister Mitsotakis during the second wave of the pandemic was the
strategy of bolstering/self-praise. This time, this strategy was implemented in an apologetic/image restoration manner in order to bolster the image of the government and address all the criticism that
was initiated against it either from the citizens (e.g., masks denial
movements) or the political opposition (accusation of mismanagement of the secondary crises and other measures like school
opening).
The government, I remind you, is fighting on many fronts at the
same time: National issues, Immigration, Economy, but also natural
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disasters. But especially in the war for health, we need the conscious
citizen as an ally more than anywhere else. (Mitsotakis, Sept. 24, 2020)

The strategy of bolstering also aimed to enhance the image of
the prime minister himself mainly to restore the trust in his figure
as a leader and crisis management authority as it was during the
previous wave of the pandemic.
I have proved, after all, that I do not hesitate to make difficult decisions quickly. But in order to tame the new wave of the pandemic, the
state, scientists and citizens must work even more closely, with more
trust in each other. (Mitsotakis, Sept. 24, 2020)

A new input in the strategic communication of the prime minister is the increased use of a new frame, the frame of hope. This
frame was used more frequently than in the first wave, where it
was almost absent in the public briefings.
I will close, however, with an optimistic message. Because for the first
time since the beginning of this adventure, the prospect of having a
safe and effective vaccine appears on the horizon. And the government has made sure we get it on time, and make it available to everyone, as quickly as possible. At the same time, the flu vaccination is
proceeding according to plan. (Mitsotakis, Oct. 22, 2020)

The hope frame was used to motivate the public to show resilience
and patience for the second wave. The storytelling of an imminent
“happy ending” of the pandemic would give the citizens strength
to follow the measures for some more time. Especially during the
lockdown in November, the press briefings included the publication of the government plans regarding the vaccination process
which would begin in January 2021.
In sum, Prime Minister Mitsotakis’s discourse, during this
period, forms the strategy of transcendence. Apparently, the failure to effectively manage the pre-crisis phase of the second wave
of the health crisis led to a second general lockdown, which was
considered a failure due to the burden of secondary crises. The
increased use of bolstering strategy (especially self-praise) shows
that the prime minister tried to restore his image toward society
in an attempt to transcend from explaining why the situation got
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from “We are far away from a lockdown” (Chardalias, Oct. 16,
2020) to the imposition of a lockdown 15 days later.

Discussion
In light of RQ1, the findings show that the basic pandemic management tool used in both pandemic waves in Greece was a severe
lockdown, including all the economic activities that related to
gatherings in public places and prohibition of unnecessary movement. Distance working from home was imposed for all administrative and service-related staff. A slight difference between the
two pandemic waves was the imposition of obligatory masks in all
public places during the second wave.
Although the same measures were imposed in both waves, the
second was considered a more serious one. One reason might be
the late imposition of containment measures and the absence of
precautionary measures during the initial phase of the crisis in
early to mid-October. This suggests a failure in the proper identification of the crisis phases.
Regarding RQ2, the findings suggest that during the first wave,
Greece seemed to have taken advantage of all the crisis phases,
drawing up action plans early on, and aimed to prevent a large
and uncontrolled influx of cases. Damage control strategies like
the closure of all activities that contained gatherings were taken
during the main crisis phase. Strategies were adjusted when necessary according to the environmental scanning. This way, Greece
managed to prevent the spread by being one step “ahead of the
disease.” At the same time, the government increased the resilience
of the health system, preparing for worst-case scenarios.
At the communication level, during the first wave of the
pandemic in Greece, the ongoing information campaigns in the
media, as well as the cohesive strategic communication message
at the daily press briefings by the same crisis managers, increased
the level of trust by the public, limiting the spread of fake news
and disinformation. The crisis management objective was clearly
communicated from the beginning during the first wave. On the
contrary, during the second wave, the delayed response, or the
total absence of precautionary measures before the cases got out of
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control, led to a more severe crisis. Furthermore, the government
authorities’ crisis communication during the second wave failed
to inform the citizens of the state of emergency at the pre-crisis
phase. Reassuring messages misinformed the citizens on the real
situation. Besides, the rotation of the experts’ committee representatives in the press briefings led to the weakening of the strategic communication messaging. The objective, this time, was not
clearly defined and communicated based on the data analyzed.
As far as RQ3 is concerned, the main rhetorical strategy (RQ3a)
used was the bolstering/self-praise which aimed at the enhancement of the leadership image and the defense of the measures
taken by the government. The dominant frames (RQ3b) were the
war frame, and the individual social responsibility frame. During
the first wave, the war frame was dominant, whereas, during the
second, the individual social responsibility frame took its predominant place. The change shows that the aim of Greek public health
authorities was to mobilize the citizens to keep the protective measures and to avoid a lockdown.
Consequently, the findings of this study suggest that the first
wave was managed more effectively than the second one. The
change in decisive variables such as leadership communication
and failure of following the crisis cycle vigilantly affected Greek
government’s pandemic management outcomes. As this study
argues, early management measures would have prevented an
uncontrolled escalation of the pandemic during the second wave.
A fundamental limitation of the study is the examination
of the managerial process in only one country, where the same
government handles two discrete crises caused by two surges of
COVID-19 cases. Another limitation is the absence of supportive
medical and epidemiological data that could provide important
additional variables. Future research may focus on comparative
studies with more countries to get more evidence on a broader
overview of effective pandemic management. Besides, follow-up
studies should be carried out, based on and expanding the current
research framework, to further understand the ongoing evolution
of the crisis management of the pandemic in Greece and other
countries throughout 2021.
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ABSTRACT
This article discusses differences between invisible and visible hazards, and how these
differences can affect risk and crisis communication. Invisible hazards are risks that we
cannot see, and often cannot touch, taste, nor smell. Examples are COVID-19, radon
gas, mold spores, or asbestos fibers. Invisible hazards are often uncertain, complex,
and ambiguous risk problems. Results from a Norwegian study show that authorities
need to be aware of the possible differences in risk perception among authorities,
stakeholders, and the general public. Involving citizens, creating trust, and being honest is important for all risk and crisis communication. However, the less we know about
a hazard, the more we need to rely on others to make decisions, and consequently
trust is particularly important when dealing with invisible hazards.
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matter, asbestos fibers, gas leaks, and chemicals in food and feed.
These risks can have sudden, direct consequences (such as COVID19 and gas leaks from plants or refineries) or delayed, long-term
consequences (such as radon, asbestos, mold spores, and chemicals in food and feed). Communicating about these risks poses
the dilemma of providing sufficient information without causing
unnecessary concern.
The purpose of communication about risk is to provide people
with the insights they need to make decisions or judgments that
reflect the best available knowledge and their own preferences. All
people exposed to risk should have enough information to cope
with risk situations (Aven & Renn, 2010).
This article discusses the differences between invisible and visible hazards and how these differences can affect risk and crisis
communication. The discussion is based on results from a research
project (Skotnes et al., 2020) studying risk and crisis communication about invisible hazards in Norwegian municipalities (local
authorities), in addition to examples from the Norwegian government’s (central authorities) risk and crisis communication about
COVID-19. The aim of the article is to show that communicating
about invisible hazards can entail challenges different from those
of visible hazards, and that it is important for risk and crisis communicators to be aware of the complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity that characterize invisible hazards.

Literature Review
According to Renn (2006), all risk communication must be tailored toward the three challenges of complexity, uncertainty, and
ambiguity. Complexity refers to the difficulty of identifying and
quantifying causal links between a multitude of potential causal
agents and specific effects. Uncertainty refers to the difficulty of
predicting the occurrence of events, and/or their consequences,
based on incomplete or invalid databases. Ambiguity refers to different views related to the relevance, meaning, and implications of
the basis for the decision-making (i.e., interpretative ambiguity),
or the values to be protected and the priorities to be made (i.e.,
normative ambiguity) (Aven & Renn, 2010). Ambiguity means
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that identical behavior or statements will be assessed entirely differently by different groups (Renn, 2006).
The type of invisible hazards that we discuss in this article can
be characterized as uncertain, complex, and ambiguous risk problems. Opinions often differ greatly on these issues because people
have different visions of the world and the future. These divisions
include strong beliefs about the necessity or reasonableness of taking or rejecting specific risks. Communicating about ambiguities
is not easy, as in such a controversy, each side is convinced to have
the truth on its side and views any possible balanced coverage with
distrust (Renn, 2006).
In this section, we provide a review of the research literature
used as a theoretical framework for this article. First, we define the
concepts of invisible hazards and risk and crisis communication.
Then, we provide a short review of literature about risk perception,
social amplification and attenuation of risk, and trust.
Invisible Hazards
Invisible (or hidden) hazards are risks that we cannot see, and
often cannot touch, taste, nor smell. The hazards are unobservable;
hence, people can lack the sensory perception of danger related to
these hazards. When we are confronted with invisible hazards, we
must depend upon information provided by third parties.
The coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2CV), which causes the disease
COVID-19, is a clear example of an invisible hazard. The COVID19 crisis is an urgent threat to societies’ basic structures and fundamental values and is a very complex and creeping megacrisis
(Boin et al., 2020; Christensen & Lægreid, 2020). The UN General
Secretary labeled the virus a “threat to humanity,” and the virus
has been fought with draconian measures, closing down whole
countries, regions, and municipalities. During the COVID-19 crisis major decisions have been taken under extreme time pressure,
and deep complexity and uncertainty regarding the cause of the
crisis, how the crisis will develop, and what the possible means and
measures are (Christensen & Lægreid, 2020), have been constantly
in mind. The risk of the virus/disease and the measures taken to
fight it have been heavily debated in national and international
media.
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In a different example of an invisible hazard, Hevey (2017)
found that a core challenge for communicating about radon risk
and promoting radon remediation relates to the fact that the
risk is inherently perceived as either low or simply non-existent.
Many people underestimate the seriousness or long-term health
effects of radon exposure. Furthermore, even when individuals are
informed that their homes have high radon levels and are made
aware of the consequent health threats, remediation rates are still
low. Radon is a colorless, odorless, and tasteless gas. Consequently,
there is an absence of sensory cues to alert people to the risk. In
general, at low levels of risk, people can easily dismiss it as too
small to worry about as they see any consequences as unlikely to
occur.
A third example of an invisible hazard is indoor particulate
matter (PM) exposure. According to Schleibinger et al. (2004),
microbial damage in indoor areas is most frequently caused by
molds and bacteria. Spores of molds and bacteria may become
airborne and are therefore ubiquitous. They can enter indoor
areas by passive ventilation or by ventilation systems. Schleibinger et al. state that infections by molds and bacteria are very rare,
but persons with an immunodeficiency are especially susceptible
to fungal infections. Overall, the dose relationship between the
concentration of microbial particles mentioned and any adverse
health effects described is not very well established, and, therefore,
guidelines concerning microbial products indoors are sparse, and
most are not scientifically sound. According to Hallman (2016),
the invisibility of PM matters, and it represents a key issue in communicating the risk of indoor PM exposure. However, it can be
difficult for people to make the link between an invisible cause and
a later, invisible effect.
Risk Communication versus Crisis Communication
According to Lofstedt (2003), risk communication is best
described as the flow of information and risk evaluations back
and forth between academic experts, regulatory practitioners,
interest groups, and the public. According to the Norwegian
Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning, risk
communication is about something that might happen, while
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crisis communication is about something that has already happened (DSB, 2014). According to Cairns et al. (2013), risk communication is not an instructive instrument; it is probably better
understood as a discourse—the exchange of ideas between various
stakeholders about something that might or might not become a
threat in the future.
However, there is not always such a clear distinction between
risk communication and crisis communication. Communication
becomes crisis communication only when an incident turns into a
crisis and people become worried and frightened. With good risk
communication, it may, in some cases, be possible to avoid a crisis
even if an incident (such as finding radon, asbestos, or mold in
buildings) occurs.
However, Fischoff (1995) also points out that avoiding all conflict is not realistic, nor even a legitimate goal for risk communication. The best-case scenario for risk communication is having
fewer, but better, conflicts. Some conflicts could be avoided by preventing needless misunderstandings, others by forestalling unacceptable projects. Those that remain would then be focused on real
issues. Most importantly, risk communication must be taken seriously; one cannot expect to quiet a raging controversy with a few
hastily prepared messages.
Risk Perception
The psychometric paradigm (e.g., Slovic et al., 1978; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1974) is noted as a landmark in research about public
attitudes toward risk. The basis of this model is that individuals
subjectively define risk and that the risk definitions may be influenced by a range of cultural, organizational, psychological, and
social factors. People create mental models (i.e., they try to make
sense of the world by creating meaning based on whatever information they have available) (Hallman, 2016; Slovic et al., 1980;
Weick, 2001). Perception can be defined as “people’s beliefs, attitudes, judgments, and feelings, as well as the wider social or cultural values and dispositions that people adopt, toward hazards
and their benefits” (Hevey, 2017).
Attitude can be shaped by several factors, such as whether
the risk is observable or unobservable, whether the risk causes
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fear/dread, whether the risk is known or unknown, whether the
risk feels controllable or uncontrollable, and so forth. Slovic et
al. (1980) found that unobservability can affect risk perception,
together with other risk factors (i.e., familiarity, knowledge, and
delayed effect). Sjöberg (2004), on the other hand, found that novelty did not seem to be very important in assessing perceived risk
and found that other factors such as possible interference with
nature and the severity of a hazard’s possible consequences played
a larger role. Hence, the reaction to a hazard is not the same in
every person. Individual characteristics can affect the importance
of some dimensions and result in quite different judgments of risk
(Savadori et al., 2004).
Several well-established cognitive heuristics (“mental shortcuts”) impact our risk perception, which impedes appropriate
behavioral responses (Hevey, 2017; Slovic et al., 1980). An example is the affect heuristic. According to Slovic et al. (2007), in the
process of making a judgment or decision, people consult or refer
to an “affect pool” containing all the positive and negative tags
consciously or unconsciously associated with the representations.
When a negative feeling is linked to an image of a future outcome
it sounds an alarm. However, when a positive feeling is associated
with the outcome image, it becomes a beacon of incentive.
A major problem in risk communication is tailoring the content of the communication process to the interests and concerns of
the different social and cultural groups within a society, thus risk
communicators need a better understanding of peoples’ concerns
and perceptions of risk (Aven & Renn, 2010).
Social Amplification and Attenuation of Risk
The theory of social amplification of risk states that hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes
in ways that may amplify or attenuate public responses to the risk
or risk event. Behavioral patterns can, in turn, generate secondary social or economic consequences, but may also act to increase
or decrease the physical risk itself (J. X. Kasperson & Kasperson,
2005). Specific biases are evident, and people can often either overestimate or underestimate a risk (Slovic et al., 1980).
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As an example, during the last decade, several invisible hazards
that led to food and feed scares were reported in the media, such
as BSE, acrylamide, aspartame, and melamine milk. According to
Fjaeran & Aven (2019), this has led to risk amplification and public distrust in regulatory bodies and food industries. The Social
Amplification of Risk Framework (SARF), which was introduced
by R. E. Kasperson et al. in 1988, provides a description of how
and why people can respond in this way and explains how risks
that were assessed by experts as low risks can still produce significant public concern that often has significant societal impacts
(Fjaeran & Aven, 2019).
Attenuation, on the other hand, involves weakening or
decreasing the importance or “volume” of certain risk signals and
symbols (Fjaeran & Aven, 2019). As an example, unrealistic optimism occurs when individuals have unreasonably low estimates
of their own susceptibility to harm. For example, Weinstein et al.
(1988) found that people who did not test for radon in a highrisk area in the U.S. held “optimistic biases,” whereby they underestimated the risks associated with their own exposure to radon.
According to R. E. Kasperson (2012), low-level radiation risks
from natural sources and medical exposures are often attenuated
and underrated, whereas radiation risks from nuclear power facilities may be amplified. Attenuation of risk can be important in that
it allows individuals to cope with the multitude of risks and risk
events encountered daily. However, it may also lead to potentially
serious consequences from underestimation and under-response
(Fjaeran & Aven, 2019; R. E. Kasperson et al., 1988).
The SARF Framework has been criticized for implying that it
is possible to define a benchmark “real” risk that is determined by
experts and around which public risk perceptions can subsequently
become amplified. This objectification of risk is particularly problematic when there are high levels of scientific uncertainty and a
lack of consensus about the nature of risk and its impacts. Urquhart
et al. (2017) found that risk assessment is a socially mediated, relational, and incremental process with experts drawing on a range of
official, anecdotal, and experiential sources of information, as well
as references to past events, to assemble a risk case. Slovic et al.
(1980) also found that experts seemed as prone to overconfidence
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as lay people, and Sjöberg (2004) found that experts made risk
judgments on the basis of factors and thought structures that were
similar to those of the public.
However, Sjöberg found a dramatic gap between experts’ and
managers’ risk perceptions and those of the public and many politicians. According to Sjöberg, people want to avoid disastrous consequences no matter how small the experts assert their probability
to be. He found that demand for risk mitigation was not strongly
related to perceived risk but rather to the expected consequences
of accidents or other unwanted events (Sjöberg, 2004).
Sandman (2009), in turn, concluded that there are three different risk communication paradigms, and these three risk communication paradigms have very little in common: (1) precaution
advocacy—alerting apathetic people to serious risks; (2) outrage
management—reassuring upset people about small risks; (3) crisis communication—guiding appropriately upset people through
serious risks.
According to Sandman (1993; 2004), the key determinant of
the public response to a hazard is not the magnitude of the hazard
itself but the level of public outrage, or concern, about it. When
people experience strong emotions, they have more difficulty hearing and processing information and are more likely to pay attention to negative rather than positive information. When it comes
to high-outrage and low-hazard risks (outrage management), the
key goal of communicators is to reduce public concern. The chief
task of communication is to address the outrage, not to state or
debate assessments of the hazard itself. According to Hooker et al.
(2017), the best foil for outrage is to build sustainable public trust.
Trust
Trust helps us reduce uncertainty to an acceptable level and simplify decisions involving a large amount of information. The less
we know about an activity, the more we need to rely on others to
make decisions and the more our judgments about risk become a
matter of trust (Savadori et al., 2004). Trust in control institutions
can compensate for even a negative risk perception, and distrust
may lead people to oppose risks even when they are perceived as
small (Aven & Renn, 2010).
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According to Aven and Renn (2010), information alone will
never suffice to build or sustain trust. The first step in any communication effort is to find a common denominator, a common
language, on which the communication can proceed and develop.
Gaining institutional trust requires a continuous dialogue between
risk managers, stakeholders, and representatives of the public. Participation creates confidence in the risk management process, and
faith is important in risk management, particularly when it comes
to risk from invisible hazards.
Trust is difficult and time-consuming to create and easily
destroyed. Information that is received unproblematically at one
point can be interpreted very differently under circumstances of
mistrust. According to Sandman (2004), acknowledging uncertainty is a key recommendation for building sustainable public
trust.

Methods
The data for the article were gathered through a research project
studying risk and crisis communication concerning invisible hazards in Norwegian municipalities, in addition to a literature study
of international research on risk communication, crisis communication, and invisible hazards. Risk and crisis communication is an
important task for Norwegian municipalities, due to a statutory
responsibility to inform and safeguard its citizens against hazards
that may pose a risk to people and health.
The project was developed based on results from a pre-project
carried out in five Norwegian municipalities in 2015 that focused
on communication about radon (Solbakk et al., 2015). The results
from the pre-project showed that risk communication about invisible hazards was a challenging task for the municipalities. Several
of the municipalities had crisis communication plans, but they
lacked routines and strategies that could be helpful before incidents occurred. Managing invisible hazards had been resource
consuming for the municipalities, and the knowledge gained after
incidents were not readily available to others.
In the current project we conducted six in-depth case studies
in four Norwegian municipalities from 2017 to 2020. The studied
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municipalities were selected from the region of Western Norway.
One of the case municipalities was a previous participant in the
pre-project, and the remaining three municipalities were chosen
based on the researchers’ knowledge combined with a search for
news stories in Norwegian media outlets. The case municipalities
were also chosen to represent municipalities with different sizes
and resources. In collaboration with the selected case municipalities, we then chose the six case studies which were incidents
involving risk and crisis communication about invisible hazards
that had occurred in the municipalities during recent years, had
received media attention, and, in some cases, had led to conflict
with stakeholders (i.e., those who are directly affected by the risk).
The main purpose of the project was to help municipalities better
understand the differences between visible and invisible hazards
and evolve from mainly using reactive crisis communication to
also using more proactive risk communication.
The case studies we chose for this project were as follows:
Discovery of radon gas at a kindergarten and radon gas at a primary school (in a large municipality—approximately 24,000
inhabitants); mold spores at a primary school and asbestos fibers
at a municipal swimming pool (in a large municipality—approximately 133,000 inhabitants); gas leaks at an oil and gas terminal
(in a small municipality—approximately 4,700 inhabitants); and
gas leaks at an oil refinery (in a medium-sized municipality—
approximately 15,000 inhabitants).
The data were gathered through seven focus group interviews
and 10 individual in-depth interviews. We interviewed people
responsible for communication about the incidents in our case
studies, including communication managers, health directors,
representatives from the occupational health services, councilmen, property managers, contingency planning managers, advisors, school principals, and kindergarten managers. We also
interviewed stakeholders (parents and employees) and representatives from the media. Examples of the questions asked in the interviews were: How did the case evolve? How was risk communicated
and who organized it? Why was this procedure chosen? Did you
have plans/strategies in advance? Did you follow these? Was there
anything you found challenging about communicating about this
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hazard? In your experience, is there a difference in communicating about visible and invisible hazards? Did you learn from previous experiences with communication about invisible hazards?
Did you use this experience in the next case? What type of information about this hazard did you receive from the municipality?
How do you perceive the communication from the municipality?
In addition to the interviews, we conducted document studies of
the municipalities’ strategies, procedures, and routines for risk and
crisis communication. This article focuses on results from parts of
the gathered data material.
All interviews were recorded on audio file and transcribed in
verbatim. The texts were then read by the three researchers (the
authors of this article) who conducted the interviews and discussed and analyzed jointly between them. The main themes were
identified, with an accompanying set of quotes from the interviews
that substantiated the findings. The researchers’ findings were then
presented at a workshop for representatives from the case municipalities where the interviews were conducted. The representatives were given the opportunity to comment on and correct the
researchers’ findings, which served as a quality assurance of the
results and helped to strengthen the reliability of the study. Finally,
the representatives from the case municipalities were invited to
read and comment on the completed analyses and conclusions as
a last quality assurance of the research process.
Lastly, the COVID-19 crisis happened during the project
period, and as the coronavirus is a clear example of an invisible
hazard, we have added examples about COVID-19 to illustrate the
challenges related to communication about invisible hazards.

Results and Discussion
The municipalities that participated in the research project had
experienced incidents where communicating about invisible hazards had become challenging. Most of the municipalities saw a
need for more knowledge about the differences between visible
and invisible hazards and advice on how to better communicate
the risk of invisible hazards to its citizens. The subsequent presentation of the results is organized according to the main themes
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that were identified during the analysis of the data material, with
an accompanying set of quotes from the interviews that substantiates the findings. Furthermore, the results are discussed according
to the theoretical framework presented in the Literature Review
section.
Differences between Risk and Crisis Communication about
Invisible versus Visible Hazards
In two of the studied cases, incidents with invisible hazards had
led to serious conflicts between the municipalities and stakeholders. One case was the discovery of radon gas at a kindergarten,
and the other was the discovery of mold at a primary school. In
these cases, the stakeholders did not trust the experts hired by the
municipalities, and they doubted and questioned the facts presented by the municipality.
In one of the cases, the parents hired their own experts, who
came to different conclusions and disagreed with the municipality’s experts. This led to negative publicity for the municipality in
the media. A participant from the focus group interview with this
municipality put it like this:
“They mistrusted us, they didn’t quite believe us.”

In addition to complexity and uncertainty, the municipalities
in our project experienced that some invisible risks led to more
ambiguity than visible risks. There were disagreements about the
causes of the hazards, the methods used for conducting measurements of the hazards, the interpretations of the results of the
measurements, and/or the possible consequences of the hazards
(interpretive ambiguity). Some risk estimates are based on uncertain inferences about incompletely understood processes. Experts
can assess these risks differently, and sometimes there are no clearcut answers. As an example, there may be disagreement about
whether the invisible hazard is actually the cause of the symptoms
and illness that occurs, such as whether radon gas and asbestos
fibers cause cancer or whether mold spores lead to asthma. It may
take a long time for symptoms to show, and some may think other
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factors are the cause of the disease. As an example, a participant
from a focus group interview with one of the municipalities said:
“And with asbestos, adverse effects might not appear until a long time
has passed. And it is very uncertain, there are so many people that get
cancer from different causes ( . . . ).”

Moreover, the municipalities experienced disagreements about
which values should be protected and which priorities should be
made (normative ambiguity). For example, some people accepted
that there were asbestos sheets in a building they worked in and
knew that work was not being done that could cause harmful
asbestos dust. Others considered this to be unacceptable.
The COVID-19 crisis has also been marked by both interpretive and normative ambiguity. As previously mentioned, the risk
of the virus/disease and the measures taken to fight it have been
heavily debated. There have been disagreements about where the
virus came from, what caused it, possible consequences of the disease, and, also, which values should be protected, and which priorities authorities should take in the fight against the virus.
Furthermore, communication about the coronavirus provides
an example of the unclear distinction between risk communication
and crisis communication. Governments around the world were
ill-prepared for the coronavirus, even though they knew pandemics were a threat. The rapid spread of the virus came as a surprise,
and quickly turned into a crisis. Thus, governments’ communication about the virus can be characterized as crisis communication: communication about something that has already happened.
However, the COVID-19 crisis is long-lasting, and, as mentioned,
there is still uncertainty about how the crisis will develop and what
the possible means and measures to handle the crisis is. Thus, parts
of the communication can also be characterized as risk communication: communication about something that might happen in the
future.
The findings from our study confirm that whether a hazard
is observable or not can affect how people perceive the risk, and
invisible hazards may therefore represent additional challenges for
risk and crisis communicators. Differences in risk perception exist
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regarding visible hazards as well, such as the risk of driving a car,
flying a plane, the dangers of a ceiling collapse, and so forth. However, these visible hazards seldom lead to a communication crisis and strong concern among stakeholders and the public. In the
research project, we found that visible hazards did not bring about
as much uncertainty and ambiguity as invisible hazards. With visible hazards, one can see and possibly also perceive with one’s other
senses what the danger is; one can see the results of the hazard
and what is being done about it. A participant from a focus group
interview involving one of the municipalities emphasized this:
“But with invisible hazards you have this added element of fear,
because after all, the documents we show and what we say in statements, they can’t see it or feel it for themselves.”

Differences in Risk Perception and Social Amplification and
Attenuation of Risk
The results from our research project suggest that invisible hazards
that are assessed as low risk by a municipality may become a crisis
if the hazards invoke concern or fear among the stakeholders. A
participant from a focus group interview with one of the municipalities said it this way:
“We need to recognize and understand that things that we perceive as
trivial can still create fear.”

In other cases, the municipalities expected strong concern and
fear among stakeholders but there were no reactions. Hence, the
results from our study can confirm the theories about risk amplification and attenuation. By this, we do not imply that it is possible
to define a benchmark “real” risk that is determined by experts and
around which public risk perceptions can subsequently become
amplified or attenuated (Urquhart et al., 2017). Rather, we can
simply demonstrate that the public’s risk perception was amplified
or attenuated in relation to experts’ or managers’ risk perception.
The results also confirm the risk perception theory that, in
many cases, people are more concerned about risks if they affect
others, especially children, rather than themselves. Risk perception
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research has identified several emotional characteristics (the affect
heuristic) that bear directly on fear, and one of them is that risks
to children evoke much more concern than the same risks to
adults (Ropeik, 2013). According to Ropeik (2002; 2004), one of
the important factors of risk perception is that when the risk is
perceived to affect future generations (i.e., when kids are at risk),
our fear is greater. For instance, asbestos in a workplace does not
frighten us as much as asbestos in schools (Ropeik, 2002).
The two cases in our study with the most serious conflicts
between the municipalities and stakeholders confirm the theory
that people feel the most fear when their children are at risk. As an
example of this, a participant from a focus group interview with
one of the municipalities stated:
“( . . . ) And unlike the asbestos case that affected adults, this affected
children. And then it gets much worse.”

However, the project results showed that this did not happen in every case. For example, one of the municipalities in the
study had experienced a case where they found asbestos sheets in
a school. The municipality wanted to close the school, but the parents objected. In this specific case, there were presumably other
factors that played a more important role in the situation, such as
keeping the local school open.
According to Fjaeran and Aven (2019), risks can develop,
grow, and/or change character over time. Risks may be attenuated
for years; they may then go through a brief or a long period of
focus and attention, where some people intensify signals that are
downplayed by others, before they are again forgotten, ignored or
attenuated, and so on. It is important for the authorities to try to
understand how the public feels about a risk, because this can play
an important role in the way the public receives information. This
point was highlighted by a participant from a focus group interview with one of the municipalities:
“But it’s important to try to assess the situation, in all cases, how serious is the matter the first time you hear about it? Is this something
that will blow over, or is this actually the beginning of a nightmare?”
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The results from the project’s case studies showed examples of
Sandman’s (2009) three different risk communication paradigms
(i.e., precaution advocacy, outrage management, and crisis communication). As previously mentioned, the chief task of communication is to address the outrage, not to state or debate assessments
of the hazard itself. Thus, it is important for the authorities to be
aware that there are different risk communication paradigms and
different ways of handling communication about risk problems. A
participant from a focus group interview with one of the municipalities put it this way:
“Yes, you have to face people’s fears and worries, not just try to lessen
it. You have to face it and also accept it—this has occurred, no one
denies that.”

According to Cairns et al. (2013), a message action plan that
is based on knowledge of the expectations of audiences, existing
relationships, and lines of communication is particularly valuable
for crisis communications teams. This may be complemented by
preemptive communication strategies, such as the dissemination
of updated information on educational websites and newsletters
before emergency situations occur to prepare key audiences for
possible eventualities. By presenting risk communication messages long before the emergence of a crisis event, the probability
of its occurrence might be reduced. Communicators also need to
be prepared to modify messages if circumstances change and have
an awareness of the active role participants play in communicative
processes. This is also in line with the World Health Organization
(WHO)’s Outbreak Communication Planning Guide:
Proactive communication of a real or potential health risk is crucial
in alerting those affected and minimizing an infectious disease threat.
Announcing early—even with incomplete information—prevents
rumors and misinformation. The longer officials withhold information,
the more frightening the information will seem when it is eventually
revealed, especially if it is revealed by an outside source. (WHO, 2008)
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Late announcements will erode people’s trust in the ability of
the authorities to manage the hazard. This was underlined by a
participant from a focus group interview with one of the municipalities:
“And if you haven’t made sure that you give enough information
beforehand, then there will be a lot of speculation. So, being proactive,
and being as open as you can, as clear as you can, as early as possible,
I think is very important.”

According to Hooker et al. (2017), public reactions during the
initial period of a risk event have costs and may be at odds with
what experts recommend. However, they are often transient. It is
more useful to plan to accommodate early overreactions to allow
them to subside as swiftly as possible. Communicating early and
often may risk generating extra media attention, and reveal problems that people have never imagined before, but at the same time
it enables the authorities to capture the issue.
Involving the Stakeholders
Participatory dialogue is especially useful when developing risk
and crisis communication strategies (Cairns et al., 2013; Glik,
2007). It is important to actively engage with stakeholders and
avoid one-way communication between experts and the public.
This can serve as an act of empowerment for stakeholders. The
process of receiving consequential and pertinent information
raises awareness of the risks pertaining to a specific issue. This, in
turn, gives stakeholders the opportunity to make informed choices
and acquire a sense of control over their own well-being (Cairns
et al., 2013).
Several of the municipalities that participated in the project
had experienced this. As one of the participants from a focus
group interview with one of the municipalities stated:
“( . . . ) (M)y impression is that if you can manage to get the stakeholders involved fast, and make them feel that they are taken seriously, that
they get information early, then you can save yourself a lot of trouble
( . . . ) they are very interested in getting involved.”
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Fischoff (1995) also found that involving the stakeholders
during a process of risk communication was a good idea. This can
show the safety measures taken and possibly dampen the social
amplification of minor risks, as well as to generate concern where
it is warranted.
Coordination and a Common Stance
The municipalities also emphasized that when communicating
about a risk it was important to coordinate and cooperate between
different departments and/or persons that had a responsibility
for handling the invisible hazard. Everyone involved should take
responsibility for the risk and/or crisis communication and not
wait and assume that another department would take care of the
problem. They should meet as soon as possible, inform each other,
and agree on a joint message and a common stance. A participant
from a focus group interview with one of the municipalities put it
this way:
“( . . . ) But, working across different disciplines, I think that was one of
the things that helped us find a good solution to this. So, this is a matter that can be a point of concern when public administration needs to
handle something, namely that people don’t talk to each other across
different departments and disciplines.”

According to Christensen and Lægreid (2020), an important
part of the Norwegian authorities’ communication strategy during
the COVID-19 crisis was that political, administrative, and professional executives appeared to take a common stance. Thus, an
important lesson from meaning-making in a crisis situation is
the importance of formulating a shared, sensible, persuasive, and
common message in the wake of a crisis; working together to make
a credible picture of what is going on; planning how to handle
it; and communicating this understanding to the general public
(Boin et al., 2019; Christensen & Lægreid, 2020).
Trust
As found in many studies of risk and crisis communication, the
results from the research project showed that it was important
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for the municipalities to be honest and try to establish trust. As
Hooker et al. (2017) state, the best foil for outrage is to build sustainable public trust. When facing trade-offs in probable outcomes
from communication it is always best to choose strategies to maintain or build trust, even at the cost of initial overreactions. One of
the participants from the focus group interview with parents at a
school said:
“Honesty. It would be better if they had said: ‘We do not have enough
knowledge about this, but we will do the best we can, and call you
back in a week.’ But no one would take the responsibility.”

As another example, in relation to genetically modified organisms, Marris (2001) found that focus group participants wanted a
more realistic assessment of risks by authorities. The participants
found expert statements that asserted that there were no risks to
be disconcerting and untrustworthy. The participants in the focus
groups accepted that it was necessary to counterbalance risks
with benefits but felt that they were not told how this judgment
had been made and were not invited to participate in the process.
Therefore, they suspected that economic interests had overridden
health and environmental considerations.
Results from the research project also showed that it was
important for the municipalities to quickly appoint a contact person that people could approach if they had fears or worries, or just
needed more information. The contact person should have good
communication skills and be knowledgeable, empathetic, and
humble. The contact person should also acknowledge any uncertainty. A participant from a focus group interview with one of the
municipalities said:
“( . . . ) If there is no contact person, then people may be left wondering: What do I do now? What should I do? Can I leave? Should I
investigate? How dangerous is this?”

According to Fjaeran and Aven (2019), adopting an uncertainty-based perspective on risk may inject some amplification into
risk assessment and management processes. However, in relation to risk problems characterized by complexity, uncertainty,
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and ambiguity, an uncertainty-based understanding of risk can
improve assessment and management processes and practice in
ways that can prevent attenuation from occurring and/or spreading. If attenuated risks are revealed, for instance following an
unanticipated risk event, accident or exposure to camouflaged
risk information or new knowledge, risk tends to become highly
amplified, resulting in significant and far-reaching effects. Some
risk amplification at an early stage of such processes, making the
invisible more visible, may reduce the degree of later amplification
and the associated consequences.
According to Andrade et al. (2020), disasters present unique
challenges given their inherent uncertainty, and facts can be elusive in rapidly evolving disaster contexts. “Information vacuums”
can create opportunities for the public to speculate, make inferences to explain gaps, question motives, generate rumors, or propagate unverified or false information in an attempt to reconcile
perceived incongruences (Andrade et al., 2020; Hagar, 2013). The
media often plays a major role in disseminating the authorities’
meaning-making and communication with citizens, and managing media relations is an important part of authorities’ communication strategies (Christensen & Lægreid, 2020).
It is also important to show the stakeholders and public that
measures aimed at reducing the risk are implemented as fast as
possible. According to Hooker et al. (2017), public concerns are
most effectively allayed by actions rather than words. People want
to know what is being done to actively mitigate the risk, not just be
reassured. A participant from a focus group interview with one of
the municipalities explained it this way:
“( . . . ) I think we were too uncertain in our communication, we waited
too long to take action; are they implementing measures, or are they
trivializing it, underestimating the danger?”

As an example, the Norwegian government hesitated and took
a wait-and-see approach during the early stages of the coronavirus
outbreak in 2020 (Christensen & Lægreid, 2020). Consequently,
the authorities were criticized in the media for reacting too late and
for being too defensive. This led to widespread confusion among
the public, and people were unsure of how serious the risk really
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was. However, on March 12, 2020, the Norwegian government
implemented draconian measures to combat the virus (Christensen & Lægreid, 2020), including closing down kindergartens
and schools and closing the borders. According to articles in the
Norwegian media, the main response from the public immediately
after this decision was that it was good to finally receive some clear
and unambiguous guidelines from the authorities.

Conclusion
It is important for those responsible for risk and crisis communication to be aware of the complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity
that characterize invisible hazards, which can vary from case to
case, depending on the context. People’s reactions to invisible hazards are often influenced by guesswork and different interpretations. Risk and crisis communicators need to be aware of possible
differences in risk perception when they plan how to communicate about risks. Social amplification and attenuation of risk are
some of the factors that can explain why there are such differences
in risk perception related to invisible hazards, both between risk
experts/managers and the public, and between different groups of
citizens. Communicators should be aware that different risk problems thus require different responses.
Creating trust and being honest are very important for all
risk and crisis communication and even more important when it
comes to invisible hazards. This is because the less we know about
a hazard, the more we need to rely on others to make decisions
and the more our judgments about risk become a matter of trust
(Savadori et al., 2004). According to Hooker et al. (2017), the governing aphorism for successful risk communication is that people
need to hear that you care before they really care about what they
hear, and demonstrating that you care far beyond a performance
of concern. However, if this is inauthentic it can generate mistrust.
Successful risk and crisis communication require the building and
sustaining of public trust.
Furthermore, it is important to coordinate and cooperate
between different departments and/or persons that have a responsibility for handling the invisible hazard and agree on a joint
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message and common stance. Stakeholders, and in some cases
the public, should be involved and dialogue should be facilitated.
Involving the stakeholders can run the risk of revealing problems
that people have never imagined before, and those responsible for
risk and crisis communication want to avoid creating unnecessary
concern or fear. However, it can also show which safety measures
are taken, perhaps dampen the social amplification of some risks,
and generate concern where it is warranted (Fischoff, 1995).
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